The Special Case: Ahmadiyya Muslims

Global Politician, 5/12/2007

By Wolfgang Bruno

There are movements within Islam, or groups of people who at least identify themselves as Muslims, that are indeed somewhat more tolerant and less violent that mainstream Muslims. One such movement is the Ahmadiyya community.

The Ahmadiyya movement was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889. He taught that jihad “by the sword” had been replaced by jihad “of the pen,” and wanted to synthesize all religions under the banner of Islam. He claimed to be the "Reformer of the age" but did not bring any new revelation. After a schism in 1914, his followers split into two groups: The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, with its center in Lahore in what is today Pakistan. The main body, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (sometimes called the Qadiani after the village where the founder was born) claimed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet, although he didn't bring any new laws. The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, on the other hand, presented themselves as an Islamic reform movement and maintained the normal Muslim view that Muhammad was "the seal of the prophets" and that there would be no new prophet after him. Both branches, however, agree that Ghulam Ahmad was the Mahdi and the Messiah. They also believe that the Koran contains no abrogations.

Ahmadis still follow traditional Muslim rituals such as prayer and fasting, but among mainstream Muslims there is deep suspicion towards them, chiefly because the main body of Ahmadiyyas have affirmed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet, a claim that is considered heretical by most Muslims. The largest concentration of Ahmadiyyas is found in the Indian subcontinent, in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both groups are viewed as heretical by Saudi authorities, and are thus not allowed to go on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

At alislam.org, their official website, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community says about themselves:

“The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam is a religious organization, international in its scope, with branches in over 178 countries in Africa, North America, South America, Asia, Australasia, and Europe. At present, its total membership exceeds 200 million worldwide [note: it is impossible to verify this number, which is almost certainly inflated], and the numbers are increasing day by day. This is the most dynamic denomination of Islam in modern history. The Ahmadiyya Movement was established in 1889 by Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) in a small and remote village, Qadian, in the Punjab, India. He claimed to be the expected reformer of the latter days, the Awaited One of the world community of religions (The Mahdi and Messiah). It [the movement] advocates peace, tolerance, love and understanding among followers of different faiths. It firmly believes in and acts upon the Qur'anic teaching: "There is no compulsion in religion." (2:257) It strongly rejects violence and terrorism [emphasis in the original] in any form and for any reason. After the demise of its founder, the Ahmadiyya Movement has been headed by his elected successors - Khalifas.”

Precisely because they champion an unorthodox and somewhat more peaceful version of Islam, Ahmadis are frequently persecuted by traditional Muslims in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Under Pakistan's strict blasphemy laws the Ahmadiyya are not allowed to preach, nor even to call themselves Muslims.

Under the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) -led government, discrimination and violence against the Ahmadis has intensified. "It's a dangerous moment in Bangladesh when the government becomes complicit in religious violence," said Brad Adams, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division. "The authorities have emboldened extremists by failing to prosecute those engaged in anti-Ahmadi violence and by banning Ahmadiyya publications."

In October 2004 Muslim fanatics razed an Ahmadiyya mosque. The mob vandalized and robbed Ahmadiyya houses, injuring at least 11. One of the injured, Shabju Mia, 52, imam of the mosque, ended up in hospital. Witnesses said local BNP leader led the raiders.

In July 2006, the Bangladeshi newspaper the Daily Star carried a story on Ahmadis who had been victimized, but the article was later removed, probably following pressures from powerful anti-Ahmadiyya forces. The police had accused four Ahmadis of preaching publicly in a village in the Punjab. The villagers protested against "unabated preaching" of the Ahmadiyya faith in their village, and urged the police to ensure the arrest of those accused. The minority sect condemned law enforcers for being reluctant to act in two assault incidents on Ahmadis that same summer. The movement believed this encouraged the bigots to be more aggressive. The Ahmadiyyas had become confined to their houses and refrained from going to work after fanatics threatened to attack them.

The irony is that although Ahmadis are hardly even considered Muslims by other Muslims, the first and so far only Muslim to be awarded a Nobel Prize for science was an Ahmadi. According to Hugh Fitzgerald:

“Among the nearly 1000 recipients of Nobel Prizes in science (Physics, Chemistry, Medicine), only one appears to have gone to a ‘Muslim’ - Abdus Salam. Trained partly at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, and dying in Oxford (to which he had retired), Abdus Salam shared the prize with Sheldon Glashow and Steven Weinberg. One presumes that Abdus Salam deserved his 1/3 of the 1979 prize. But his entire career depended upon access to Western education. And while he wrote on the ‘Wisdom of Islam’ (just the kind of thing to win a Templeton Prize) he was both claimed, in Pakistan, as a ‘Muslim’ and yet belonged, as ah Ahmadiyya, to a sect regarded by many Muslims in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and elsewhere as not a real Muslim at all. It was a case of claiming not him, but rather his Nobel, for Islam, and then not discussing if just possibly, the reason he was the only Muslim Nobel-winner in science might have something to do with, precisely, the relatively greater mental freedom that Adhamiddya Islam may offer its adherents, compared to that available to those in orthodox Islam.”

The Ahmadis do in some ways represent an interesting case of a “reformed” Islam, but it is in my view unlikely whether their version of Islam could ever form a viable alternative to the majority of the world’s Muslims. They are simply too far removed from Islamic orthodoxy, especially the largest branch which considers their founder a prophet.

Wolfgang Bruno is a European author. He is writing a book about the Internet movement of ex-Muslims.

http://globalpolitician.com/22785-islam (Accessed 7/25/2011)

Blasphemy laws in Muslim-Majority Countries

Authors:
Uddin, Asma T.¹

Source:

Review of Faith & International Affairs; Jun2011, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p47-55, 9p

Document Type:

Article

Abstract:

In Pakistan, courts use blasphemy laws to bully religious minorities, as well as Muslims, and to justify broad censorship on speech. In Indonesia, officials impose criminal penalties on the Ahmadiyya and other groups whose teachings are deemed deviant from the state-sanctioned religions. In Egypt, officials use blasphemy laws to prevent conversions, inhibit proselytism, and silence critics. Such laws appease rather than control violent extremists and create a culture of impunity, where increasingly egregious crimes are committed with little or no consequences for the perpetrators. The United Nations Defamation of Religions Resolution similarly empowers states to limit religious expression and works counter to the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author Affiliations:

¹Attorney, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

Ambiguities of apostasy and the repression of Muslim dissent

Authors:

Saeed, Abdullah¹

Source:

Review of Faith & International Affairs; Jun2011, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p31-38, 8p

Abstract:

Early Islam acknowledged religious diversity and offered protections for people of other religions. As Islam's political and cultural influence grew, the concepts of apostasy, blasphemy, heresy, hypocrisy, and unbelief emerged to suppress dissent. Today, there are no universally agreed upon definitions of these terms, and laws against apostasy and blasphemy are used to suppress religious dissent, thwart political opposition, harass intellectuals, and incite acts of violence. Scholars who propose reforms may be imprisoned, exiled, or killed. Muslims in Muslim-majority states need to rethink laws that criminalize dissent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author Affiliations:

¹Sultan of Oman Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, Australia

Ahmadiyah’s Controversy in Indonesia — Vying for an Authority

Islamlib.com, 23/07/2008

By: Ulil Abshar-Abdalla

The whole furor and controversy over Ahmadiyah sect is just a parcel of a larger dynamic in the Indonesian politics. Over the last ten years after the unleashing of democratic movement in Indonesia, one development stands out to be worthy of our analysis, namely the radicalizing trend among Muslim society. This trends manifested in various form, including the vigorous campaign launched by Islamists to adopt and implement sharia or Islamic law. The entire campaign to dissolve Ahmadiyah, to me, cannot be analyzed separately from this larger trend.

Looking at Indonesia solely through its constitution, you cannot help but to think that it is a modern state whose facade is not so different from the United States or Western European countries. All basic requirements you need to create democracy are meticulously met by Indonesia, ranging from free and fair election, protection of basic civil rights, freedom of the press, freedom of association, to a robust civil society–every thing, you name it. Indonesian press is now entitled a relatively full freedom to publish whatever it thinks fit to put on its page, including, of course, criticizing the way government officers conduct public affairs–something that is hardly to happen in the previous regime.

Indonesian constitution lends also a full protection of religious freedom. Theoretically speaking, people are free to exercise their freedom to embrace any religion, faith, mazhab, and denomination of their choice. You are free to be Muslim, Christian, Hindus, Budhist, Confucian, and so forth. As a Muslim, you are also free to be Sunni or Shi’i, as well as free to affiliate with any Islamic organization you think fit to express your way of being Muslim.

But constitution is not the best lens to have a glimpse into the nature of any state and society, since it is only what Indonesia’s adage says “hitam di atas putih”, a mere ink on a paper. What is more important is to look at how that ink materializes into reality, and to what extent state policies live up to the lofty ideals espoused in the constitution. If this is the stick by which you judge Indonesia, I am afraid that it fails, particularly with respect to religious freedom.

The recent phenomenon is the whole furor over what is considered as a “deviant sect” in Islam called Ahmadiyah. The problem of Ahmadiyah has been around since early on even before Indonesian independence. This sect that was groomed in Pakistan came to Indonesia in 1925, and it spurred a controversy right away as it did anywhere it spread. This sect made a claim that raised the eyebrow of Muslim, namely that its founder is a new “prophet” that came after the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims who adhere to mainline Islam believe in the finality of prophecy in Islam. Ahmadiya’s doctrine on prophecy runs at odd with this doctrine. To say that new prophet possibly emerges is as odd to Muslim ear as to say that Jesus is not resurrected on the third day after his crucifixion to Christians.

From its early stage of its introduction to Indonesia, many Muslim scholars objected to the doctrine of Ahmadiyah, although Ahmadiyah should be credited with its good work to introduce Islam to the rank of Muslim intelligentsia in 30s in a way that resonates with Modern mind-set. Bung Karno, the first Indonesian president, befriended many intellectuals and activists who are either member or sympathetic to Ahamdiyah’s version of Islam. The first “official” translation of the Quran into Indonesian language conducted under the auspice of Ministry of Religious Affairs in 60s was pretty much influenced by Ahmadiyah’s writers. In nutshell, Ahmadiyah has successfully made an inroad into the Indonesian Islamic discourse through its committed missionaries and propagandists.

Throughout President Suharto’s rule (1968-1998), Ahmadiyah still enjoyed a full freedom to conduct its proselytizing activities which seems to be robust and aggressive as it is the case anywhere. In early 80s, the first “fatwa” or religious edict was being issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) in which this sect was for the first time officially deemed “deviant”. However, the edict didn’t go far as to demand the government to intervene to dissolve the movement.

The crucial shift occurred after reformasi (political reform) that followed the downfall of Suharto and his regime in May 1998. A series of attacks on Ahmadiyah’s mosques and its member escalated right after the issuance of a second fatwa by MUI on July 29th, 2005 in which Ahmadiyah is again labeled as deviant sect. However, the fatwa took different course this time. It was followed by a massive campaign conducted by radical and fundamentalist Islamic groups to press for the dissolution of Ahmadiyah as an organization and movement. There are certain groups that are worthy to be singled out as “engineers” of this campaign, namely Hizbut Tahrir, FUI (The Forum of Islamic Umma or Community) and and FPI (Front of Islam’s Defender).

The campaign succeeded to achieve its goal, marked by the issuance of the Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama, known as SKB) in June 9th, 2008. The decree falls short of fulfilling the demand of radical Islamists to dissolve forever the Ahmadiyah movement. It mandates instead to freeze the proselytizing activities of Ahmadiyah, particularly its doctrine of prophecy. As noted by many observers, the decree is quite ambiguous. The question that is left un-addressed is whether the Ahmadi people are still free to conduct their religious activities in their mosques and madrasahs.

No matter how you interpret the decree, the fact remains the same: the government seems to fall into the trap set up by the Islamist groups that seem to be exerting its role recently in the Indonesian political landscape. By all means, the decree is evidently at odd with the constitution that insures the freedom of religion and faith.

How do we interpret this recent development as it unfolds in the case of Ahmadiyah?

Ahmadiyah is not a major and mind-boggling issue for Muslim rank-and-file. Of course, Muslim believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet. However, many of them won’t roll in anger if somebody in the corner of Islamic world show up and claim to be a new prophet. They will certainly object to that claim, but will never ever run into an amok simply because of that minor issue. If the course of event proceeds in the opposite direction, something must have gone wrong in one way or another!

The whole furor and controversy over Ahmadiyah sect is just a parcel of a larger dynamic in the Indonesian politics. Over the last ten years after the unleashing of democratic movement in Indonesia, one development stands out to be worthy of our analysis, namely the radicalizing trend among Muslim society. This trends manifested in various form, including the vigorous campaign launched by Islamists to adopt and implement sharia or Islamic law. The entire campaign to dissolve Ahmadiyah, to me, cannot be analyzed separately from this larger trend.

The main actors in this campaign are obviously Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, FUI and FPI. Hizbut Tahrir is worth mentioning here. I venture to claim that Hizbut Tahrir is the only group that has the highest stake in this campaign for a simple reason, namely to gain a credibility and credential in the eye of Indonesian Muslim who are mainly Sunni as an “Islamic voice”. Hizbut Tahrir has been confronted with resistance and political repression throughout Muslim countries, particularly in the authoritarian monarchies in Middle East. Indonesia is the only country where it finds a fertile soil to thrive. The first international conference of caliphate (Islamic global state) was conducted in Jakarta on August 2006. After its kicking out from UK on the allegation of its involvement in London bombing in 2007, Hizbut Tahrir sought an alternative base to launch its global movement to establish the Islamic caliphate. Where else does it fit better than Indonesia?

Ahmadiyah issue is also being politically exploited by other Islamist groups to earn reputation as an “authority” that deserves the respect of Muslim society. There are two major Islamic organizations that represent Islamic moderation in Indonesia, i.e. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. However, the image of “moderation” is looked upon with deep suspicion by other Islamic groups, especially the Islamist and radical ones. Moderation, in their eye, amounts to being playing into the game of Washington. It is incumbent upon these groups to wrestle the authority to speak about Islam from these two moderate organizations.

In other words, the entire debate on deviant sect in Islam is not something that has a merit on its own, but rather a proxy for differing Islamic groups which vie for an authoritative position as the sole “voice” of Islam. What is regrettable is that Indonesian government slipped or deliberately let itself trapped in this dangerous game. As stated in the constitution, the Indonesian government is tasked with only one thing, i.e. to respect and guarantee the right of all its citizens to exercise their freedom to embrace any religion and faith of their choice. The state has no stake whatsoever in delineating what is “straight” and what is “crooked” with respect to religious doctrinal debate within any community![]

http://islamlib.com/en/article/ahmadiyahs-controversy-in-indonesia-vying-for-an-authority/ (Accessed 7/23/2011)

Ahmadiyah and Indonesian Democracy

The Jakarta Globe

Wim Tangkilisan | March 11, 2009

Democracy is not just about elections. Even more essential is the way minorities are treated by the majority.

