Declarations and the Indonesian Constitution on Religious Freedom

Al-Jamiah Vol 49 No 2 2011 


Alexius Andang L. Binawan
Atmajaya University, Jakarta, Indonesia

Abstract
One of controversial issues in Indonesia regarding human rights is concerning religious freedom. There were two contradict opinions on the issue, i.e. those who preferred Indonesia as an Islamic state, with a consequence that there is only very limited religious freedom and those who preferred secular state with a wider religious freedom. Though finally Indonesia adopted Pancasila (five pillars) as the state ideology, as a mid-way between the two, final agreement on the problem is from being finalised as debates are still carried out. This paper is aimed at analysing how and where the ‘pendulum’ is swinging between two contrasting views since Indonesia has signed both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and also the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights. I argue that during the New Order Indonesia, the pendulum on religious freedom swung closer to Islamic view.

[Salah satu isu terkait Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia adalah mengenai kebebasan agama. Setidaknya ada dua cara pandang yang saling bertentangan, yaitu (1) yang menghendaki bentuk negara Islam, konsekuensinya adalah kebebasan agama sangatlah terbatas, dan (2) yang menginginkan negara sekuler yang mengindikasikan kebebasan agama lebih luas. Indonesia mengadopsi Pancasila sebagai ideologi negara dan sebagai jalan tengah antara kubu negara Islam dan sekuler, namun perdebatan mengenai bentuk negara tersebut terus saja bergulir. Artikel ini menganalisis bagaimana dan ke mana ‘pendulum’ bergerak di antara dua pandangan yang saling bertentangan di atas. Semasa Orde Baru, pendulum tersebut condong ke kubu Islam.]

Keywords: human rights, Pancasila, religious freedom

The Twelver Shi‘i Understanding on the Finality of Prophethood

 Al-Jamiah Vol 48 No 1 2010

R. Cecep Lukman Yasin
State Islamic University (UIN) Maulana Malik Ibrahim, Malang, Indonesia

AbstractThis article discusses the issue of the finality of prophethood, an issue that is considered as a fundamental principle of Islam. Although the Qur’an (33:40) has explicitly mentioned that the prophethood has ended with Muhammad, the khatam al-nabiyyin, two scholars Yohanan Friedmann and Ignaz Goldziher argued that the issue did not gain universal acceptance because the primary meaning of the phrase, the khatam al-nabiyyin, is not certain. The doctrine of the finality of prophethood was used to refute and silence the claims of other individuals to prophecy. The focus of this paper is exploring and examining the Qur’anic phrase, the khatam al-nabiyyin, and the doctrine of the finality of prophethood from Shi’i’s perspective. Two main questions would be addressed this article: 1) how the Shi’i theologians and western scholars differentiate between a Messenger and a Prophet? 2) How to understand the Shi’i doctrine of the finality of prophethood in the light of the doctrine of the Imamate? The article comes to conclusion that, within Shi‘i thought, there are two views in regard to the doctrine of the finality of prophethood: one tradition accepted the Shi‘i position that prophethood and messengership have indeed come to an end, and the other tradition, while never outright rejecting the doctrine, it sought to continuously expand the boundaries of orthodoxy and explore other interpretations of the doctrine of finality.

On Human Rights and the Qur'aic Perspective: Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Apostasy

Al-Jamiah Vol 45 No.2 2007

Syafa’atun Almirzanah
Faculty of Ushuluddin, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta

Abstract

It is often argued that Islam is not compatible with modernity. This can be seen for instance in the fact of the problem that Islam faces to the challenge of universal values of human rights. Built on this supposition, the present article discusses on the great extent the question of religious freedom in Islam. As freedom of religion in the framework of universal declaration of human rights can mean as freedom to change religion, this contradicts to Islamic prohibition of apostasy, punishable with death penalty. The author argues that Islam in fact guarantees religious freedom. This is clear from the Quranic injunctions assuring the freedom of choice whether to embrace Islam or not. Such a freedom is however often contradicted to one prophetic tradition sanctioning death penalty for apostasy. In her view, the author believes that the hadith more in attunes to the political strategy of the prophet to safe Muslim community from any acts of treason or sedition. Death penalty for apostasy is thus not related to the mere personal crime of changing religion but more that of public law related to war or crimes against state. More relying on the modern interpretation of the Quranic verses as well as the prophetic traditions, the author concludes that Islam is in conjunction with the modern values of religious freedom in which personal choice of religion or belief is the backbone of human rights.

