Contemporary Islam, June 2014, DOI: 10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2
Daniel C. Bottomley (dbott@udel.edu)
Institute for Global Studies, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA
AbstractThe history of Islam and Indonesian nationalism has been one of constant contestation and acquiescence. Although a new openness in discussing Islamic issues has emerged within Indonesia since President Suharto’s rule came to an end, past logics of national cohesion have not dissipated and have in fact contributed to the upheaval over the Ahmadiyya’s position as Indonesian Muslims and Indonesians. Exploring Indonesian Identification Cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, otherwise known as KTP), which currently require every applying Indonesian citizen to self-identify with one of six religious options: (1) Islam; (2) Christianity; (3) Catholicism; (4) Hinduism; (5) Buddhism; and (6) Confucianism, I argue that despite the 2008 Indonesian Joint-Ministerial Decree categorizing the Ahmadis as deviant Muslims, KTP offers the group an opportunity to publically declare and receive official recognition of their Muslim identity from the Indonesian government. Thus, a situation has emerged in which contradictory governmental action problematizes religious categories and illuminates the paradoxical nature of Indonesian nationalism.
Link of the article
Daniel C. Bottomley (dbott@udel.edu)
Institute for Global Studies, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA
AbstractThe history of Islam and Indonesian nationalism has been one of constant contestation and acquiescence. Although a new openness in discussing Islamic issues has emerged within Indonesia since President Suharto’s rule came to an end, past logics of national cohesion have not dissipated and have in fact contributed to the upheaval over the Ahmadiyya’s position as Indonesian Muslims and Indonesians. Exploring Indonesian Identification Cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, otherwise known as KTP), which currently require every applying Indonesian citizen to self-identify with one of six religious options: (1) Islam; (2) Christianity; (3) Catholicism; (4) Hinduism; (5) Buddhism; and (6) Confucianism, I argue that despite the 2008 Indonesian Joint-Ministerial Decree categorizing the Ahmadis as deviant Muslims, KTP offers the group an opportunity to publically declare and receive official recognition of their Muslim identity from the Indonesian government. Thus, a situation has emerged in which contradictory governmental action problematizes religious categories and illuminates the paradoxical nature of Indonesian nationalism.
Link of the article