The Koran is very clear that “in matters of faith there shall be no coercion.”

And it stresses that “if it had been the will of your Lord that all the people of the world should be believers, then all the people of the earth would have believed! Would you now compel humankind against their will to believe?”

Now comes a Muslim leader, Cholid Ridwan, a chairman of the Indonesian Council of Ulema, or MUI, who warns the President of Indonesia that if he does not outlaw Ahmadiyah, an Indonesian-based Islamic sect, the council will issue a fatwa, or religious edict, prohibiting Indonesian Muslims from voting for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the upcoming presidential elections.

Ahmadiyah is a sect of Indian origin, with some links to Sufism. It is controversial because of its claim that its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was the last of the prophets, contrary to the basic tenet of Islam that the final of the prophets is Muhammad.

The sect is not new to controversy. In the 1930s, it was rumored that independence hero and former President Sukarno had become a propagator of Ahmadiyah. He denied it in writing, but in the process he wrote a few words of praise for the good behavior of its adherents. He was emphatic, however, that he was not one of them.

Today there are Muslim circles in Indonesia that clamor for an outright ban against the sect. That is old news. What is new is the election-related threat of a fatwa against the president if he does not outlaw the sect.

Another Muslim leader, Umar Shihab, also a chairman of the MUI, says that Cholid speaks only for himself. Furthermore, he says no such fatwa is being prepared. No threat of one. But, in effect he says that it would be nice indeed if the president did outlaw the sect.

The presidential spokesman, Andi Mallarangeng, says that this is just one more sign that everyone has caught election fever. “We don’t need to worry about it at all,” he said.

What indeed is there to worry about then? We perhaps have more urgent things to concern ourselves with, like corruption in the House of Representatives and getting the economic stimulus package up and running.

But wait a minute. There are basic questions involved in this issue that need attention.

There is, of course, the question of what Islam really teaches about tolerance, about the command against coercion on matters of faith. Where does it say in the Koran or in the Hadith that an exception has to be made in the case of the Ahmadiyah? The Muslim faithful may wish to obtain some clarity on that.

Since I am not a Muslim, I should let this be a matter among Muslims. But as an Indonesian, I am most concerned about the political implications of the issue. And when I say political, I don’t mean electoral politics. President Yudhoyono, I think, will win or lose the election on the basis of his performance as leader of the nation, fatwa or no fatwa.

What I mean is Indonesian democracy. I mean Indonesia’s aspiration and claim to be the world’s third largest democracy. I mean the pride that the Indonesian people derive from our international reputation as living proof that Islam, democracy and modernization can flourish together.

I mean human rights. Freedom of thought. Freedom of speech. Freedom of association.

Democracy is not just about elections. Even more essential to democracy is the way minorities are treated by the majority — whether their rights are held sacred or trampled upon.

We take pride in our tradition of m usyawarah untuk m ufakat , or consultations leading to consensus, a process in which all views are spoken for and all interests are taken into account. But all I have been hearing about Ahmadiyah are the threats against them.

Wim Tangkilisan is the president and editor in chief of the Jakarta Globe.

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/ahmadiyah-and-indonesian-democracy/309657 (Acessed 7/22/2011)

Ahmadiyah and crisis of Indonesian Islam

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post | Fri, 07/11/2008 5:12 PM | Opinion

Thomas Barker

It has been said of Indonesia's Muslims that they constitute a majority with a minority mentality -- a contradictory situation in which Muslims, while comprising 90 percent of Indonesia's population, have felt unjustly restricted from politics, especially from the strongly Pancasila-based governments of Sukarno and Soeharto.

This observation may not hold true today, but what we see is worse: Islam in Indonesia is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy.

It has been seven years since September 11th, after which Islam became synonymous with violence and terrorism. Although this orientalist fallacy still persists in some quarters, our perceptions of Islam have broadened. That it is as diverse as any other system of human belief should not be surprising, as its history is as rich, varied and tumultuous as any other.

However, in Indonesia -- often referred to as the world's largest Muslim nation -- the specter of violence in the name of religion has returned. Persistent attacks against and vilification of Ahmadiyah by fundamentalist Islamic groups acting in the name of a unitary Islam. Continued harassment of Christians and the destruction of their churches in Bekasi.

And one month ago, only a stone's throw away from the presidential palace, a violent attack on a rally for religious freedom and tolerance. This newspaper, like many others, has been filled with articles expressing outrage at these vigilante groups.

In broader geopolitical terms, Islam is having trouble proving to the world that it is not a religion of violence. This is the case even in Indonesia -- often seen as the poster boy for Islam and democracy working together.

While the rhetoric surrounding Islam and violence is wrong, Islam itself has failed to prove otherwise. It will continue to be plagued by the specter of violence unless it can take on a more constructive role in civil society.

This argument may seem to lump together mainstream and fundamentalist Islamic groups. But recent events have tended to blur the distinction between the two. While mainstream groups have made obligatory statements against violence, this is only the tip of the iceberg: The controversy surrounding violence points to disarray and a deeper crisis of legitimacy in Indonesian Islam.

Ahmadiyah's mistake was perhaps rather simple. By professing to be Islamic while at the same time acknowledging a prophet after Muhammad, they engaged in heresy. The sect could have avoided this situation if it had withdrawn from Islam. While Christianity, another Abrahamic religion, tolerates splinter beliefs, branches and other prophets, Islam requires the acknowledgment of Muhammad as God's true and only prophet.

However, the issue is not merely one of Ahmadis exiting Islam because certain vigilante groups have made it their mission to obliterate the sect from the archipelago, but rather: Why draw attention to them now? Ahmadis have been in Indonesia for more than 70 years, quietly building a religious community.

According to a recently quoted statistic, Ahmadiyah in Indonesia comprises 242 branches. It is understandable that smaller fundamentalist groups started to notice these branches and, feeling threatened, took action.

However, the problem does not lie with Ahmadiyah itself. Many have pointed their fingers at the government's inability to handle incidents surrounding the sect.

For example, Fahri Hamzah of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) strongly criticized the government's immature response and said the government should seek a solution in the form of an inter-Muslim dialogue. Likewise, the police have been severely criticized for failing to protect Ahmadis and their property and for being benign toward vigilante groups.

The debate has also turned to the two mainstream Islamic organizations -- Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) -- and their inability to provide a moderate response to both the question of Ahmadiyah and to the actions of fundamentalist Islamic groups. In fact, NU has started training its own militant group, Ansor, without realizing this is a recipe for disaster.

These events and responses to it all point to a religion deep in crisis. Islam in Indonesia has never been homogeneous but instead characterized by a diverse range of interpretations -- from orthodox to the particular Javanese syncretic forms.

What we see, however, is a religion that has turned (in) on itself, albeit led by its more extreme wing. Unable to effect change in society more broadly, certain groups within Islam have started to attack members of their own religious community. The move to "purify" is emblematic of a religion in crisis.

The failure of Islam, more generally, has been its failure to deal with this problem. Although it has now become the state's problem, alarm bells should have gone off long ago within the Muslim community. A political Islam, ready to take on a more active and constructive role in civil society, has not emerged from the instrumentalist policies of the New Order. Instead, the New Order accustomed Muslims to complacency and powerlessness while Islam as a moral system has failed to dominate political discourse, leaving the task to the often arbitrary and incoherent decisions of individual Muslims.

After decades of being politically repressed, mainstream Islamic groups have failed to take up the mantle of responsibility. Even today, the political arm of Muhammadiyah -- the National Mandate Party (PAN) -- is still engaged in reactionary and populist politics, just like the majority of political parties.

No coherent political platform exists to marry Muhammadiyah's ideology with its vast experience in the democratic process. Likewise the Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI), whose only activity seems to be releasing fatwa, provides little in the way of religious leadership or example.

Despite arguments from within Islam against the "Islam equals violence" fallacy, it is hard to see where the community of Muslims has made concrete efforts to substantiate its claim. There are certainly individual cases of charity and assistance -- the spate of responses to recent natural disasters being the most obvious example.

However, with current concern over food scarcity and the recent hike in fuel prices, Islamic groups have been conspicuously absent from programs of social aid and poverty alleviation. Likewise in the political arena, they have been missing from constructive discussions of possible policy solutions to these current problems.

Instead, we have seen reactionary politics from moderate Islam and violent intimidation from fundamentalist Islamic groups acting in the name of the people. Sharia law, introduced in some areas to address social problems -- so it was argued -- has become nothing more than a set of laws governing public morality, laws that unfairly target women and society's vulnerable.

Unfortunately these events reflect negatively on the entire Muslim community. The opportunities afforded by the reform era to improve governance and social conditions in Indonesia are being squandered by Islamic groups and their dearth of leadership.

The writer is a Ph.D. candidate in the sociology department at the National University of Singapore. He can be reached at thomas.barker@nus.edu.sg

— JP

Copyright © 2011 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

A 'Way Out' for Ahmadiyah

Fake Prophet: Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Ahmadiyah (died 1908). Muhammad Iqbal saw Ahmadiyah as part of the colonial "split and rule" programme to keep the Muslims fighting among themselves. Picture: Wikimedia

Dr. Syamsuddin Arif
SHAH ALAM

The Brunei Times (http://www.bt.com.bn), Friday, May 16, 2008 - Page

' ' I do not believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, nor do I accept him as a mujaddid [religious reformer]," wrote the late Ir. Soekarno in his major book, Under the Banner of Revolution (2nd imp. Jakarta, 1963, vol.1, p.345).

For the past three months, Indonesia has been deeply involved in an endless debate on Ahmadiyah. Ir. Soekarno, the first Indonesian President, was neither the first nor the sole Muslim figure to express such unfavorable view.

Long before him, the celebrated thinker Sir Muhammad Iqbal when asked by Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India, concerning Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's propaganda, emphatically replied that "no Revelation the denial of which entails heresy is possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor to Islam" (Islam of And Ahmadism, repr. Islamabad, 1990, p.8).

Iqbal saw striking similarities between the Ahmadiyah movement in India and the Babism in Persia (Iran), whose founder also claimed to be a prophet. Because their creed was political servility, both movements were supported by the British and the Russian as part of the colonial 'split and rule' program to keep the Muslims fighting among themselves.

If the Russian government allowed Babism to establish their own mosque in Ishqabad, Turkmenistan, the British let the Ahmadiyah found their mission centre in Woking, Surrey.

According to Iqbal, Ahmadism or Qadianism --so he preferred to call it-- would only bring people back to stupidity. Its chief mission is but "to carve out, from the Ummat of the Arabian Prophet, a new ummat for the of Indian prophet." (page 2)

A prominent Indian scholar, Syed Abul Hasan Ali an-Nadwi, having made an extensive study of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's life and "evolution" from a simple student turning into a hero (1880), a "promised messiah" (1891) and a self-proclaimed prophet (1910), concluded that the Ahmadiyah movement has contributed nothing but adding burden to the Muslim people, dividing them, and rendering their problems even more complicated (See: Qadianism: A Critical Study, repr. Lucknow 1980, p. 155).

That the essence of Ahmadiyah lies in accepting Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood is attested by Yohanan Friedman of Hebrew University of Jerusalem in his book, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background, (Berkeley, 1989, p.119, 181 & 191).

Ahmadiyah was first brought into Indonesia sometime in 1925 by several students from Sumatra who had been converted and trained in Qadian, India. To help spread their dogma, the mission has published bulletins such as "Sinar Islam" (The Light of Islam - sic!), "Studi Islam" and "Fathi Islam". The resentment generated by the Ahmadi missionary activities used to drag them several times into an open debate 1933 in Bandung and other cities (See: Fawzy S. Thaha, Ahmadiyah Dalam Persoalan, Singapura, 1982).

Followers of Ahmadiyah had been declared aberrant and infidel (murtad - apostate) by Muslim scholars at the Fifth Congress of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1930 in Pekalongan as well as by the Ulama Association of East Sumatra in 1935.

After a long period of silence, the Ahmadiyah question resurfaced in late 1970s and early 1980s following the Pakistani parliament's resolution to treat the Ahmadis as non-Muslim under the law.

In 1980 the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Hamka issued a fatwa stating that Ahmadiyah is outside the fold of Islam, and its adherents apostate.

The decree was recently reaffirmed in an official statement signed by MUI chairman Prof. Dr. H. Umar Shihab and its secretary Prof. Dr. H.M. Din Syamsuddin. In addition, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1984 had also warned the Muslims against the danger of Ahmadiyah.

Finally, in April 16, 2008 the Supervision Committee on Cults and Sects (Bakorpakem), made known its findings that the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) has truly deviated from Islam and so urged the Minister of Religious affairs, Attorney General, and Minister of Home Affairs to take action against it.

Indeed, according to Atho Mudzhar, senior officer at the Religious Ministry and chief of the investigation team, during three months Bakorpakem had been observing 55 Ahmadiyah communites 33 districts. As many as 35 members of the team met 277 members of Ahmadiyah. Nothing has changed among them doctrinally, since they still affirm that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (MGA) is a prophet after Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.

They also believe that Tadzkirah is a collection of revelation received by MGA.

Advocates and followers of Ahmadiyah often put forth three arguments to support their position. First, an Ahmadi is also a Muslim because they have the same syahadat (faith declaration).

Try to compare this with the statement that the "orang Ahmadiyah" (Ahmadi man) is no different from "orangutan" because both are "orang" (human). Of course such thing is unacceptable.

It is clear in this case what matters is not their similarity, but rather their difference. What distinguishes orangutan from an Ahmadi is not so much its being-'orang' as its 'utan' characteristic. By the same token, what makes Ahmadiyah followers differ from the Muslims is not their apparent similarity in creed and rituals, but rather their belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

Second, it has been argued that like all other Indonesia citizens, the Ahmadiyah followers have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion so that to ban Ahmadiyah is to violate human rights and to act against the Constitution.

There is a logical twist here. To be sure, Article 29 of the very same Universal Declaration of Human Rights unequivocally states that in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

This means that abuse of freedom is not allowed which would disrupt order or bring damage to religion. Now what MGA and his Ahmadiyah did is like "building a new house inside someone's house" --that is to say, founding a religion within religion.

Their affirmation of MGA's prophethood is an insult to Islam. Consequently, as Dr Tony P. Chi points out in his study (1973, p.134-5): "Ahmadiyya preaching and propagation have instigated unrest and dissension in the Muslim world." Therefore, the only solution to Ahmadiyah problem is to expell it from the House of Islam and become a new religion like Mormonism in the United States.