Vast majority of the world faces restrictions on religion, study finds

By Richard Allen Greene, CNN

December 17, 2009 2:19 p.m. EST

 

(CNN) -- Intan Suci Nurhati was on her way to a religious gathering when her sisters called to say they were under attack.
"They were running for their safety as they called," she said. "When I heard, I realized how far it was to the main compound, and I was like, 'Oh, my God.' "
Nurhati and her family are members of a Muslim minority sect called the Ahmadi, who hold annual gatherings in each country where they have a community. It was in July 2005 that the Indonesian gathering came under attack by -- Nurhati estimates -- 10,000 people throwing stones.
The protesters outnumbered the Ahmadi by 100 to 1.
Nurhati was on her way to the gathering in Parung, West Java province, from the capital Jakarta with a member of the Indonesian Parliament when the attack happened.
By the time she arrived, houses and books had been burned, she said.
"No one was killed, but there were some minor injuries from the throwing of rocks. We decided to call off the conference. It was unsafe to go on with the gathering," said Nurhati, 27, a graduate student studying climate change at Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, Georgia.
"There was so much anger in their faces," said Nurhati, a native of Indonesia who has been living in the United States for 10 years.

Explainer: Restrictions on religion

Police provided buses to get the Ahmadi community to safety, but Nurhati does not know of any arrests or prosecutions as a result of the attack.
"It was really disappointing. We have the right to be there. But the police were trying to minimize the clashes, rather than trying to say we have the right to be there," she said.
Indonesia -- the most populous Muslim country in the world -- is often touted as an example of tolerance and democracy in the Islamic world.
But a huge new study suggests it's actually among the most restrictive countries in the world when it comes to religion.
The study charted publicly reported incidents of religious violence, intolerance, intimidation and discrimination in 198 countries and territories from mid-2006 to mid-2008, its authors said. Brian Grim, the lead researcher on the project, said he worked on the study for more than three years.
The report looks not only at legal restrictions, but also at how laws are implemented and how social tensions restrict freedom of religion, even where there is no official or legal bar against the practice.
Indonesia has both.
In fact, more than two out of three people around the world live in countries with high or very high restrictions on religion, according to the report, which claims to be the first to systematically measure religious discrimination.
It produced some surprising findings and makes it possible to compare countries in ways that could not be done before, its authors say.
"Most reports don't try to quantify," Grim said. "What you are left with is studies that don't allow you to see patterns."
The study, "Global Restrictions on Religion," found some interesting ones.

This one is looking more in depth at what ... affects a person's ability to freely practice religion in society.
--Brian Grim, lead researcher on the project

For example, "religion-related violence happens in the majority of countries, but only in one in 10 does that escalate" to terrorism causing casualties, Grim said.
The study tracked violence between religious groups in 126 countries -- 64 percent of the countries in the survey. But there was religion-related terrorism leading to injury or death in only 17 countries -- 9 percent of those in the study.
In about a quarter of all countries, majority groups use force or threat of force against minority religions, according to the study, from the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life in Washington.
Nearly half of all countries restrict the activities of foreign missionaries or prohibit them altogether.
Ninety percent have some requirement that religious groups register with the government, usually in return for some benefit such as a tax exemption. But in 40 percent of countries, those registration requirements result in major problems for those groups.
"Others often focus on naming and shaming, but this one is looking more in depth at what goes on on the street in countries -- what affects a person's ability to freely practice religion in society," Grim said. "Sometimes, one incident of violence can affect a whole country."
The report also makes it possible to compare what kinds of restrictions are placed on religious practices in different countries.
China, for example, has tight legal controls on the practice of religion, but has has relatively little social conflict over faith. India, by contrast, has only moderate government restrictions on religious observance, but very high levels of social hostility -- primarily between Muslims and Hindus.
Brazil has the lowest ratings in both categories among the 25 largest countries in the world, while Pakistan has the highest, followed closely by Indonesia. Egypt, Iran and Bangladesh also rate poorly for religious freedom, while Japan, the United States, South Africa, Italy and the United Kingdom score well.
European governments place more restrictions on religion than do governments in sub-Saharan Africa or South America, the survey concluded.