Finally, to the suggestion that compassion should be preferred to violence in dealing with the Ahmadiyah, we reply that this advice is badly needed by the American and Israeli governments vis-a-vis the people of Iraq and Palestine.

"Abu Bakr As-Siddiq is the most compassionate among my folk (arhamu ummati)," said Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Yet when there arose a group of apostates, he did not hesitate to take action against them.

Islam guarantees one's freedom to embrace -- not to spoil, any religion. As for the Quranic verses: "There is no compulsion in religion" (translation of the Quran surah Al-Baqarah: 256) and "For you, your religion, and for me, my religion" (surah Al-Kafirun:6), these are referring to religions outside Islam. Thus, Prophet Muhammad told the impostors to choose either to repent or be punished to death (See: Imam Al-Mawardi, al-Hawi al-Kabir, vol.13, p.109).

* The writer is an assistant professor at the International Islamic University Malaysia

The Brunei Times

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Source URL: http://www.bt.com.bn/friday_special/2008/05/16/a_way_out_for_ahmadiyah (Accessed 7/22/2011)

Faith and violence

Inside Indonesia, Monday, 01 January 2007, Edition 89

The Islamic sect Ahmadiyah has been under official pressure and violent attack.

Munawar Ahmad

In July 2005, several thousand followers of the Ahmadiyah movement were holding a jalsah, or annual gathering, at their headquarters, the Mubaraq campus in Bogor, just outside Jakarta, when a mob invaded the campus grounds. This attack received considerable media publicity in both Indonesia and around the world. But it was just the latest and most dramatic episode in what increasingly looks like an organised and systematic campaign of violence against Ahmadiyah.

Ahmadiyah, an Islamic religious movement founded by a nineteenth century visionary, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, from present-day Pakistan, first appeared in Indonesia in 1925. It has approximately 500,000 followers in the country, part of a world-wide movement led from Britain. Its views on some key matters are very different from mainstream Muslims. For example, followers of Ahmadiyah believe that Ahmad was the promised messiah. As a result, its followers often come under great pressure in Indonesia and elsewhere.

The July 2005 attack began when a group of activists from the well-known Islamist group the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), hung a banner outside the meeting ground proclaiming ‘Ahmadiyah is un-Islamic, its Prophet is Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, its holy book is the Tazkirah.’ An FPI leader, Abdurrahman Assegaf, as well as others, made speeches denouncing Ahmadiyah as a ‘deviant sect’ and demanding that the meeting be cancelled.

Failing to have their way peacefully, on the second day, about 100 FPI members attacked the meeting. They began by throwing rocks at whoever they could see in the campus grounds. None of the Ahmadiyah members responded in kind, but 15 of them received head wounds. Although there was a police post located at the campus gates, the authorities did not prevent the growing crowd pushing down the gate, destroying and looting whatever they could find, breaking windows and burning copies of the Qur’an.

Most of the attackers came from the area of Parung, about one kilometre away from the campus. Other local people could do little more than look on. One of them, Trisno, told an Ahmadiyah production crew (who later produced a VCD detailing the attack) that it was the anarchy of the mob that seemed un-Islamic to him, and that the Ahmadiyah followers had behaved well and not disrupted the locals.

History of discrimination

This attack was just one of many attempts to forcefully dissolve Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Between 1993 and 2005, 35 separate violent attacks on Ahmadiyah members were recorded around Indonesia. And since the attack in Bogor, there have been more.

Ahmadiyah’s problems in Indonesia flow from more than just mob rule. Since 1980 the movement has faced structural discrimination. In that year, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the government-endorsed Council of Islamic Scholars) released a fatwa (legal ruling) that Ahmadiyah was ‘outside Islam’, that it was ‘deviant’ and could lead others into error. Then Minister for Religion, H Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara, signed off on the decree. Eventually, in 1984, the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta issued an instruction to its offices in the regions to carefully monitor the movement and do what they could to prohibit its activities.

At the July 2005 attack, one of the main speakers denouncing Ahmadiyah was Amin Jamaluddin, a leader of the Islamic Institute for Research and Study (LPPI). LPPI is itself part of MUI. Its job is to study the religious credentials of movements within Islam, and its views are typically endorsed by the Ministry of Religion.

A few days after the attack on the Bogor campus, MUI again reconfirmed its view, issuing another fatwa declaring that Ahmadiyah are kafir (infidels). Since then, the Minister of Religion, Maftuh Basyuni, has repeatedly spoken out against Ahmadiyah. For instance, in February 2006 he warned them that its adherents would have to choose between returning to core Islamic beliefs or proclaiming themselves a new religion.

What is Ahmadiyah?

In sociological terms, the followers of Ahmadiyah are not strikingly different from other Muslims. They perform the five pillars of Islam: they pray five times a day, fast in the month of Ramadhan, read the Qur’an, recite the confession of faith and partake in the haj pilgrimage if they are able. Theologically speaking, however, Ahmadiyah is unique because it believes that prophets can appear after the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him [pbu]). They believe that Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the movement’s founder, was himself such a person.

This view about prophets and prophecy is the central source of conflict between followers of Ahmadiyah and most other Muslims in Indonesia. The Ahmadiyah understanding is quite unique. As Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself wrote in the Tazkirah (Our Teaching), to confirm whether a person has truly been appointed by God as a prophet, he must first proclaim himself to be acting on God’s mandate. The community of believers then must make their own evaluation of the claim on the basis of the previous scripture.

This belief conflicts with that of the mainstream Islamic community. Mainstream sunni Muslims believe that there is a total of 25 prophets, and that none would come after the Prophet Muhammad (pbu). This view is based on an interpretation of the Al-Ahzab verse (33): 40 of the Qur’an which includes the Arabic phrase khataman nabiyiin, which is usually translated into English to mean that Muhammad (pbu) is the ‘seal of the Prophets’. The mainstream interpretation is that Muhammad (pbu) is the ‘last’ of the prophets. However, the Arabic word khatam in fact has several meanings, including ‘most perfect’, ‘most glorious’ and ‘ring’ or ‘seal’. Ahmadiyah followers interpret the phrase to mean that the Prophet Muhammad (pbu) was the main or most important of the prophets, thus not excluding the possibility that others would come after him. For them, it is thus not inconsistent to be both a Muslim and to believe that the founder of their movement was a prophet.

For many Muslims in Indonesia, however, this interpretation of the phrase ‘khataman nabiyiin’ is a dangerous insult to their own beliefs. MUI scholars are particularly angered by the belief that Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad could be considered a prophet, as well as by the view that his book, the Tazkirah, is a revelation from God and that Ahmadiyah followers make the haj pilgrimage not to Mecca but to Qadian.

In my own view, it is possible to reconcile Ahmadiyah’s beliefs with mainstream Islamic practice. Six centuries ago the famous theologian Ibn Arabi wrote that there would be prophets after Muhammad (pbu). In his view, the spiritual light provided by the Prophet Muhammad (pbu) would continue to glow after his departure. Indeed, he believed that the phrase ‘khataman nabiyiin’ guaranteed that there would be prophets after Muhammad (pbu); if there were not, this would mean that the spiritual strength of the message of the Prophet Muhammad (pbu) was weak, which could not be. In this respect, it might be possible to think of prophets after Muhammad (pbu) as carrying forward the mission of their great predecessor, in the way that, in Islam, Isa (Jesus) is seen as carrying forward the prophecy of Musa (Moses). Such prophets do not bring their own law, but instead revive and implement the law their predecessor has brough.

Ahmadiyah today

The theological controversy about the status of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the root of violence against Ahmadiyah. The movement has been attacked not just in Indonesia, but also elsewhere, including in Bangladesh and Pakistan. As a result of the pressure they face from others, Ahmadiyah has become both more cohesive internally, and more exclusivist in how it deals with others.

Even so, Ahmadiyah is a fast-growing religious movement in many countries, including Australia. In Australia, the movement is based in Blacktown, Sydney, and has a beautiful large mosque and a congregation of about 2000 people, mostly Pakistani migrants. From the movement’s headquarters in Britain, Muslim Television Ahmadiyya (MTA) is broadcast globally. The channel provides information about Ahmadiyah’s vision of a rational Islam which can be applied easily in daily life, and which lays heavy emphasis on moral teachings and peace.

In Indonesia, it is almost as if the all the pressure has helped to promote Ahmadiyah. Many people have been attracted by Ahmadiyah’s peaceful resistance, and by the message of love that is at the heart of its vision. Data from 2004 suggests that over the preceding 12 years, there had been about 150,000 new converts in 298 branches around the country. This remarkable growth itself refutes the view that Ahmadiyah has no place in Indonesian society, as the movement’s detractors suggest. Indeed, it might just be that the cause of the violent reaction against Ahmadiyah is not just theological, but also derived from resentment at the movement’s success.

Munawar Ahmad (munawar_ahmad@lycos.com) is a lecturer at the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University in Yogyakarta. He is currently writing a PhD thesis on the political thinking of Abdurrahman Wahid. This article was translated by Edward Aspinall.

Inside Indonesia 89: Jan-Mar 2007
http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-89/faith-and-violence-1407014

Religious Freedom Isn't an Absolute”

By Dr Bernhard Platzdasch
Today Newspaper Singapore
13 June 08

INDONESIA is commonly seen as a tolerant Muslim-majority country that guarantees and protects religious freedom. The current hullabaloo surrounding the legal status of the Islamic Ahmadiyah sect, the pressure by the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) on the government to ban the Ahmadiyah and the government's response to that demand, however, raises a number of questions.

On Monday, an official declaration said Ahmadiyah members "must cease all activities not consistent with the general interpretation of Islam". This long-awaited announcement gave another indication of the government's hesitancy in coming to terms with contentious matters. For those who want the government to take a firmer stance on the Ahmadiyah, the statement lacked the crucial words "prohibit" and "disband". Neither was the announcement illuminating for those wishing for a lenient position regarding Ahmadiyah.

Several commentators have said the statement was vague because President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his advisers needed to put pressure on Ahmadiyah in order not to risk losing the support of "conservative Muslims" ahead of next year's parliamentary and presidential elections. At the same time, the government reportedly felt that it also needed to safeguard the view that Indonesia endorsed and protected religious freedom through its laws and Constitution.

Two things come to mind: First, FPI is a numerically insignificant organisation and Islamist agendas have received only little support in recent national elections. Hence, by keeping up the pressure on Ahmadiyah, the President's team obviously did not cater exclusively to an "Islamist" audience as it did not expect to risk its approval ratings from the non-Islamist Muslim majority.

Catering to "conservative" Islamic sensitivities, the President and his team obviously deemed that, for all their perceived tolerance, it is the "mainstream" Muslim perception that a non-conformist Islamic offshoot like the Ahmadiyah should be barred from practising its tenets.

Indonesian political parties tend to reflect this view. Interestingly, it was not only MPs from Islamist parties (such as PKS), but also religiously neutral parties (Golkar) who publicly said last week that the government should issue a ban on Ahmadiyah. Their shared rationale seems to be that such a ban would stop FPI from causing trouble.

The logic here is peculiar. The FPI is prone to violence while Ahmadiyah is a dissident group committed to peaceful conduct. Yet Ahmadiyah's religious doctrine, which acknowledges another prophet after Mohammad, appears to make it less acceptable to the Muslim "mainstream" than the violent antagonism of the FPI. In other words, FPI is considered as belonging more to "mainstream" Islam than Ahmadiyah. This is a regrettable message to convey to the non-Muslim world.

Further, there is the question of whether a ban on Ahmadiyah would indeed be unconstitutional as several NGOs have claimed. It is certainly true that the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion. The First Article of Paragraph 29 reads: "The state is based on the One All-Powerful God". Article Two adds: "The state guarantees all people the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion and belief".

The Constitution does not contain a reference to any religion in particular. One has to keep in mind, however, that Article Two is usually interpreted with regard to Article One which, due to its reference to "the One God", only appears to acknowledge monotheist religions. What is more, the Pancasila, the overriding philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state, only acknowledges five official religions and claims to treat them equally. These are Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism.

It is discriminative about Judaism and syncretic and mystic local beliefs ("kepercayaan" in Indonesian). The latter are not classified as formal religions but come under the constitutional Human Rights Paragraph (28), which says: "Every person shall have the right to the freedom to believe in his/her faith (kepercayaan)".

Yet this freedom is only defined as a human right. It therefore appears to be inferior in rank to that of an officially recognised "religion". It is not spelled out what the exact difference is, but adherents of religions tend to have greater access to state facilities and funds than adherents of mere "beliefs".

Furthermore, there are edicts banning heresy and blasphemy. Article 156a of the Criminal Code decrees a maximum 5-year jail term for people who "express hostile, insulting or abusive views towards religions". This article was adopted from a 1965 presidential decree concerned with the "Prevention of Blasphemy and Abuse of Religions", which bars "deviant interpretations" of religious teachings and obligates the President to disband groups practising "deviant teachings". Given the stance of various Muslim-based parties and organisations, there are apparently
more grounds to label the practices of the Ahmadiyah as "deviant teachings", rather than those inspiring the actions of the FPI.

Overall, the "blasphemy" law can either be seen as being at odds with the Constitution or as an elaboration of Article Two of Paragraph 29. As such, it would suggest that "the state guarantees all people the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion and belief", on the provision that those religions and beliefs can be classified as "non-deviant". In any case, avowals that Indonesia would per se "guarantee religious freedom" are to be taken with more than just a grain of salt.

The writer is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies (Iseas). His PhD is on Islam in post-New Order Indonesia.

Ahmadiyah dispute intensifies

Inside Indonesia, Wednesday, 04 March 2009, Nathan Franklin, Edition 95

Violence at the National Monument in Jakarta almost caused a conflict between Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in Lamongan

Nathan Franklin

A typical street scene in Lamongan, East Java, where FPI finds support from many Muhammadiyah members Nathan Franklin

1 June 2008 marked the sixty-third anniversary of the Pancasila ideology. On this day members of the National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion held a rally at the National Monument (popularly known as ‘Monas’) in Jakarta demanding that the controversial Ahmadiyah sect should be dealt with in accordance with Indonesian law rather than subjected to organised violence. Members of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) descended upon the gathering, harassing and assaulting them. It did not surprise many that the FPI took this action: for years its members have attacked Ahmadiyah mosques, prayer houses, and other properties throughout Indonesia, while calling on the government to disband the organisation.

The incident at the National Monument appeared to swing public opinion against the FPI. What should have been a day of celebration was instead transformed into a violent incident that reverberated throughout the country. For several weeks, the national media were flooded with reports about the incident at Monas. There was a cry from liberal groups and many ordinary Indonesians for the FPI itself to be disbanded. The government responded by arresting the FPI militant wing’s commander, Munarman, and central chief, Habib Risiek Shahib, for initiating the violence.

It is less widely known that the incident also had consequences outside the capital. In the East Java pesantren region of Lamongan, it very nearly caused a conflict between members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.

FPI in Lamongan

The FPI was formally established in Lamongan in July 2005, built upon a local organisation called ‘The Fighters Enjoining Honour and Forbidding Dishonour’. The Lamongan branch is relatively autonomous but nevertheless receives instructions from the FPI Central Leadership Board in Jakarta. A long-standing instruction commands FPI members to pressure the government to disband Ahmadiyah.

The FPI has a strong presence in the subdistricts of Brondong and Paciran, north of Lamongan. Local reports suggest their numbers range from 75 to 100 members. However, according to their leader in Lamongan, the FPI under his command can amass between five hundred and a thousand ‘soldiers of Allah’ when it goes on raids. The Lamongan group relies heavily on young males as foot-soldiers. The older members provide leadership in Qur’anic studies, and in directing physical operations. This is based on the FPI philosophy of ‘amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar’, derived from the Qur’anic verse in Surah Ali Imran (Ayat 104), ‘Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity’.

Since this Brondong–Paciran area along the north coast of Lamongan is dominated by Muhammadiyah, the FPI ranks include many Muhammadiyah Muslims. In fact, the deputy leader of the FPI in Lamongan is also the headmaster of the Muhammadiyah pesantren of Karangasem in Paciran. Another Lamongan group whose membership overlaps with the FPI is the North Coast Islamic Youth Association, which was responsible for inviting Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to the area in October 2007 (see Inside Indonesia 92 ). Like the FPI, Ba’asyir encourages a rigid interpretation of ‘amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar’ during his sermons, selectively intertwining it with promotion of holy war and martyrdom. These narrow and literalist interpretations of Islam provide legitimacy for hardline Muslims in the area who wish to resort to physical action to achieve their objectives.

An NU–Muhammadiyah conflict in the making?

Even before the 1 June incident, former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) had been an outspoken defender of Ahmadiyah’s rights and a frank critic of the FPI. Gus Dur argued that Ahmadiyah was not a threat to anybody, and that its followers were responsible citizens who deserved the same rights and privileges as other Indonesians. FPI founder Habib Risiek Shihab argued that Gus Dur was wrong and that Allah would judge him so. The situation developed into a heated public debate about tolerance and what methods were acceptable for dealing with such issues.

Police in Lamongan asked local religious leaders to discourage angry NU youth from confronting the FPI

Although there are no known Ahmadiyah members in Lamongan, the local youth wing of NU, known as the Ansor Youth Movement (GP Ansor), who are concentrated in the south of Lamongan, were angered by the way the FPI – and in particular Habib Risiek – treated Gus Dur. In a TV statement broadcast on Indonesia’s Channel One shortly after 1 June, Habib Risiek stated that Gus Dur could not have understood what happened at Monas because he was blind. Furthermore, he claimed that Allah protected the FPI from the former president’s efforts to disband it, and instead disbanded Gus Dur’s government. A local newspaper reported that the GP Ansor were about to come to the north coast of Lamongan from their base in the south to force the FPI to disband. According to a police chief in the area, there was a real concern that the row could develop into an NU–Muhammadiyah conflict, as a large number of Muhammadiyah members were affiliated with the FPI.

Police in Lamongan approached the local religious leaders, including the leaders of the Sunan Drajat School and the Lamongan branch of the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars, in the hope that these religious figures could persuade the GP Ansor not to come to the north coast to confront the FPI. This strategy proved successful. The GP Ansor members never arrived. Speaking afterwards, the leader of the Lamongan branch of NU downplayed the situation, saying the GP Ansor had planned to go to the Paciran-Brondong area only to get a clear picture of the FPI’s position in Lamongan. However, many local residents believe that the intervention and consultation initiated by the Lamongan police succeeded in averting a dangerous conflict which could have had serious long-term consequences.

Is the problem over?

FPI members gather to study the Quran Nathan Franklin

According to polling conducted on the official NU website, 57 per cent of respondents maintained that the FPI was necessary to eliminate immorality and oppose liberal groups, while a quarter of respondents believed that the FPI should be disbanded because it ruined the image of Islam.

Both positions are found among the NU community in Lamongan. Some locals think that the FPI were just thugs and the organisation should be disbanded. Others see the FPI as useful for eliminating drinking, gambling and prostitution in the area. Although there were mixed opinions about disbanding FPI, there is considerable consensus among NU followers in Lamongan about Ahmadiyah. Most believe it should be disbanded because of its recognition of a prophet postdating Muhammad. Regardless of affiliation, all Lamongan residents believed that an NU–Muhammadiyah conflict would be detrimental to Islam.

The existence of Ahmadiyah and the FPI will continue into the foreseeable future, as will disagreements between Gus Dur and Habib Risiek. And as this example shows, events on the national stage can resonate in regional contexts and ignite religious conflict. There is reason to hope that the incident in this rural district in East Java has been resolved. But the history of rivalry in Lamongan means religious matters are highly charged and the potential for conflict remains. ii

Nathan Franklin (nathan.franklin@cdu.edu.au) is a doctoral student at the Charles Darwin University, working on pesantren and Political Islam in East Java.

Inside Indonesia 95: Jan-Mar 2009

http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-95/ahmadiyah-dispute-intensifies-08031180

Accusations of blasphemy

Inside Indonesia, Monday, 02 January 2006, Akh Muzakki, Edition 85

Are recent fatwa evidence that moderate Islam is a myth?

Akh Muzakki

On 30 November 2002, Muslims across Indonesia were celebrating the closing days of their month-long fast. It was the final week of the holy month of Ramadan. That week, however, was marked by the release of a fatwa, or opinion on religious law. The fatwa came from the Religious Scholars Forum of the Indonesian Muslim Community (FUUI) in Bandung, West Java.

FUUI had delivered their decision in response to an article written by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, the coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL). The article, entitled ‘Refreshing Our Understanding of Islam’, had been published nearly two weeks earlier in the popular Indonesian language newspaper Kompas. FUUI declared that Ulil’s article was blasphemous and that according to Islamic law such an offence was punishable by death.

Fatwa promoting the death penalty for perceived acts of blasphemy are rare in Indonesia, so the impact of the FUUI announcement was dramatic. All the more so because it was issued during Ramadan, a month devoted to peace and good will among Muslims.

Backlash

Why had Ulil’s article provoked such an intense reaction? In his article, Ulil strongly criticised the religious understanding of some Indonesian Muslims. He stated that some groups had ‘fossilised’ Islam by unconditionally accepting an understanding of Islam as it was practiced in seventh century Arabia. They allowed no room for reinterpretation.

In his view, the interpretation of Islam which these groups propagate has led to stagnation within Islam. He argued that Islam should be perceived as a living organism; something which grows and develops. He maintained that Islam does not promote ‘divine laws’. Rather, it develops universal principles the application of which may change with time and place.

Ulil’s article, and the subsequent fatwa, sparked a heated debate among Muslim scholars and leaders across the country. Not surprisingly, the strongest criticism of JIL came from FUUI, a small group of conservative Islamic leaders and activists. Their view was that Ulil had been deliberately provocative and attacked the basic principles of religion: God, Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim scholars, and the Muslim community in general. On these grounds, FUUI argued, he deserved to die.

FUUI pointed out that according to Islamic law a death penalty can be issued for any act of humiliation directed towards the teachings of Islam. Athian Ali M Da’i, the chair of FUUI and one of those responsible for issuing the fatwa, said in response to Ulil’s article that, ‘being a Muslim, my blood boiled.’

Earlier criticism

Eleven months before FUUI issued their fatwa, JIL had already been the target of criticism. This criticism was most vehement in a book entitled The Dangers of Liberal Islam. The author of the book was Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, one of the key Muslim thinkers behind the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytising, or DDII. In highlighting the danger of JIL, Hartono had raised the issue of the death penalty in the opening sections of his book.

Throughout the book, Hartono repeatedly called for the death penalty against those who reject being bound by Islamic law. This specifically included JIL. Hartono’s references to the potential use of a fatwa calling for the death penalty highlighted the opportunity for using such a penalty against JIL activists.

In the months following the release of the book, the argument for the death penalty against JIL members was developed within the pages of Media Dakwah, a publication of DDII.

Over the course of 2002, the publication ran numerous pieces under the same title as Hartono’s book. Gatra, a weekly news magazine, suggested that Hartono’s statements about the death penalty against the JIL activists made early in 2002, along with the ensuing barrage of criticism against JIL in Media Dakwah, culminated later in the year in the fatwa issued by FUUI.

Is Indonesian Islam moderate?

The rather extreme reaction of FUUI and DDII to an interpretation of Islam with which they did not agree may seem surprising. Indonesia has long been regarded as a nation whose Muslim population is tolerant and inclusive.

However, incidents such as FUUI’s fatwa and DDII’s ongoing discussions about applying the death penalty for heresy indicate that some groups do not wish to tolerate all views and, in fact, strongly oppose them.

These extreme responses raise a fundamental question. Why has there been such open confrontation between Indonesian Muslims in a nation that has long been known for its moderate and tolerant convictions and practices?

Looking further back into the history of Islam in the archipelago, we find previous examples of contestation between various groups of believers, including the issuing of death sentences.

During the initial process of Islamisation in Java, the walisongo (the nine revered Muslim saints who brought Islam to Java in the fifteenth century) delivered a fatwa calling for the death penalty for Syekh Siti Jenar. Syekh Siti Jenar, who was indeed put to death, was accused of spreading heresy among the Muslims of Indonesia.

But that was a long time ago. A death penalty fatwa is quite new in the context of modern Indonesia. And it is not the only indication that the nature of Indonesian Islam as moderate and peaceful may be at a crossroads.

No longer an isolated incident

In 2005, another fatwa was released, this time by the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI). MUI issued a fatwa against the followers of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect, asserting that the organisation was propagating heretical teachings about Islam. This fatwa was actually a re-assertion of a fatwa MUI had issued against Ahmadiyah in 1980. It did not mandate the death penalty, but it did state that Ahmadiyah was heretical. Unlike the fatwa against Ulil, however, this fatwa was acted upon.

On 9 July 2005 a mob destroyed part of the Ahmadiyah compound in Parung, West Java. Less than a week later, media sources reported that thousands of people armed with sticks had descended on Ahmadiyah’s headquarters in Pondok Udik, Bogor, West Java demanding the dissolution of Ahmadiyah. The local police were forced to evacuate around 200 Ahmadiyah followers to the police station in Cibinong.

> Where are the moderate Muslims?

It is generally believed that radical Islam has only a small following in Indonesia. But perhaps this notion has been promoted in order to dismiss a worrying reality. Have Indonesian Muslims been radicalised during the transitional period following Suharto’s authoritarian rule?

A number of religious commentators have argued that moderate Islam in Indonesia is only a myth. They go so far as to argue that law-abiding Indonesians can never hope to be free from the destructive powers of radical Islam and their fatwa. JIL activist Hamid Basyaib even argues that what has been known as ‘the moderate group’ now amounts to basically nothing.

These sentiments, however, would seem to be an over-reaction. The process of democratisation in Indonesia is still in its infancy. And despite isolated calls from groups like FUUI and DDII, Indonesians are already enjoying more freedom of speech than they have for several decades. There are also arguably unprecendented levels of protection of human rights.

Indeed, while there was some public criticism of Ulil’s article, only a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims supported the responses of FUUI and DDII. Both the small membership of FUUI and the limited circulation of Media Dakwah are testament to the fact that these organisations do not represent the majority of Indonesian Muslims.

The large moderate Islamic organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, have led campaigns to educate Indonesian Muslims about the dangers that radicalisation of socio-religious life can bring. These organisations have openly rejected radical teachings that endanger human rights and tolerance.

These efforts must be supported by a commitment on the part of the government to ensuring equal rights for all citiziens. Indonesians must be allowed to practice their religious beliefs freely but responsibly. While fatwa proposing death penalties for blasphemy are not supported by the large majority of Indonesian Muslims, they do impinge on the rights and the safety of individuals and organisations who simply wish to practice their newly acquired rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief.

Akh Muzakki (azaki9@hotmail.com) teaches at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Surabaya. He is a graduate of the Australian National University.

Inside Indonesia 85: Jan-Mar 2006

http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-85/accusations-of-blasphemy-1507117

Sikap Nabi terhadap Nabi Palsu Tanggapan terhadap Tanggapan Dr. Syamsuddin Arif dan Ahmad Rofiqi

Islamlib.com, 22/03/2011

Oleh Akhmad Sahal*

Penting untuk dicatat, paparan Ibn Hisyam tentang laporan Ibn Ishaq tersebut adalah dalam konteks pembahasannya tentang fenomena munculnya dua Nabi palsu: Musailamah dan al-Aswad. Dari situ bisa disimpulkan sekurang-kurangnya dua hal: gejala kemunculan nabi palsu pada masa itu sangat erat kaitannya dengan gerakan pembangkangan terhadap pembayaran Zakat, yang sudah berlangsung semenjak masa Nabi, dan semakin membesar pada masa khalifah Abu Bakr. Kedua, al-Aswad al-‘Unsi jelas jelas melakukan penyerangan terhadap delegasi Nabi bernama al-Muhajir bin Umayyah bin al-Mughirah.

Tulisan saya di Koran Tempo, “Nabi Palsu, Sikap Nabi dan Ahmadiyah” ditanggapi secara keras oleh Dr. Syamsuddin Arif di Hidayatullah.com dan Ahmad Rofiqi di notes facebook-nya.
( Untuk tulisan saya, lihat: http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/kolom/2011/02/16/kol,20110216-324,id.html
Untuk tulisan Dr. Syamsuddin Arif, lihat: http://www.hidayatullah.com/read/15606/28/02/2011/-menyikapi-%E2%80%98nabi-palsu%E2%80%99-dan-ahmadiyah-%281%29.html
Untuk tulisan Ahmad Rofiqi, lihat:
http://www.facebook.com/#!/notes/ahmad-rofiqi/kasus-nabi-palsu-dan-sikap-rasulullah-saw-tanggapan-terhadap-akhmad-sahal-di-maj/10150121665244681
Juga lihat:
http://pemikiranislam.multiply.com/journal/item/26 )

I

Kedua penanggap tersebut pada intinya menegaskan bahwa gerakan murtad apapun bentuknya harus diperangi dengan tanpa kompromi, dan kaum murtad harus dibunuh. Dr. Syamsuddin Arif mengklaim bahwa sikap Nabi Muhammad SAW dan khalifah Abu Bakr sangatlah tegas dalam memerangi gerakan nabi palsu, baik yang membangun kekuatan militer seperti dalam kasus Musailamah al-Kazzab, maupun yang tidak, seperti kasus al-Aswad al-‘Unsi dan Thulaikhah bin Khuwailid. Untuk memperkuat pendapatnya, ia mengutip surat ayat al-Qur’an ( al Ma’idah 33:34) dan hadist: “barang siapa menukar agamanya, maka bunuhlah.”