So in the United States, what does a Muslim woman who wears a hijab in a small city feel?
--Alan Cooperman, associate director of research, Pew Forum

RELATED TOPICS

• Religion
• Islam
• Hinduism
• Guantanamo Bay
• Fort Hood

While the U.S. has a low level of government restriction on religion, it does experience a moderate amount of social tension, the report found.
"The test is not whether someone who belongs to the majority faith and is affluent and is socially advanced feels restrictions, but whether religious minorities do," said Alan Cooperman, associate director of research at the Pew Forum. "So in the United States, what does a Muslim woman who wears a hijab in a small city feel?"
Religious discrimination in the United States is not simply a matter of people feeling uncomfortable, he added.
"Law enforcement officials report to the FBI every year on hate crimes, including religious bias," he said. "There were about 1,400 each year [in the study], and they were reported in nearly all 50 states. Those crimes run the gamut, but they include arsons."
The U.S. was also marked down because of the Bush administration's "global war on terror," Grim said.
"The fact [is] that we have detainees from a war that at least one side is calling religion-related -- the Guantanamo detainees," he said.
Neither the September 11, 2001, attacks and their aftermath, nor the shootings at Fort Hood in Texas this year were included in the time period covered by the study, he said, but both could have increased the U.S. score for social hostilities based on religion, Grim said.
"Scores are not fixed. Situations can change, which is why we are looking at this as an over-time study," he said. "Countries and societies will change in how they respond to the situations they face."
In fact, the authors plan to revisit the question of religious restrictions regularly, so they can track changes over time, and the U.S. might rank differently when the Fort Hood shootings are included -- if investigators rule that they were motivated at least partly by religion.
The study authors do not assign motives to incidents of discrimination, instead relying on local sources to determine the causes.
The study does not rank countries from "best" to "worst" -- saying such a list would not be meaningful -- but instead groups them into those with very high restrictions, high restrictions, moderate or low.

It does not include North Korea, because there is not enough reliable data from the reclusive communist state, the authors said.

Retrieved from: http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/17/religious.restrictions/index.html

 

Kebebasan Beragama 2013: Tiga Catatan

Indonesia-2014.com

Oleh Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

12 January 2013

Tidak ada kabar baik menyertai para jamaah Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI) Taman Yasmin di penghujung tahun 2012 yang baru lalu. Seperti tahun sebelumnya, mereka masih harus merayakan Natal tahun ini di luar tempat ibadah yang sudah lama mereka idam-idamkan tapi tak kunjung dapatkan. Itu pun tak selamanya berlangsung dengan aman dan tanpa ancaman.

Ini satu tantangan kebebasan beragama yang terus menghantui kita di tahun 2012: ada kelompok tertentu yang tidak bisa menikmati hak untuk bebas beragama seperti dijanjikan konstitusi, karena pembangunan tempat ibadah mereka terhalangi. Kontroversi muncul terutama mengenai pembangunan gereja di tengah-tengah komunitas yang didominasi kaum Muslim. Tapi kontroversi juga muncul menyangkut pembangunan Masjid Nur Musofir, misalnya, di Batuplat, Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur, yang didominasi umat Kristiani.

Ini mencerminkan adanya masalah dalam pengelolaan hubungan yang harmonis di antara kelompok-kelompok mayoritas dan minoritas agama di daerah-daerah tertentu. Salah satu sebab mengapa umat Kristiani di NTT menghalang-halangi pendirian masjid, kata salah satu peneliti yang sedang mempelajari kasus itu, adalah karena umat Islam melakukan hal yang sama di Jawa. “Itu seperti balas dendam,” lapornya. Tantangan lainnya, kedua, adalah intensifikasi aksi-aksi kekerasan yang menyertai konflik-konflik keagamaan. Jika tahun lalu ada tiga anggota Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) yang terbunuh dalam peristiwa anti-JAI di Cikeusik, Banten, kini jumlah korban meninggal lebih banyak. Akhir Agustus lalu, dua orang meninggal dalam kekerasan anti-Syiah di Sampang, Madura, Jawa Timur. Lalu, pada akhir Oktober, tiga orang menjadi korban amuk massa di Bireun, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Yang sangat mengerikan dan membuat kita bergidik, dua di antaranya dibakar hidup-hidup!

Dalam kasus-kasus ini, yang menjadi alasan mengapa aksi-aksi kekerasan, bahkan pembunuhan, dianggap layak dilakukan adalah karena kelompok mayoritas tertentu merasa bahwa kelompok-kelompok tertentu menyebarkan kesesatan. Dan di tengah-tengah itu, negara tidak melakukan apa-apa. Bahkan, di tempat-tempat tertentu, ada indikasi bahwa negara malah mengkriminalisasi para korban.