Senada dengan itu, Ahmad Rofiqi menganggap saya melakukan manipulasi dan distorsi ketika menyitir Tarikh al-Tabari dalam paparan saya tentang korespondensi antara Musailamah dan Rasulullah SAW, karena saya tidak menyertakan pernyataan lisan Rasul kepada utusan Musailamah: “Kalau bukan karena utusan-utusan tidak boleh dibunuh, sungguh aku memenggal leher kalian berdua.” Menurut hematnya, pernyataan lisan Rasulullah tersebut dengan jelas menunjukkan ketegasan sikap Nabi Muhammad dalam memerangi dan membunuh nabi palsu. Rofiqi juga menyatakan bahwa bahwa: (1) Rasul menjelang wafatnya mengirim pasukan untuk menumpas gerakan al-Aswad al-‘Unsi; (2) pidato khalifah Abu Bakr secara tegas menyatakan bahwa gerakan nabi palsu wajib diperangi tanpa terkecuali karena mereka telah keluar dari Islam.

Betulkah tuduhan Rofiqi bahwa saya telah melakukan distorsi dalam mengutip Tarikh al-Tabari? Benarkah klaim-klaim Dr. Syamsuddin Arif dan Ahmad Rofiqi bahwa Nabi dan para sahabat memerangi nabi palsu karena semata-mata karena kemurtadannya?

Untuk menjawab pertanyaan2 tersebut, saya akan memeriksa satu persatu data dan dalil yang mereka ajukan, dengan mengacu langsung pada Tarikh al-Tabari dan sumber-sumber primer lain, selain juga sumber sekunder yang relevan.

A. Musailamah Al-Kazzab:

Bagi Rofiqi, sikap Rasulullah terhadap nabi palsu dan para pengikutnya secara jelas tercermin dari pernyataan beliau yang hendak memenggal kepala utusan Musailamah. Menurut Rofiqi, Rasul tidak membunuh utusan Musailamah semata-mata karena beliau menghormati etika diplomasi yang melarang utusan dibunuh. Dari sinilah Rofiqi menyimpulkan, Rasul dari awal hendak memerangi Musailamah karena telah murtad dari Islam.
Pertanyaan saya: kalau memang sikap Rasul dari awal seperti itu, mengapa beliau tidak mendeklarasikannya secara eksplisit dalam surat balasannya ke Musaylamah, yang justru lebih resmi dan langsung tertuju kepada Mu’awiyah? Mengapa justru hanya melalui pernyataan lesan ke kurirnya? Surat balasan Rasul, seperti saya kutip dalam tulisan saya di Koran Tempo, sama sekali tidak mengandung nada peringatan atau ancaman perang terhadap Musailamah. Rasul hanya menyebutnya al-Kazzab (pendusta).

Satu hal yang diabaikan oleh Rofiqi, Musaylamah tidak semata-mata mengaku Nabi, tapi juga dengan kejamnya telah membunuh seorang sahabat Rasulullah bernama Habib bin Zaid, utusan Nabi yang ditangkap oleh Musailamah saat melakukan perjalanan dari Bahrain ke Makkah. Peristiwa ini direkam dalam Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyyah karya Ibn Hisyam (Vol. 2 halaman 57):

قال ابن اسحاق: فجمىع من شهد العقبة من الاوس والخزرج ثلاثة وسبعون رجلا وامراءتان منهم...ومن بني مازن بن النجار: نسيبة بنت كعب... وهى ام عمارة, كانت شهدت الحرب مع رسول الله, وشهدت معها اختها. وزوجها زيد بن عاصم بن كعب. وابناها: حبيب بن زىد وعبدالله بن زىد. وابنها حبيب الذي اخذه مسيلمه الكذاب الحنفي, صاحب اليمامة, فجعل يقول له: اتشهد ان محمدا رسول الله؟ فيقول نعم. فيقول: افتشهد اني رسول الله؟ فيقول: لا اسمع. فجعل يقطعه عضوا عضوا حتى مات في يده...

Ibn Ishaq berkata: maka keseluruhan orang yang menjadi saksi ‘aqabah dari suku Aus dan Khazraj ada 37, dua dia ntaranya perempuan. Dari Bani Mazin bin al-Najjar adalah Nusaibah bin Ka’ab..Dan dialah ibu Umarah. Dia dan saudara perempuannya ikut berperang bersama Nabi. Suaminya bernama Zaid bin Ashim bin Ka’b, dan dua putranya adalah Habib dan Abdullah bin Zaid. Musailamah sang pendusta (al-Kadzdzab), pemimpin Yamamah, menangkap Habib bin Zaid dan bertanya kepadanya: apakah kamu bersaksi Muhammad adalah utusan Allah? Habib menjawab ya. Lalu Musailamah melanjutkan, “apakah kamu bersaksi Musailamah adalah utusan Allah? Habib menjawab, saya tidak pernah dengar (tentang itu). Lantas Musailamah memutilasi tubuh Habib sampai dia meninggal.”

Pembunuhan sadis yang dilakukan oleh Musaylamah terhadap Habib bin Zaid ini jelas menandakan adanya aksi makar dari pihak Musaylamah terhadap otoritas Nabi, yang kemudian berkembang menjadi pemberontakan terhadap pemerintahan khalifah Abu Bakr. Ini jelas suatu ancaman serius terhadap pemerintahan pusat di madinah, mengingat Yamamah, dengan lokasi geografisnya yang strategis secara politik dan ekonomi di jazirah Arab, memang sejak awal cenderung “mbalelo” terhadap Madinah. Untuk diketahui, sebelum Musaylamah tampil ke permukaan, Yamamah dipimpin oleh seorang kafir bernama Hawdzah bin ‘Ali. Hawdhah termasuk dalam sejumlah pemimpin yang disurati Nabi untuk diajak masuk Islam. Ini terjadi pasca perjanjian Hudaibiah. Dan respon Hawdzah penuh dengan sikap antipati thd Islam. Ketika Musaylamah tampil menggantikannya, kecenderungan untuk “mbalelo” dari pemerintahan pusat masih kuat tertanam di Yamamah.

Itulah kenapa gerakan Musailamah kemudian ditumpas oleh Khalifah Abu Bakr. Penyebabnya bukan semata-mata karena ia mengaku menjadi nabi, tapi juga membunuh seorang duta Nabi SAW, dan membangun armada militer yang mengancam kedaulatan Madinah.

B. Al-Aswad al-‘Unsi

Dr. Arif dan Rofiqi menyatakan bahwa al-Aswad ibn Ka’b al-‘Unsi dibunuh oleh detasemen khusus yang dikirim oleh Nabi karena ia mengaku jadi nabi. Menurutnya, meski al-Aswad tidak memberontak dan tidak membangun kekuatan militer, ia tetap dibunuh karena telah murtad.

Betulkah demikian? Mari kita periksa Tarikh al-Tabari. Pada halaman 189, Volume 3, Imam al-Tabari bertutur tentang Al-Aswad demikian:

ان اول ردة كانت فى الاسلام باليمن كانت علي عهد رسول الله علي يدي ذي الخمار عبهله بن كعب وهو الاسود في عامة مذحج خرج بعد الوداع كان الاسود كاهنا شعباذا و كان يريهم الاعاجيب ويسبي قلوب من سمع منطقه وكا ن اول ما خرج ان خرج من كهف خبان وهى كانت داره وبها ولد ونشاء فكاتبه مذحج ووعده نجران فوثبوا بها واخرجوا عمرو بن حزم وخا لد بن سعيد العاص وانزلوه منزلهما ووثب قيس بن عبد يغوث يلي فروه بن مسيك وهو على مراد فاجلاه ونزل منزله ولم ينشب عبهله بنجران ان سار الي صنعاء فاخذ ها وكتب بذالك الي النبي من فعله ونزوله صنعاء وكان اول خبر وقع به عنه من قبل فروه بن مسيك ولحق بفروه من تم علي الاسلام من مذحج وكانوا بالاحسية ولم ىكاتبه الاسود ولم يرسل اليه لانه لم يكن احد ىشاغبه وصفا له ملك اليمن.

“Kemurtadan dalam Islam terjadi pertama kali di Yaman ketika Rasululullah SAW masih hidup, yakni oleh Dzu al-Khimar Abhahah bin Ka’b ( al-Aswad) di tengah khalayak Madzhij, setelah haji Wada.’ Al-Aswad adalah seorang dukun; dia acapkali mempertontonkan hal2 ajaib, memikat hati para pendengar pembicaraannya. Pertama kali dia mengaku jadi Nabi saat muncul dari gua Khubban, tempat dia lahir dan dibesarkan. Madzhij berkorespondensi dgn Al-Aswad, menjanjikan tanah Najran utknya. Mereka berdua lalu menyerang Najran dan mengusir ‘Amr bin Hazm dan Khalid bin Sa’id bin al-‘Ash (yang diangkat Nabi sebagai penguasa Najran, AS), dan al-Aswad tampil sebagai penggantinya. Qays bin Abd. Yaghuts menyerang dan mengusir Farwah bin Musayk (deputi Nabi) di Murad, dan menempatkan al-Aswad sebagai penggantinya. ‘Abhalah al-Aswad tidak hanya berhenti di Najran tapi juga menguasai San’a.’ (huruf tebal dari saya, AS). Berita tentang kemunculan al-Aswad dan tindakannya merebut San’a’ tersebut akhirnya sampai ke telinga Nabi SAW. Itulah berita pertama yang diterima beliau dari Farwah bin Musayk. Orang2 Madzhij yang masih setia pada Islam lalu bergabung dengan Farwah, dan mereka berada di al-Ahsiyyah. Al-Aswad tidak mengontak Farwah dan tidak mengirimkan kurir, karena dia merasa Farwah tidak menjadi ganjalan buatnya. Al-Aswad menguasai Yaman secara utuh.”

Masih dalam kitab yang sama, al-Tabari menyatakan bahwa al-Aswad membunuh gubernur Yaman, putera Badham yang diangkat oleh Nabi untuk menjadi gubernur wilayah Yaman. Bukan hanya itu, Aswad juga merebut istri sang raja yang dibunuh tersebut (Tarikh al-Tabari 3:218).

Data lain tentang Al-Aswad juga bisa kita temukan dalam Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyah karya Ibn Hisyam (w.312 H/834). Pada halama 189, Volume IV, Ibn Hisyam memaparkan perkataan Ibn Ishaq tentang betapa Al-Aswad melakukaan penyerangan terhadap delegasi yang ditugaskan Nabi untuk memungut shodaqoh/zakat di pelbagai wilayah Arab yang sudah dikuasai Islam. Coba simak kutipan berikut:

قال ابن اسحاق: وكان رسول الله صلي الله عليه وسلم قد بعث امراءه وعماله علي الصدقات الي كل ما اوضاء الاسلام من البلدان. فبعث المهاجر بن ابي امىه المغىره الى صنعاء. فخرج عليه العنسى وهو بها. وبعث زىاد بن لبيد اخا بنى بياضة الانصاري الي حضرموت وعلى صدقاتها, وبعث عدي بن حاتم على طيء وصدقاتها وعلي بنى اسد, وبعث مالك بن نوىزه—قال ابن هشام: الىربوعي—علي صدقات بني حنظلة. وفرق صدقة بنى سعد على رجلىن منهم. فبعث الزربقان بن بدر على ناحية منها وقيس بن عاصم علي ناحىة . وكان قد بعث العلاء بن الحضرمى على البحرين. وبعث علي بن ابي طالب الي اهل نجران ليجمع صدقتهم وىقدم علىه بجزىتهم.

Ibn Ishaq berkata: “Nabi mengirim sejumlah gubernur dan agen beliau untuk memungut dan mengumpulkan zakat ke segenap penjuru tanah Arab yang sudah dikuasai Islam. Beliau mengirim al-Muhajir bin Umayyah bin al-Mughira ke San’a, dan al-Aswad al-‘Ansi tampil menyerangnnya ketika ia berada di sana (huruf tebal dari saya, AS). Beliau mengirim Ziyad bin Labid, saudara Bani Bayadha al-Anshari ke Hadramaut. Nabi mengirim Adiy bin Hatim ke Tayyi dan Bani Asad; Malik bin Nuwairah al-Yarbu’I ke Bani Hanzala. Beliau membagi tugas penarikan zakat dari Bani Sa’d ke dua orang: Zibriqan bin Badr dan Qays bin Ashim, masing2 bertanggungjawab dgn bagiannya. Nabi juga mengirim al-Ala’ bin al-Hadrami ke Bahrain, dan Ali bin Abu Thalib ke penduduk Najran untuk mengumpulkan zakat mereka dan membawa ke Nabi jizyah mereka.”

Penting untuk dicatat, paparan Ibn Hisyam tentang laporan Ibn Ishaq tersebut adalah dalam konteks pembahasannya tentang fenomena munculnya dua Nabi palsu: Musailamah dan al-Aswad. Dari situ bisa disimpulkan sekurang-kurangnya dua hal: gejala kemunculan nabi palsu pada masa itu sangat erat kaitannya dengan gerakan pembangkangan terhadap pembayaran Zakat, yang sudah berlangsung semenjak masa Nabi, dan semakin membesar pada masa khalifah Abu Bakr. Kedua, al-Aswad al-‘Unsi jelas jelas melakukan penyerangan terhadap delegasi Nabi bernama al-Muhajir bin Umayyah bin al-Mughirah.

Dari tiga bukti tekstual tentang al-Aswad yang saya paparkan di atas, jelas bahwa nabi palsu Al-Aswad Al-‘Unsi dan pengikutnya ditumpas bukan semata-mata karena murtad, tapi karena al-‘Unsi melakukan makar: menyerang agen pengumpul zakat dan membunuh gubernur yang dua-duanya diangkat Nabi Muhammad. Ini sekaligus memuktikan bahwa klaim Dr. Arif dan Dr. Rofiqi tentang Al-Aswad sama sekali keliru.

C. Tulaikhah bin Khuwailid

Dr. Syamsuddin Arif menyebut kasus Thulaikhah bin Khuwailid sebagai contoh nabi palsu yang tetap diperangi oleh Nabi dan para Khalifah-nya meski dia tidak membangun kekuatan militer.

Betulkah begitu? Tarikh al-Tabari Volume 3 halaman 232 ternyata secara telak meruntuhkan klaim Dr. Arif tersebut. Al-Tabari menulis:

فلم ىعد ان انهزموا فاقروا جميعا بالاسلام خشية علي الذراري واتقوا خالدا بطلبته واستحقوا الامان ومضي طليحه حتى نزل في كلب علي النقع واسلم ولم ىزل مقىما في كلب حتي مات ابو بكر وكان اسلامه هنالك حين بلغه ان اسدا وغطفا ن وعامرا قد اسلموا ثم خرج نحو مكة معتمرا في امارة ابي بكر ومر بجنبات مدينة فقيل لابي بكر هذا طليحة فقال ما اصنع به خلوا عنه فقد هداه الله للاسلام ومضي طليحة نحو مكة فقضي عمرته ثم اتي عمر الي البيعة حىن استخلف فقال عمر انت قاتل عكاشه وثابت والله لا احبك ابدا فقال ىا امير المؤمنين ماتهم من رجلين اكرمهما الله بيدي ولم ىهني بايديهما فبايعه عمر ثم قال له ىاخدع ما بقي من كهانتك نفخة او نفختان بالكير ثم رجع الى دار قومه فاقام بها حتى خرج الى العراق

Tidak lama setelah ditaklukkan, nabi palsu dan sejumlah pengikutnya kembali memeluk Islam karena cemas akan nasib keturunan mereka, dan karena melindungi diri mereka sendiri dari Khalid bin Walid dengan cara memenuhi tuntutannya. Dengan begitu mereka mendapatkan jaminan keamanan. Thulayhah bin Khuwailid pun bertahan dgn cara itu. Dia pindah tempat di kalangan Kalb di Naqa,’ memeluk Islam dan tetap berdiam di sana sampai Abu Bakr wafat. Dia kembali ke Islam lagi setelah tahu bahwa Asad, Ghothfan, dan ‘Amir juga kembali ke Islam lagi. Lalu Thulayhah pergi ke Makkah untuk menjalankan umrah dengan melewati Madinah. Saat itu Khalifah Abu Bakr RA masih hidup. Sang khalifah diberi tahu kalau Thulayhah sedang di Madinah, tapi beliau hanya menjawab, “Saya mesti berbuat apa ke dia? Biarkan saja, toh Allah sudah memberinya petunjuk utk kembali ke Islam.” Thulayhah akhirnya bisa menuju ke Makkah dan ber-umrah. Lalu pada saat Umar bin al-Khattab menjadi khalifah, Thulayhah datang untuk menyatakan sumpah setia ke Umar. Lalu ‘Umar bilang ke Thulayhah, “kamu pembunuh ‘Ukkasyah dan Tsabit, demi Tuhan, aku sama sekali tidak suka kamu.” Mendengar itu, Thulayhah menjawab, “Wahai Amirul Mu’minin, mengapa engkau risau dengan dua orang yang justru dimuliakan oleh Allah di akhirat lantaran perbuatanku, sementara Allah tidak menghinakan daku melalui tangan mereka berdua?” Akhirnya ‘Umar menerima sumpah kesetiaan Thulayhah. Lalu ‘Umar bertanya, “hai mantan nabi palsu, apa yang masih tersisa dari keahlian dukunmu?” Jawab Thulaihah, “satu atau dua tiupan pada alat peniup.” Setelah peristiwa tersebut, Thulayhah kembali ke wilayah suku asalnya dan tetap berada di sana sebelum menuju Irak.

Kutipan di atas menarik karena menggambarkan bagaimana Abu Bakr dan Umar bin al-Khattab memberi kesempatan kepada nabi palsu Thulaikhah bin Khuwailid untuk kembali memeluk Islam dan bahkan dibiarkan melakukan ‘umrah. Patut diingat, Thulaikhah bukanlah nabi palsu yang tidak punya pasukan militer. Ketika digempur pasukan Islam pimipinan Khalid bin Walid, Thulaikhah berhasil membunuh sahabat dekat Nabi, Ukkasyah bin Mihsan. Tapi Thulaikhah lolos. Dalam keadaan terdesak dan tidak punya kekuatan menyerang, Thulaikhah kemudian masuk Islam.

Kalau memang kemurtadan langsung diganjar dengan hukuman mati seperti ditegaskan Dr. Arif dan Rofiqi, Khalifah Abu Bakr tentu tidak akan memberi kesempatan orang seperti Thulaihah bin Khuwailid untuk kembali ke Islam—apalagi masuk Islamnya demi alasan keamanan, seperti dinyatakan al-Tabari—, tapi langsung memenggalnya. Tapi nyatanya Thulaikhah dibolehkan masuk Islam lagi. Artinya apa? Seorang murtad yang tidak melakukan penyerangan dan pemberontakan terhadap umat Islam tidak lantas dikenai hukuman mati. Pintu tobat tetap terbuka baginya, seperti kasus Thulaikhah. Lagi-lagi pendapat Dr. Arif dan Rofiqi terbantahkan.

II

Ahmad Rofiqi juga merujuk pada surat diplomatik Abu Bakr untuk menopang pendapatnya bahwa kaum murtad wajib diperangi dan dibunuh semata-mata karena kemurtadannya. Rofiqi menulis:

“Surat diplomatik Khalifah Abu Bakar ra ini berbunyi jelas, ketika menggambarkan alasan perang yang ia lakukan adalah: “…keluarnya orang-orang diantara kalian dari agamanya setelah tadinya mengakui Islam dan mengamalkannya”. Jadi alasannya adalah: “keluar dari agama” atau murtad. …..Abu Bakar ra tidak membicarakan tentang masalah isu keamanan negara dan sejenisnya. Beliau hanya menyebutkan alasan utama perang adalah memberantas kemurtadan nabi palsu.”

Kesimpulan Rofiqi: perang yang dilakukan Khalifah Abu Bakr, yang belakangan disebut dengan “perang melawan kemurtadan” (huruub al-ridda), adalah murni masalah teologis, dan tidak ada sangkut pautnya dengan isu-isu keamanan negara seperti separatism, pemberontakan, dan sejenisnya.

Benarkah begitu? Untuk menguji apakah kesimpulan Rofiqi berdasar atau tidak, mari kita lihat apa yang dipaparkan Imam al-Thabari tentang bagaimana ekspedisi militer yang dipimipin oleh Khalid bin Walid ini sesungguhnya berlangsung , misalnya pada kasus pembunuhan terhadap Malik bin Nuwairah dan kelompoknya dari suku al-Buthah. Di mata Khalid bin Walid, gerakan Malik bin Nuwairah termasuk dalam daftar gerakan murtad yang harus diperangi. Tapi kelompok tersebut dengan tegas menolak disebut murtad karena mereka merasa tetap sebagai muslim. Meskipun begitu, Khalid tetap membunuh mereka semua, dan menikahi janda Malik bin Nuwairah, Umm Tamim binti al-Minhal, setelah pembunuhan itu. Mendengar peristiwa ini, Umar bin al-Khattab langsung murka dan mengecam keras tindakan Khalid, langsung di depan orangnya. ‘Umar juga menuntut agar ia dipecat sebagai panglima tertinggi angkatan bersenjata kaum muslim. Tapi Abu Bakr memaafkan tindakan Khalid dan tidak menjatuhi hukuman apapun terhadapnya.

Peristiwa ini direkam dalam Tarikh Al-Tabari Vol.3 hal: 242-243:

ان ابا بكر كان من عهده الي جيوشه ان اذا غشيتم دارا من دور الناس فسمعتم فىها اذانا للصلاة فامسكوا عن اهلها حتي تساءلوهم ماالذي نقموا وان لم تسممعوا اذانا فشنوا الغارة فاقتلوا واحرقوا وكان ممن شهد لمالك بالاسلام ابو قتادة الحارث بن ربعي اخو بنى سلمة وقد كان عاهد الله ان لا يشهد مع خالد بن الوليد حربا ابدا بعدها وكا ن يحدث انهم لما غشواالقوم راعوهم تحت الىل فاخذ القوم السلاح قال فقلنا انا مسلمون فقالوا ونحن المسلمون قلنا فما بال السلاح معكم قالوا لنا فما بال السلاح معكم قلنا فا ن كنتم كما تقولون فضعوااسلاح قال فوضعوها ثم صلينا وصلوا وكان خالد بن الوليد يعتذر في قتله انه قال وهو يراجعه ما اخال صاحبكم الا وقد كان ىقول كذا وكذا قال او ما تعده لك صاحبا ثم قدمه فضرب عنقه واعناق اصحابه فلما بلغ قتلهم عمر بن الخطاب تكلم فيه عند ابي بكر فاكثر فقال عدوالله عدا علي امريء مسلم فقتله ثم نزا علي امراءته واقبل خالد بن الوليد قافلا حتى دخل المسجد وعلىه قباء له عليه صداء الحديد معتجرا بعمامة له قد غرز في عمامته اسهما فلما ان دخل المسجد قام الىه عمر فانتزع الاسهم من راءسه فحطمها ثم قال ارءاء قتلت امراء مسلما ثم نزوت علي امراءته والله لارجمنك باحجارك ولا ىكلمه خالد بن الولىد ولا يظن الا ان راءى ابي بكر علي مثل راءي عمر فيه حتى دخل علي ابي بكر فلما ان دخل علىه اخبره الخبر واعتذر الىه فعذره ابو بكر وتجاوز عنه ما كان في حربه تلك قال فخرج خالد حين رضي عنه ابو بكر وعمر جالس فى المسجد فقال هلم الى ىا ابن ام شملة قال فعرف عمر ان ابا بكر قد رضي عنه ولم يكلمه ودخل بيته.

Sesungguhnya salah satu wejangan Abu Bakr kepada para pasukannya adalah ini: “Ketika kalian memasuki wilayah pemukiman orang-orang itu (maksudnya kelompok yang dianggap murtad, AS), and lalu mendengar suara adzan, berhentilah bertindak terhadap orang-orang itu dan tanyakan apa alasan sikap permusuhan mereka terhadap kita. Tapi jika kalian tidak mendengar suara adzan, maka serbulah mereka, bunuh dan bakar mereka.”

Nah di antara para sahabat Nabi yang menjadi saksi bahwa Malik (bin Nuwairah) itu muslim adalah Abu Qatadah al-Harits bin Rib’i, saudaranya Banu Salimah. Makanya dia bersumpah tidak akan sudi berperang lagi bersama Khalid bin Walid setelah kejadian itu. Abu Qatadah mengacu pada kejadian ketika dia bersama pasukan muslim lain pada suatu malam hendak menyerbu satu kelompok yang sudah siap dengan senjata mereka. Ketika kita bilang, “kami semua orang muslim,” mereka membalas, “kami juga muslim.”Lalu kami berkata, “lantas apa artinya senjata kalian.“ Mereka menimpali, “apa artinya juga senjata kalian?” Kami menukas, “Kalau kalian memang seperti yang kalian bilang, letakkan senjata!!” Lantas mereka meletakkan senjata mereka. Kami lalu melakukan sholat, dan mereka pun melakukan sholat.

Namun Khalid bin Walid memberi alasan atas pembunuhannya (atas Malik), bahwa Malik suatu kali pernah bilang begini ke dia: “kawanmu (maksudnya Nabi Muhammad) berkata begini-begini.” Khalid langsung menimpali, “kenapa kamu tidak menganggap beliau sebagai kawanmu juga?” Atas dasar itu Khalid lalu memengal kepala Malik dan kelompoknya.”

Ketika kabar pembunuhan tersebut sampai ke ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, beliau sontak mengecamnya di depan khalifah Abu Bakr dan tak henti2 berujar, “Si musuh Allah (maksudnya Khalid bin al-Walid, AS) telah melakukan kekerasan terhadap seorang Muslim dengan membunuhnya dan mengambil istrinya.”

Tak lama kemudian Khalid bin Walid kembali ke Madinah. Dia memasuki masjid dengan mengenakan pakaian perangnya yang dililit dengan panah. Seketika itu juga ‘Umar mendekatinya dan menarik beberapa anak panah yang menempel di kepalanya lalu memukulkannya ke Khalid. Umar berkata, “dasar munafik, membunuh seorang muslim dan lalu mengambil istrinya! Demi Allah, akan saya rajam kamu dengan batu-batu kamu sendiri.” Khalid tidak berucap sepatah katapun. Dia pikir Abu Bakr pasti akan sependapat dengan Umar. Tapi ketika Abu Bakr datang dan Khalid bin al-Walid menceritakan kepadanya ttg kronologi peristiwanya, Abu Bakr langsung memaklumi Khalid dan mengampuninya atas apa yang terjadi dalam perang yang dipimpinnya. Begitu tahu Abu Bakr berada di pihaknya, Khalid berkata ke Umar, yang saat itu duduk2 di masjid, “datanglah ke sini, wahai Ibn Ummi Syamlah.” Seketika itu Umar tahu bahwa Abu Bakr telah merestui Khalid, jadi Umar tidak bicara kepadanya, dan langsung pulang ke rumahnya.”

Ada beberapa poin penting dari kutipan di atas yang sangat relevan untuk topik pembahasan kita di sini:

Pertama, Abu Bakr menyatakan dalam instruksinya kepada para pasukannya bahwa jika mereka mendengar suara adzan dari kelompok yang dianggap murtad, maka mereka harus menahan diri untuk tidak menyerang dan ber-tabayyun (memperjelas duduk perkaranya) dulu tentang sikap permusuhan mereka. Tapi kalau para pasukan tidak mendengar bunyi adzan, mereka boleh langsung menyerang. Dari sini kita bisa menyimpulkan bahwa yang kaum murtad diperangi Abu Bakr adalah mereka yang punya sikap permusuhan terhadap kaum Muslim.

Kedua, menurut ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, kalau ada satu kelompok yang ditengarai telah murtad, tapi kelompok tersebut masih mengaku sebagai muslim, mereka sama sekali tidak boleh diperangi dan dibunuh. Karena itu, ‘Umar sangat berang ketika mendengar panglima tertinggi “perang melawan kemurtadan” membunuh Malik bin Nuwairah dan kelompoknya karena dianggap murtad, padahal mereka jelas-jelas mengaku muslim. Tak tanggung-tanggung, ‘Umar menyebut Khalid bin Walid sebagai “musuh Allah” karena perbuatannya itu. Dan Khalid diam seribu bahasa, tak berani menyangkal ‘Umar. Tidak hanya ‘Umar yang bersikap demikian. Abu Qatadah juga bersumpah tidak mau lagi menjadi pasukan di bawah kendali Khalid bin Walid.