Sebagian kalangan – aktivis kebebasan beragama di dalam dan luar negeri, tapi juga para pengamat dan sarjana – mulai berbicara mengenai Pakistanisasi Indonesia. Di koran berbahasa Inggris Jakarta Post, debat ini sempat melibatkan Duta Besar Pakistan di Indonesia, yang merasa bahwa penggambaran mengenai negerinya berlebih-lebihan. Ini merujuk kepada intensifikasi aksi-aksi kekerasan terhadap kelompok minoritas, baik dari segi jumlah maupun skala.

Saya tidak akan mendeskripsikan kasus-kasus di atas lebih jauh. Mereka yang bekerja memonitor naik dan turun kebebasan beragama kita akan mencatat kasus-kasus ini secara lebih lengkap dan terinci. Di bawah ini saya ingin mendiskusikan tiga hal yang patut digarisbawahi dari perkembangan-perkembangan di atas.

Mahalnya Ongkos Kepemimpinan Buruk
Catatan pertama terkait lemahnya kepemimpinan Presiden Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Ini bukan masalah kontroversial, karena bahkan kalangan awam sekalipun sudah banyak bicara mengenainya.
Saya mencatat faktor ini karena dalam perkara jaminan kebebasan beragama, model kepemimpinannya tidak saja buruk pada dirinya sendiri, tetapi juga membawa dampak yang jauh lebih buruk pada tingkat-tingkat kepemimpinan lain di bawahnya. Dalam istilah agama, model kepemimpinan ini bukan saja sesat (dhallun) tetapi juga menyesatkan (mudhillun). Ini misalnya berbeda dari dampak kepemimpinannya dalam bidang ekonomi: PDB tetap meningkat dan investasi terus masuk meskipun kepemimpinan SBY sendiri lemah.

Baru-baru ini (lihat Jakarta Post, 21 Desember 2012), dampak buruk ini diakui bahkan oleh Wakapolri Nanan Sukarna. Dia dikutip menyatakan: “We are conscious of human rights. We have internalized human rights values. However, we are very much influenced by politics. The country’s leadership and public policies determine our responses when dealing with religious conflicts.”

Banyak laporan menyebutkan bahwa aksi-aksi kekerasan atas nama agama dilakukan dengan legitimasi fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) mengenai aliran-aliran sesat. Penting diingat, fatwa-fatwa ini adalah hasil Kongres ketujuh MUI (26-29 Juli 2005), yang dibuka SBY. Dalam pidatonya, SBY menyatakan: “Kami membuka pintu hati, pikiran kami untuk setiap saat menerima pandangan, rekomendasi dan fatwa dari MUI maupun dari para ulama, baik langsung kepada saya, kepada saudara Menteri Agama, atau kepada jajaran pemerintah yang lain. Kami ingin meletakkan MUI untuk berperan secara sentral yang menyangkut akidah ke-Islaman, dengan demikian akan jelas bedanya mana-mana yang itu merupakan atau wilayah pemerintahan kenegaraan, dan mana-mana yang pemerintah atau negara sepatutnya mendengarkan fatwa dari MUI dan para ulama.”

Pernyataan itu, yang sengaja saya kutip agak panjang dan apa adanya, menunjukkan betapa SBY seperti sedang cari muka kepada MUI. Ini jelas harus disayangkan. Selain kepada MUI, dia juga wajib bertanya kepada lembaga seperti Komnas HAM, yang jelas berwenang menangani masalah kebebasan beragama.
Banyak catatan menyebutkan, rekor kebebasan beragama kita secara konsisten memburuk sejak 2008 – dengan skala kekerasan terburuk berlangsung pada dua tahun terakhir. Di tahun 2013, tahun terakhir kepresidennya, SBY harus mengambil langkah-langkah tegas untuk memperbaiki kesalahan-kesalahan kebijakannya di masa lalu.

Ini harus dia lakukan bukan dengan pernyataan penyesalan sesudah peristiwa kekerasan berlangsung. Melainkan, dia harus memimpin peneguhan kembali hak-hak kelompok minoritas agama dari berbagai segi.
Di antara aktor-aktor lain di Indonesia, SBY adalah aktor dengan sumber daya politik paling besar untuk membalikkan situasi di atas. Dia bisa memobilisasi para pemimpin agama, juga para pemimpin lainnya, untuk melakukan hal itu. Jika tidak demikian, dia akan dicatat sejarah republik ini sebagai presiden yang paling buruk rekornya dalam membela hak-hak kelompok minoritas agama di negeri pluralis ini. Jika Pakistanisasi Indonesia nanti terbukti, beberapa dekade kemudian, dia akan dikecam sebagai pionirnya.

Kerukunan versus Kebebasan
Catatan kedua terkait dengan dasar pertimbangan yang sering digunakan aparat pemerintah dalam menangani konflik-konflik keagamaan. Rekor kebebasan beragama kita di tahun 2012 ditandai oleh makin dominannya pendekatan “kerukunan”, dalam persaingannya dengan pendekatan “kebebasan”, dalam penanganan atas konflik-konflik ini. Pada yang pertama, tidak penting siapa yang salah atau benar. Yang penting adalah kembalinya order, tatanan, meski kedamaian yang tercipta dalam kerukunan yang dipaksakan itu hanya semu.

Inilah yang mendasari mengapa pemerintah memilih opsi relokasi kelompok Syi`ah menyusul konflik keagamaan di Sampang, Madura. Dengan begini, memasuki 2013, kita akan dihadapkan pada masalah pengungsi baru yang kita ciptakan sendiri: ada 63 keluarga di sana, terdiri atas 282 orang, yang jatah makannya sekarang, apalagi nanti, entah siapa yang tanggung. Padahal kita tahu, di Transito, Mataram, masih ada 115 orang pengungsi akibat kekerasan anti-JAI pada 2007: terdiri atas 36 keluarga, di mana tiap keluarga dipisahkan oleh kain atau kerdus bekas seluas 3x2 meter persegi, mereka sulit memeroleh KTP baru, yang belakangan mempersulit mereka mengurus surat-surat resmi lainnya. Kita seperti keledai yang tidak bisa mengambil pelajaran dari berlaku bodoh di masa lalu.

Pendekatan kerukunan umumnya ditempuh aparat pemerintah karena membela kebebasan, yang biasanya menjadi tuntutan kelompok minoritas, tidak menguntungkan secara politis. Ini ditunjang oleh tersedianya aturan mengenai penodaan agama (KUHP Pasal 156a), yang eksistensinya bahkan diteguhkan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) pada 2010. Dalam politik elektoral seperti yang berlangsung sekarang, kesempatan ini dimanfaatkan oleh para politisi untuk menarik dukungan massa dengan meminggirkan kelompok minoritas agama atau dengan tidak membela mereka ketika konflik terjadi.

Yang menyedihkan, ini diakui sendiri oleh Mendagri Gamawan Fauzi dalam pembelaannya terhadap banyak aturan yang bernuansa Syari`ah di berbagai wilayah di Indonesia. Dan bahkan yang lebih buruk dari itu, justru aturan mengenai penodaan inilah yang hendak dimajukan Presiden SBY ke dunia internasional sebagai “sumbangan Indonesia” bagi perdamaian dunia!

Belajar dari Kasus-kasus “Positif”
Karena alasan-alasan di atas, dapat dipastikan bahwa model pendekatan kerukunan masih akan mendominasi cara penanganan konflik-konflik keagamaan di Indonesia di masa depan. Apalagi 2013 adalah tahun persiapan menjelang pemilihan umum presiden di tahun berikutnya (2014), di mana para politisi akan memanfaatkan segala cara untuk meraih dukungan politik.

Yang menarik, dan ini catatan ketiga saya, kasus-kasus seperti disebutkan di atas tidak umum terjadi di seluruh pelosok negeri ini. Kasus-kasusnya memang meningkat, dan ini jelas alarming, tetapi Indonesia sebagai satu unit dan keseluruhan jelas (masih) bisa dibedakan dari Pakistan. Tolong saya tidak disalahpahami: saya tidak sedang merayakan aksi-aksi kekerasan atas nama agama, tetapi sedang mengajak Anda untuk mengambil pelajaran dari kasus-kasus di mana hal itu tidak terjadi di cukup banyak tempat di Indonesia. Inilah kasus-kasus yang saya sebut “positif”.

Misalnya sering dikatakan bahwa posisi MUI begitu berpengaruh, sehingga efek fatwanya kepada kekerasan harus dinisbatkan kepadanya juga. Setahu saya, belum ada riset sistematis mengenai hal ini. Saya sendiri meragukan klaim itu, karena jika demikian, fatwa MUI akan melahirkan kekerasan di mana-mana. Kenyataannya tidak: sebagian Muslim Indonesia tidak peduli dengannya, sebagian lainnya bahkan menertawakannya.