Pendirian ‘Umar ini, dalam hemat saya, sangat penting untuk digarisbawahi karena ia menegaskan satu pedoman fundamental dari kacamata Islam tentang bagaimana menentukan apakah seseorang itu muslim atau tidak. Bagi ‘Umar, tolok ukur ke-Islaman adalah yang lahiriah, bukan apa yang ada dalam hati, yaitu pengakuan orang itu sendiri. Sejauh ia mengaku muslim, maka ia terhitung muslim. Soal apakah dalam batinnya ia musyrik atau kafir itu urusan dia pribadi.

Dalam hal ini, sikap ‘Umar sesuai dengan semangat hadits yang bertutur tentang marahnya Rasulullah terhadap Usamah bin Zaid pada suatu kali. Kenapa? Karena dalam satu pertempuran melawan kaum kafir, Usamah memutuskan untuk membunuh seorang musuh, yang setelah kalah dalam duel dan terdesak, kemudian menyerukan kalimat syahadat. Usamah beralasan, syahadat-nya si musuh hanyalah akal-akalan saja, agar tak dibunuh. Rasul tidak terima dengan alasan Usamah, dan bertanya: “apa kamu sudah periksa hatinya untuk memastikan dia jujur atau pura-pura.” Rasul kemudian bersabda:

نحن نحكم بالظواهر والله ىقضى السرائر
“Kita berhukum berdasarkan ukuran-ukuran lahiriah, dan Allahlah yang memutuskan apa yang sejatinya yang tersembunyi dalam batin.” (Lihat Baihaqi, Kitab Sunan al-Kubro, vol 8: 196).

Di samping itu, pelajaran penting yang bisa dipetik dari sikap ‘Umar bin al-Khattab dalam kasus ini adalah perlunya kehati-hatian dalam menyikapi kelompok yang ditengarai telah murtad, padahal pada saat yang sama kelompok itu masih mengaku sebagai muslim. Dari cerita al-Thabari di atas kita bisa menyimpulkan, gerakan Malik bin Nuwairah memang semula dikategorikan sebagi kelompok murtad agresif yang mesti diperangi—buktinya, mereka mempersenjatai diri. Tapi ternyata terbukti Malik dan pengikutnya menolak dikategorikan sebagai murtad. Mereka mengaku muslim dan menjalankan sholat.

Bagi ‘Umar bin Khattab, pengakuan dan tindakan lahiriah Malik danpengikutnya cukup menjadi bukti bahwa mereka masih muslim, dan karena itu sama sekali tidak boleh diperangi. Makanya beliau marah besar dengan Khalid bin Walid yang menurut ‘Umar main hantam kromo saja dengan membunuh Malik bin Nuwairah dan kelompoknya.

Ketiga, yang menarik untuk dicatat adalah sikap Khalifah Abu Bakr terhadap perbuatan Khalid bin Walid terhadap Malik bin Nuwairah. Tadinya Khalid menyangka Abu Bakr akan bersikap sama dengan ‘Umar. Tapi ternyata Abu Bakr mengampuni kesalahan Khalid dan malah justru berada di pihaknya.

Mengapa Khalifah Abu Bakr pada akhirnya mengampuni kesalahan Khalid bin Walid dan berada di pihaknya, suatu posisi yang berbeda secara diametral dengan ‘Umar bin Khattab? Patut dicatat, dengan tindakannya mengampuni Khalid bin Walid, secara implisit Khalifah Abu Bakr sebenarnya juga menganggap Khalid bersalah dalam tindakannya memenggal kepala Malik bin Nuwairah dan pengikutnya. Tapi Abu Bakr ternyata memutuskan untuk mempertahankan posisinya sebagai panglima tertinggi “perang melawan kemurtadan.” Mengapa?

Menurut pendapat saya, keputusan Abu Bakr tersebut menunjukkan bahwa “perang melawan kemurtadan” tidak bisa dilihat semata-mata sebagai persoalan teologis semata-mata. Sebab kalau memang begitu, tentunya Khalifah Abu Bakr tidak akan mengampuni tindakan Khalid membunuh Malik dan menikahi janda almarhum. Kalau pertimbangannya murni teologis, Abu Bakr tentunya akan bersikap sama dengan ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, yakni menghukum Khalid yang telah membunuh seorang muslim.

Tapi kenyataannya, Abu Bakr justru memaafkan Khalid dan tetap mempertahankan jabatannya. Karena itu, perang melawan kemurtadan pimipinan Khalid mesti dilihat juga sebagai perang yang sangat kental nuansa politiknya, yakni sebagai bagian dari upaya mengukuhkan fondasi kedaulatan politik kekhilafahannya. Dan karena Khalid bin Walid dianggap berjasa besar untuk itu, Abu Bakr pun kemudian memaafkannya. Tindakan Abu Bakr ini tentu saja bisa dimengerti, apalagi beliau baru terpilih sebagai khalifah di tengah goncangan psikologis umat akibat ditinggal wafat Rasulullah. Di tengah situasi demikian, maraknya gerakan nabi palsu yang rame-rame murtad, membangkang dari kewajiban membayar zakat dan menolak mengakui legitimasi pemerintahan pusat di Madinah menjadi identik dengan aksi makar dan pemberontakan.

Itulah saya kira alasan utama kenapa ‘Umar bin Khattab tidak menentang keputusan Abu Bakr untuk tetap mempertahankan Khalid bin Walid sebagai panglima tertinggi. Meskipun tetap menganggap Khalid layak dihukum atas pembunuhannya terhadap Malik bin Nuwairah, ‘Umar tetap setia mendukung keputusan yang diambil sang Khalifah. Tapi ketika ‘Umar menjabat sebagai khalifah kedua dan melihat fondasi kedaulatan kekhalifahan sudah cukup kokoh, Umar akhirnya memecat Khalid dan menempatkan Abu ‘Ubaidah bin al-Jarrah sebagai penggantinya.

Dalam konteks semacam itulah “perang melawan kemurtadan” mendapatkan signifikasni politiknya . Karena itu sungguh keliru ketika Ahmad Rofiqi menyatakan bahwa Abu Bakr memerangi kaum murtad melulu karena kemurtadannya.

Bukti lain yang menunjukkan betapa tak berdasarnya klaim Rofiqi bisa kita temukan dalam kasus bagaimana Abu Bakr bersikap terhadap pemimpin gerakan murtad dari suku Kindah di Hadramaut bernama al-Asy’ats bin Qays.

Seperti dituturkan Al-Tabari dalam Tarikh al-Thabari, dan Baladhuri dalam Futuh al-Buldan, Banu Wali’ah dari suku Kindah yang dipimipin oleh al-Asy’ats rame-rame murtad tidak lama setelah Nabi wafat, karena mereka beranggapan bahwa gubernur muslim di Hadramaut saat itu, Ziyad bin Labid, tidak menepati apa yang telah dijanjikan oleh Nabi Muhammad kepada mereka saat masih hidup. Menurut pengakuan mereka, saat delegasi suku Kindah berbai’at masuk Islam di hadapan Nabi, Nabi setuju kalau suku Kindah mendapatkan tu’ma (porsi yang telah ditentukan) dari hasil penarikan shadaqah/zakat di Hadramaut. Tapi setelah Nabi wafat, gubernur Hadramaut ternyata menolak untuk memberikan tu’ma kepada mereka. Akhirnya mereka rame-rame menyatakan keluar dari Islam dan berbuat makar (misalnya membunuh membunuh utusan yang dikirim gubernur Hadramaut untuk menemui mereka). Merespon gerakan tersebut, Abu Bakr akhirnya mengirim pasukan yang dipimpin oleh ‘Ikrimah bin Abu Jahl di bawah koordinasi panglima Khalid bin Walid untuk mengepung markas gerakan murtad tersebut di Nujair. Pasukan ‘Ikrimah akhirnya berhasil menumpas gerakan murtad dari suku Kindah, menangkap pentolannya dan menyerahkannya kepada Abu Bakr untuk dihukum.

Tapi menariknya, Abu Bakr tidak lantas langsung menjatuhkan hukuman mati terhadap sang pemimpin gerakan murtad dari Kindah. Yang terjadi justru ini: al-Asy’ats menyatakan masuk Islam lagi, dan lalu dinikahkan oleh Abu Bakr dengan saudari kandungnya, Umm Farwah. Simaklah Tarikh al-Tabari, Vol.3, hal 276:

ان الاشعث لما قدم به على ابي بكر قال ما تراني اصنع بك فانك قد فعلت ما علمت قال تمن علي فتفكنى من الحدىد وتزوجني اختك فاءنى قد راجعت واسلمت قال ابو بكرقد فعلت فزوجه ام فروة ابنة ابي قحافة فكان بالمدىنة حتي فتح العراق

Sesungguhnya al-Asy’ats ketika dibawa ke hadapan Abu Bakr, Abu Bakr bertanya, “menurutmu, apa yang mesti kulakukan terhadapmu mengingat apa yang telah kamu perbuat?” Lalu al-Asy’ats menjawab, “saya harap paduka bersikap baik terhadap saya. Bebaskan saya dari besi-besi ini dan nikahkan saya dengan saudara perempuan paduka, karena telah kembali dan memeluk Islam lagi.” Abu Bakr kemudian mengiakan permintaannya dan menikahkannya dengan Umm Farwah binti Abi Qahafah. Setelah itu al-Asy’ats berada di Madinah sampai saat penaklukan Iraq.

Kalau memang orang murtad harus dihukum mati semata-mata karena kemurtadannya seperti dikatakan oleh Ahmad Rofiqi dan Dr. Syamsuddin Arif, mestinya begitu al-Asy’ath tertangkap, ia langsung dipenggal kepalanya. Tapi hal itu sama sekali tidak terjadi. Al Asy’ath justru masih diberi kesempatan untuk menjadi muslim lagi, dan setelah itu malah menjadi ipar Khalifah Abu Bakr. Lagi-lagi klaim tuan Arif dan Rofiqi secara telak terbantahkan.

III

Dr. Syamsuddin Arif dalam tulisannya di bagian kedua merumuskan pandangannya tentang status orang murtad menurut Islam sebagai berikut:

“Maka ahli-ahli hukum Islam yang disebut fuqaha sepakat bahwa orang yang murtad (keluar dari Islam) mesti dijatuhi hukuman mati. Ini dikukuhkan oleh sabda Rasulullah yang diriwayatkan Imam an-Nasa’i: “Siapa yang menukar agamanya maka bunuhlah dia (man baddala dinahu fa-uqtuluhu).” Maka tatkala Mu‘adz ibn Jabal berkunjung ke kediaman Abu Musa al-Asy‘ari di Yaman dan melihat seorang Yahudi diikat lantaran masuk Islam tetapi kemudian keluar lagi (murtad), beliau berkata: “Aku tidak akan duduk sebelum orang ini dieksekusi. Demikianlah ketentuan Allah dan RasulNya (la ajlisu hatta yuqtala, qadha’Allahi wa rasulihi).” Pendapat ini yang dipegang antara lain oleh Imam at-Thahawi dan sebagian ulama salaf. Sementara mayoritas ahli fiqih empat mazhab menyatakan perlunya kesempatan terakhir diberikan kepada yang si murtad untuk bertaubat dalam tempo maksimal tiga hari. Dasarnya adalah kebijakan Sayyidina ‘Umar ibn al-Khaththab dan Sayyidina ‘Ali ibn Abi Thalib dalam menangani kasus murtad.”

Apakah kesimpulan Dr. Arif di atas bisa dipertahankan dari sudut pandang doktrin Islam? Marilah kita periksa satu persatu bukti-bukti tekstual yang ada tentang pokok soal ini:

Poin pertama, tidak betul bahwa ahli-ahli hukum Islam (fuqaha) telah bersepakat dalam soal hukuman mati untuk orang murtad, seperti ditengarai Dr. Arif. Telaah yang dilakukan oleh Mohammad Hashim Kamali, profesor hukum Islam pada International Islamic University of Malaysia, terhadap literatur fiqh dan hadits tentang hukum apostasy (irtidad) dalam Islam setidaknya membantah adanya ijma’ (konsensus) para ulama dalam soal ini sejak dulu sampi sekarang. Profesor Kamali menyebut sejumlah pemikir Islam generasi salaf yang berpendapat bahwa orang yang keluar dari Islam tidaklah diganjar dengan hukuman mati, melainkan mesti terus menerus diberi kesemptan untuk kembli ke Islam, karena selalu ada harapan bahwa mereka akan berubah pikiran dan bertaubat. Sebut saja nama-nama seperti Ibrahim al-Nakha’i , faqih (ahli fiqh) generasi tabi’in; Sufyan al-Tsauri, ahli hadist generasi tabi’ al-tabi’in yang digelari amir al-mu’minin dalam soal hadits dan pengarang buku kompilasi hadist tekenal, Jami’ al-Shaghir dan Jami’ al-Kabir; juga ahli fiqh empat mazhb seperti Imam Sya’roni dan Imam Syarakhsyi. (Lihat Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, hal. 93). Dengan kata lain, ahli-ahli hukum Islam sejak dulu berbeda pendapat tentang soal status orang murtad.

Kedua, hadits yang dikutip Dr. Symsuddin Arif memang hadits sahih dan dimuat dalam kitab Sahih Bukhari. Imam Bukhori menyebut pernyataan Nabi tersebut dalam kaitannya dengan tindakan khalifah ‘Ali bin Abu Thalib yang menghukum bakar beberapa orang zindiq (heretik) atas kejahatan yang mereka perbuat. Ketika kabar itu sampai ke telinga Ibn ‘Abbas, ia diriwayatkan menyatakan bahwa kalau seandainya ia adalah Khalifah ‘Ali, ia tidak akan membakar mereka karena adanya larangan dari Nabi terhadap hukuman bakar. Kalau Ibn ‘Abbas yang jadi khalifah, yang ia lakukan adalah membunuh orang-orang zindiq tersebut, berdasar hadits Nabi: “barang siapa mengganti agamanya maka bunuhlah.” (Qastallani, Irshad al-Sari li Sharh Shhih Al-Bukhari, vol. 14: hal. 395-396).

Persoalannya, apakah dari hadits ini bisa ditarik kesimpulan bahwa orang murtad harus dihukum mati karena kemurtadannya, seperti dinyatakan Dr. Arif? Saya kira pendapat semacam ini dengan mudah dibantah kalau kita mengacu pada prinsip-prinsip metodologi dalam hukum Islam (Ushul al-Fiqh).