Ada jarak cukup panjang, berisi rangkaian mekanisme dan proses, agar sebuah fatwa (artinya: opini) tentang sesatnya kelompok tertentu berbuah menjadi aksi kekerasan atas kelompok itu, oleh orang lain yang dipengaruhi opini bersangkutan. Selain fatwa penyesatan dari MUI, si fulan yang dipengaruhi fatwa itu memerlukan: (a) kemauan untuk melakukan aksi-aksi kekerasan dengan dukungan fatwa itu, (b) kemampuan untuk melakukannya, dan (c) kesempatan untuk melakukannya (misalnya, polisi tidak menghalangi, kalau bukan malah mendukungnya).

Mekanisme dan proses inilah yang harus ditelusuri. Dari riset kami di PUSAD Paramadina yang masih berlangsung, misalnya, kami menemukan pola pemolisian yang saling bertentangan terhadap aksi-aksi anti-JAI di Manislor dan di Cikeusik. Meski sama-sama ditopang sentimen anti-JAI yang kuat dan sama-sama berlangsung di Jawa Barat, sangat jelas kelihatan bahwa ketegasan aparat polisi ada di yang pertama dan absen di yang kedua. Apa sumber ketegasan itu, terlalu panjang diceritakan di sini. Tapi semuanya bukan mustahil untuk dipelajari dan ditiru di tempat-tempat lain.

Hal yang sama juga ditemukan jika kita membandingkan bagaimana polisi menangani aksi-aksi anti-Syi`ah di Sampang, Madura, dan di Bangil, keduanya di Jawa Timur. Itu akan tampak jika kita menelusuri kapan konflik bermula dan bereskalasi, apa yang dilakukan para pemimpin – agama, politik, dan lainnya – di masing-masing tahapan konflik itu, dan bagaimana aparat polisi memberi reaksi.

Pakistanisasi Indonesia?
Dalam perdebatan mengenai Pakistanisasi Indonesia, Dubes Pakistan mencela para kritikus Pakistan sebagai sedang menjelek-jelekkan negara itu. Dari berbagai laporan mengenai apa yang terjadi di negara itu, kita tahu dia sedang berbohong. Bukankah tugas seorang dubes di negara tertentu memang berbohong tentang negaranya demi kepentingan negaranya itu?

Terlepas dari itu, saya sendiri tidak terlalu yakin dengan argumen Pakistanisasi Indonesia. Pertama, di sini tidak ada Taliban yang di Pakistan seperti bebas menjalankan aksi-aksi kekerasannya bahkan di siang bolong. Di Indonesia, aksi-aksi kekerasan atas nama agama masih kuat dikecam orang dan masih membuat pemerintah malu, meski langkah lanjutan dari rasa malu atau kecaman itu belum tentu ada atau efektif.
Kedua, beda dari Pakistan yang sejak pertama didirikan atas nama Islam, Indonesia adalah negara yang sejak lahirnya plural. Dari segi konstitusi dan elektoral, juga jelas bahwa kaum Muslim Indonesia, dulu dan sekarang, tidak mendukung Pakistanisasi Indonesia.

Tapi apa yang mustahil terjadi di kolong langit ini? Apalagi jika kita memang membiarkannya terjadi.

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi adalah Direktur Pusat Studi Agama dan demokrasi (PUSAD), Yayasan Paramadina, dan dosen pada Universitas Paramadina, Jakarta.

Retrieved from: http://www.indonesia-2014.com/read/2013/01/12/kebebasan-beragama-2013-tiga-catatan#.UPQzqPL4aeZ

Indonesia Violence: 'Something Radically Wrong'

CIKEUSIK, Indonesia -- Christians often face persecution in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country. But other Muslims have also been attacked by radical Islamists in their own country.
In February, religious fanaticism boiled over in the small village of Cikeusik. A mob of more than 1,000 Muslim hardliners attacked 17 members of a small Islamic sect known as the Ahmadiyah.
Wielding machetes, and shouting "Kafir!" - the Arabic word for infidel - they threw rocks at the Ahmadis and mercilessly clubbed three of them to death.
Many Muslims consider the Ahmadis to be infidels because they do not accept Mohammed as the final prophet. Instead, Ahmadis embrace their Hindu founder, Ghulam Ahmad as savior and messiah.
After the ferocious attack, the Ahmadis abandoned their homes and none of them dared set foot in Cikeusik again.
"We were traumatized when they attacked the house of the Ahmadis who lived right next door. But I'm glad they're gone," said Wildan bin Satim, a former neighbor of an Ahmadi family.
"They have a different belief. They don't pray with us in the mosque," he said. "They are a cult and we don't want them in our village."
Twelve men who were part of the brutal murders are now back in the village after serving just five months in prison.
This incident has once again raised questions on the intolerance of this country towards religious minorities.
One Victim's Story
Deden Sudjana, a victim of the sectarian violence, almost lost his arm defending himself from a machete attack.
As the security officer for the Ahmadiyah, he was trying to peacefully negotiate with the police before the attacks ensued.
Sudjana was charged with disobeying the police and inciting violence. He was sentenced to six months in prison.
The Islamists responsible for murdering the Ahmadis received only three to five months behind bars.
Sudjana is angry that his attackers are free and have even been given a hero's welcome home while he's still in jail.
His lawyers say he can an appeal his conviction, but Sudjana would rather not try.
"Deden is depressed. He said that he cannot stand prison life and so he will not make an appeal," Andi Mutaqqien, his attorney, said.
"Because in this country, most of the time when the case involves religious minorities, the attackers -- mostly Muslim hardliners -- get less of a sentence than the victims," he said.
"And when the victims make an appeal, there's the danger of getting a longer prison term," he noted.
"It is scary for me to see Muslims kill fellow Muslims. I believe all religions come with peace; They teach about peace and how to help others," Firdaus Mubarik, an Ahmadiyah spokesperon, told CBN News.
"Like our fellow Indonesians, we fought for the independence of this country. But until now, we are still fighting for our freedom," Mubarik added. "I hope this government will protect the freedom of their people including the Ahmadis."
'As If They Are Not Human'
Christian churches are also targeted by Muslim hardliners. In recent years, Christian churches have been closed and Christian schools and students attacked.
Despite this persecution, government officials remain silent.
"It will condemn violence in generic terms. But it won't urge the government to take a stand in protection of Indonesian citizens whatever their beliefs," Sydney Jones, director of the International Crisis Group, said.
"And it won't take a stand in support of constitutionally protective freedom of religion," Jones said.
"These are not just pre-meditated murders. These are lynch mobs or individuals taking stones and clubs, smashing the skulls until these people were dead," he explained.
"It's as though these people were no longer human beings on either side," he said. "The people they were targeting, they didn't see as human beings any longer and when a society comes to that point there's something radically wrong."
One of those brutally killed in the attack was Mubarik's friend, Chandra. Chandra and his wife waited for a long time for their first child, but sadly he was killed just weeks before their child was born.
Mubarik is hoping that justice will be served for Chandra and his son and for all the other victims, even if it takes a whole generation.
*Original broadcast Sept. 16, 2011.

http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/September/Indonesia-Violence-Something-Radically-Wrong-/

Indonesia's Religious Intolerance On A Dramatic Rise

In this Thursday, July 26, 2011 photo, Dani bin Misra, one of the suspects in the brutal lynching of three Ahmadiyah sect members in February, sits on the defendant's chair during his sentencing at the district court in Serang, Indonesia. 

 