Siapapun yang mempelajari Ushul al-Fiqh tentu tahu bahwa penetapan hukuman hudud ( hukuman mati termasuk hudud) haruslah didasarkan pada ketentuan nash (teks rujukan) yang qath’iy (bersifat pasti), baik dalam hal pengertian yang dikandungnya (qath’iyyu al-dalalah) maupun dalam hal rangkaian sanad/rantai transmisinya (qath’iyyu al-wurud). Yang memenuhi kedua kriteria tersebut adalah Al-Qur’an dan hadits mutawatir (hadits yang diriwayatkan oleh puluhan orang dalam setiap mata rantai transmisinya).

Nah, hadits-hadits tentang hukuman mati terhadap orang murtad sejatinya termasuk dalam kategori hadits ahad (hadits yang diriwayatkan hanya oleh satu atau segelintir orang saja), dan bukan hadits mutawatir. Dan harus diingat, hadits ahad, meskipun sahih statusnya, bukanlah suatu nash yang qath’iy (pasti) melainkan dzanniy (bersifat sangkaan) belaka. Karena itu, ia tidak bisa dijadikan sebagai dasar bagi penetapan hukuman hudud. Walhasil, dilihat dari sudut pandang Ushul al-Fiqh, argumen Dr. Arif yang memakai hadits ahad sebagai dalil untuk menegakkan hukuman mati terhadap kaum murtad terbukti rontok dengan sendirinya.

Ketiga, klaim Dr. Syamsuddin Arif dan juga Ahmad Rofiqi bahwa kaum murtad harus dibunuh karena kemurtadannya jelas bertentangan dengan spirit sejumlah ayat al-Qur’an tentang orang murtad ( seperti QS 3:90, 4:137, dan 2:217). Ayat-ayat ini memang menegaskan bahwa perbuatan murtad adalah suatu dosa yang serius, dan orang murtad akan dihukum Allah di akhirat. Tapi ayat-ayat tersebut sama sekali tidak menyinggung adanya hukuman mati di dunia buat mereka.

Simak misalnya ayat 4:137: “Sesungguhnya orang-orang yang telah menyatakan beriman kemudian menjadi kafir, lalu beriman lagi, lalu menjadi kafir lagi, kemudin bertambah-tambah dalam kekafirannya, maka Allah tidak akan mengampuni mereka dan tidak akan memberi mereka petunjuk kepada jalan (yang lurus).” Perhatikan, ayat ini berbicara tentang orang yang bolak-balik murtad. Tapi hukuman yang disebut dalam ayat ini hanya hukuman yang berlaku nanti kalau di akhirat. Tidak disinggung adanya hukuman mati buat mereka di dunia. Logikanya, kalau tindakan murtad serta merta harus diganjar hukuman mati, tentu statemen Al-Qur’an tentang fenomena bolak-balik murtad menjadi tidak bermakna, karena si murtad tentunya sudah dipenggal sejak pertamakali keluar dari Islam. Dari ayat itu kita bisa menyimpulkan, tindakan murtad memanglah suatu dosa besar. Kalau si murtad tidak bertobat sampai meninggal, maka Allah tidak akan memberinya ampunan. Meskipun demikian, si murtad tetap punya hak untuk hidup dan selalu diberi kesempatan untuk bertobat hingga ajal menjemputnya.

Kesimpulan semacam ini juga didukung oleh ayat-ayat lain yang berbicara tentang tidak adanya paksaan dalam agama; tentang prinsip bahwa setiap orang punya tanggungjawab sendiri-sendiri untuk memilih mana jalan yang benar dan mana yang sesat; dan bahwa tugas Rasul hanyalah menyampaikan risalah kenabian dan bukan untuk memaksa orang untuk menjadi mu’min, karena kalau Allah menghendaki, niscaya semua orang bisa saja Dia bikin menjdi beriman.

Anehnya, baik Syamsuddin Arif maupun Ahmad Rofiqi dalam tulisannya sama sekali bungkam terhadap ayat-ayat yang saya sebut di atas. Dr. Arif malah mengutip ayat Ma’idah 33-34, yang berbicara tentang hukuman bagi “orang-orang yang memerangi Allah dan Rasulnya.” Pihak yang melancarkan perang terhadap Allah dan Rasulnya bisa saja kaum murtad, tapi bisa juga kaum kafir ataupun musyrik. Dus, sungguh keliru kalau memakai ayat ini sebagai dalil hukuman mati terhadap orang murtad semata-mata karena kemurtadannya.

Keempat, Syamsuddin Arif dan Ahmad Rofiqi juga mengabaikan sejumlah hadist sahih lain yang bercerita tentang sejumlah orang yang keluar dari Islam pada masa Nabi, tapi beliau tidak menjatuhkan hukuman mati terhadap mereka. Misalnya, ketika Nabi masih tinggal di Makkah, ada seorang muslim bernama Ubaidillah bin Jahsh ikut serta dalam hijrah sejumlah sahabat Nabi dari Makkah ke Ethiopia. Sesampai di sana, Ubaidillah pindah ke agama Kristen dan tetap tinggal di Ethiopia. Nabi tentu tahu akan hal itu, tapi beliau ternyata tidak membunuhnya.

Contoh kasus lain: ketika di Madinah, ada seorang Arab badui datang menemui Nabi untuk menyatakan masuk Islam. Tapi beberapa saat kemudian, si badui minta supaya bai’at Islam-nya dibatalkan. Pada mulanya Nabi menolak, tapi si badui ngotot, dan akhirnya meninggalkan Madinah untuk kembali ke keyakinan pra-Islamnya. Meskipun demikian, Nabi juga tidak menjatuhkan hukuman mati terhadapnya. Kisah ini termuat dalam Sahih Bukhari:

عن جابر رضى الله عنه: جاء اعرابي الى النبي صلي الله علىه وسلم فباىعه علي الاسلام فجاء من الغد محموما فقال: اقلني, فابى- ثلاث مرار. فقال: المدىنة كالكىر تنفي خبثها وىنصع طىبها.

Diriwayatkan dari Jabir R.A: seorang badui datang menemui Nabi dan melakukan bai’at masuk Islam. Tapi keesokan harinya dia datang dalam keadaan demam: batalkan bai’at Islamku, tapi Nabi menolak—berulang sampai tiga kali. Akhirnya Nabi berkata: Madinah ibarat alat peniup api, membuang yang kotor dan menjernihkan yang bersih darinya.

Dalam kaitan dengan empat poin yang saya paparkan di atas, ada baiknya di sini kita menyimak pandangan Mahmud Syalthut, pemikir Islam Mesir yang pernah menjadi rektor Universitas al-Azhar pd dekade 1950-an. Dalam kitabnya Al Islam: ‘Aqidatun wa Syari’atun, Mahmud Syaltut menulis:

“Mengenai hukuman mati untuk perbuatan murtad, para ahli fiqh mendasarkan diri pada hadits yng diriwayatkan Ibn Abbas:” Man baddala dinahu faqtuluhu” (Barang siapa berganti agama maka bunuhlah.) Hadits ini memunculkan pelbagai respon dari ulama. Banyak di antara mereka bersepakat bahwa hukuman hudud tidak bisa didasarkan pada hadits ahad.

Tindakan murtad semata tidak dengan sendirinya membawa konsekuensi hukuman mati. Faktor utama yang menjadi penentu hukuman ini adalah adanya agresi dan permusuhan (dari si murtad, AS) terhadap kaum beriman, dan kebutuhan untuk menjaga kemungkinan munculnya penghasutan melawan agama dan negara. Kesimpulan ini didasarkan pada banyaknya ayat-ayat al-Qur’an yang melarang paksaan dalam beragama.” (dikutip dalam Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, 1994, hal. 94-95).

Terdapat sekurang-kurangnya dua hal penting yang bisa kita garisbawahi dari pernyataan Mahmud Syalthut ini.

Pertama, hadits “barang siapa mengubah agamanya maka bunuhlah” adalah hadits ahad, yang meskipun sahih, tidak bisa digunakan sebagai dasar penetapan hudud, sepertihalnya hukuman mati buat kaum murtad. Poin ini sudah saya paparkan sebelumnya.

Kedua, statemen Syalthut “faktor utama yang menjadi penentu hukuman ini adalah adanya agresi dan permusuhan (dari si murtad, AS) terhadap kaum beriman, dan kebutuhan untuk menjaga kemungkinan munculnya penghasutan melawan agama dan negara” sangat penting untuk ditekankan karena statemen itu menegaskan ‘illat (ratio legis, alasan hukum) yang menjadi alasan diterapkannya hukuman mati buat orang murtad. Yakni, bahwa hukuman itu terkait erat dengan adanya unsur agresi dan permusuhan dari si murtad. Dengan kata lain, kaum murtad memang wajib diperangi kalau kemurtadan mereka dibarengi dengan tindakan memusuhi dan menyerang kaum beriman. Adapun kalau mereka keluar dari Islam tanpa disertai dengan tindakan semacam itu, maka hukuman mati dengan sendirinya tidak berlaku buat mereka. Ini sesuai dengan satu diktum al-qawa’id al-fiqhiyyah (legal maxims): Al-hukmu yaduru ma’a al ‘illati wujudan wa ‘adaman (berlaku atau tidaknya suatu hukum bergantung pada ada atau tidaknya ‘illat (alasan hukum) yang mendasarinya).

Yang menarik, pendapat Mahmud Syalthut ini juga digemakan kembali oleh Tariq Ramadan, pemikir Islam Eropa kontemporer yang sekaligus juga cucu Hasan Al-Banna, pendiri garakan Ikhwanul Muslimin. Dalam satu wawancarnya yang pernah dimuat di Nesweek dan Washington Post, Tariq Ramadan menyampaikan pandangannya tentang apostasy dalam Islam sebagi berikut:

In the Islamic legal tradition, “apostasy” known as “ridda” is related to changing one’s religion and its injunction is mainly based on two prophetic sayings (ahadith) both quoted in sahih Bukhari (9,83 and 84): “The one who changes his religion, kill him” and another tradition noting that among the three categories of people who can be killed is “the one who leaves the community”. The great majority of the Muslim scholars, from all the different traditions and throughout history, have been of the opinion that changing one’s religion is prohibited in Islam and should be sanctioned by the death penalty.

Nevertheless we find, in very early studies and writings, several Muslim scholars having a different approach. The jurist Ibrahîm al-Nakha’î (8th), Sufyân ath-Thawrî (8th) in his renowned work on the prophetic tradition (Al-Jâmi’ al Kabîr, Al-Jâmi’ al-Saghîr) as well as the hanafi jurist Shams ad-Dîn as-Sarakhsî (11th) – among others- hold other views. They question the absolute authenticity of the two prophetic traditions quoted above. They also argue that nothing is mentioned in the Qur’an pertaining to this very sensitive issue and add that there is no evidence of the Prophet killing someone only because he/she changed his/her religion.

The Prophet took firm measures, only in time of war, against people who had falsely converted to Islam for the sole purpose of infiltrating the Islamic community to obtain information they then passed on to the enemy. They were in fact betrayers engaging in high treason who incurred the penalty of death because their actions were liable to bring about the destruction of the Muslim community and the two prophetic traditions quoted above should be read in this very specific context.

In light of the texts (Qur’an and prophetic traditions) and the way the Prophet behaved with the people who left Islam (like Hishâm and ‘Ayyash) or who converted to Christianity (such as Ubaydallah ibn Jahsh), it should be stated that one who changes her/his religion should not be killed. In Islam, there can be no compulsion or coercion in matters of faith not only because it is explicitly forbidden in the Qur’an but also because free conscious and choice and willing submission are foundational to the first pillar (declaration of faith) and essential to the very definition of “Islam”. Therefore, someone leaving Islam or converting to another religion must be free to do so and her/his choice must be respected. (Untuk wawancara lengkapnya, lihat: http://www.tariqramadan.com/Muslim-Scholars-Speak-Out.html ).

Penutup

Telaah saya terhadap aspek historis (bagian pertma dan kedua) dan aspek doktrinal (bagin ketiga) menyangkut gerakan nabi palsu dan status orang murtad menurut Islam pada prinsipnya ingin menunjukkan betapa klaim Dr. Syamsuddin Arif dan Ahmad Rofiqi bahwa orang murtad wajib diperangi dan dihukum mati semata-mata karena kemurtadannya terbukti sama sekali tidak ditopang oleh fakta historis dan dalil syar’i yang bisa dipertanggungjawabkan.

Ahmad Rofiqi dalam tulisnnya menyebut artikel saya di Koran Tempo yang ia tanggapi sebagai mengandung “aroma liberalisme sinkretis” (saya nggak paham maksud istilah ini, AS) yang “mendistorsi dan memanipulasi” data historis. Rofiqi juga menuduh saya sebagai “menghalalkan segala cara,” “pembela nabi palsu dan aliran sesat,” dan “berdusta kepada masyarakat Islam di negerinya sendiri.” Sungguh ironis bahwa seorang yang mengaku sebagai intelektual begitu gampangnya memberikan label-label yang penuh prasangka terhadap pihak yang berbeda pendapat dengannya. Ironis bahwa tuduhan2 serem ini keluar dari kalangan akademisi, “alumni pasca-sarjana Ibnu Khaldun,” yang mestinya menjunjung soal adab dalam berpolemik. Kalau sudah begitu, saya tidak bisa menahan diri untuk punya pikiran semacam ini: perbedaan antara posisi saya dan Rofiqi sesungguhnya bukanlah antara “liberal” versus “salafis,” melainkan antara sikap yang mengakui pentingnya kritik ilmiah dan kesadaran historis dalam mendaras agama dengan sikap yang berlumur dengan prasangka dan dogmatisme.

Yang juga tak kalah ironis, Dr. Syamsuddin Arif menyebut dirinya sebagai pakar orientalis. Tapi anehnya, pandangan keislamannya—setidaknya tercermin dalam tanggapannya terhadap artikel saya—justru memperkukuh stereotip tentang Islam yang dulu sering didengungkan sejumlah orientalis, yakni stereotip tentang Islam sebagai agama yang penuh kekerasan dan intoleransi, Islam yang sama sekali jauh dari kesan damai dan tanpa paksaan. Bukankah gambaran Islam yang seperti itu yang dulu sering dilantunkan oleh sejumlah orientalis Barat, dengan maksud untuk memojokkan Islam, untuk senantiasa memposisikan Islam sebagai “the other” dari Barat? Dengan demikian, disadari atau tidak, dalam hal pandangannya tentang Islam, pakar orientalis dari International Islamic University (IIU) Malasyia ini justru mengamini kaum orientalis.

Wallahu A’lam bi-al Shawab.

*Aktivis Komunitas Nahdlatul ‘Ulama (KNU) di Amerika Serikat

http://islamlib.com/id/artikel/sikap-nabi-terhadap-nabi-palsu