By NINIEK KARMINI   08/ 9/11 06:33 AM ET  

CIKEUSIK, Indonesia -- When Dani bin Misra was released from prison last week after serving just three months for smashing in the skull of a member of a Muslim sect, this conservative Indonesian town let out a triumphant cry.
"He's a hero!" Rasna bin Wildan said of the teenage killer.
The ferociousness of the attack, captured on video and circulated widely on the Internet, guaranteed no one from the Ahmadiyah group would dare set foot in Cikeusik again, the 38-year-old farmer said as others nodded in agreement.
Their reaction is part of a wider wave of intolerance against religious minorities that is challenging Indonesia's image as a beacon of how Islam and liberalism can coexist.
Once the preserve of hard-line preachers, the hatred of Ahmadis now seems to be spreading among ordinary people in pockets of the world's most populous Muslim nation. Whether the government can check this and other intolerance could be key to how Indonesia, home to 240 million people and one of the world's fastest growing economies, evolves in the 21st century.
There are reasons to worry, analysts say.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who relies heavily on Islamic parties for support in parliament, has remained silent as hard-liners shuttered Christian churches, threw Molotov cocktails at one of their theology schools, and attacked worshippers and priests with knives and clubs as they headed to morning prayers.
A string of attacks on the Ahmadiyah – including the torching of mosques and homes – only got worse after a 2008 government decree that said those who follow their practices or proselytize could face up to five years in prison.
Soon after, residents in Cikeusik, a rough-and-tumble farming community less than 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Jakarta, elected a new village chief, Muhammad Johar – the only candidate pledging to take a tough stand against the sect.
Many mainstream Muslims consider the Ahmadis heretics because they do not believe Muhammad was the final prophet.
In the eyes of the villagers, Dani and other members of the frenzied mob who killed three Ahmadis in February were just helping get the job done. Six were wounded, and the others fled with only the clothes on their backs, their houses destroyed and looted.
"I do feel bad people had to die," said Asep Setiadi, 40, as he headed out to his rice field. "But I'm grateful that they're finally gone."
Twenty-eight-year-old Siti Zubaidah, holding her baby girl in a sling as she chatted with a neighbor, had nothing but praise for Dani.
"We had to clean our village," added Wildan bin Satim, 72. "This is no place for the followers of a cult."
The Ahmadiyah, established in 1889 in India, consider its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a savior and messiah, counter to traditional Islamic teaching. They have tens of millions of members worldwide and around 200,000 in Indonesia.
They were not always unwelcome in Cikeusik, where men carry swords as they walk the dusty, potholed roads after nightfall to ward off beggars, thieves and other potential troublemakers.
Matori Abdullah was the first Ahmadi to arrive.
He, his wife and eight children lived peacefully alongside other Muslims in the 1980s and early '90s, attending the same mosque and religious ceremonies.
But the situation began to deteriorate after the ouster in 1998 of longtime dictator Suharto, who had suppressed hard-liners and even discouraged the wearing of headscarves by women.
Conservatives in Cikeusik used a newfound freedom of expression to insult the Ahmadiyah, who by then numbered about 35, most of them part of Abdullah's extended family.
Clerics raised questions during sermons about the validity of their faith, and residents whispered as they passed in the streets.
"Sometimes teachers would tell the class the Ahmadis are heretics," said 15-year-old Arief Muhammad Zainal, now living in fear in the outskirts of Jakarta with others from the village. "The other students would point and stare. Other times kids would pinch or slap me, muttering 'Ahmadiyah boy' as they passed."
Over time, the Ahmadis started to withdraw. In 2009, they used a $15,000 donation to build a concrete house for their religious ceremonies and stopped going to the mosque.
"They refused to pray with us," said Johar, the village chief. "So how should we consider them as Muslim?"
Visitors would flock to the house from neighboring towns, sparking rumors they were trying to recruit new members.
On Feb. 6, as the Ahmadis were preparing to entertain guests from Jakarta, a mob of 1,500 from Cikeusik and neighboring villages approached with machetes, rocks and wooden clubs.
They surrounded the house and set it ablaze.
Women and children fled, screaming. Some of the men stood firm, fighting back with whatever they could grab, but they were far outnumbered.
"Kill! Kill!" the crowd chanted. "Burn! Burn!"
By the time a video camera was rolling, two men lay naked and lifeless in the mud. The attackers continued to hammer their bodies with bamboo sticks, each thud met with a cheer.
Dani, wearing a black leather jacket and a white skull cap, was the most brutal. The 17-year-old smashed a rock repeatedly into the skull of Roni Pasaroni as the crowd yelled "Allahu Akbar" or God is Great.
The attack, just a few months after U.S. President Barack Obama held up Indonesia as an example of religious tolerance, sparked global condemnation.
In a rare departure, Yudhoyono called for the perpetrators to be caught and punished, leading to the arrest and trial of Dani and 11 other suspects.
But human rights groups say police, under pressure by hard-liners, did not carry out a proper investigation. Prosecutors, claiming the Ahmadis were instigators, didn't call key eyewitnesses.
The relatively lenient sentences handed down last week – three to six months – surprised even Dani's family. Taking into account time served, the teen was released almost immediately. He returned to the nearby village of Cikadu, where he was shielded from the media by his parents.
The Ahmadis from Cikeusik are in hiding. "We live in fear now," said Nayati, a mother of four. "Everyday we are afraid they'll find us and kill us all."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/09/indonesia-religious-intolerance_n_922037.html?view=print&comm_ref=false