Treating minorities with fatwas: a study of the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia

Contemporary Islam, Volume 8, Issue 3 , pp 285-301 DOI: 10.1007/s11562-013-0278-3

Author: Ahmad Najib Burhani
Author Affiliation: Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, Indonesia

Abstract

The term “minority religious community” in the Muslim country of Indonesia refers not only to those embracing religions other than Islam, but also to minority groups like the Ahmadiyya. Recently, the treatment of Ahmadis has been worse than the treatment of non-Muslims. This article, therefore, intends to study the status of ‘deviant’ groups under Islamic law and the treatment of them in Muslim society. Specifically, this article addresses the following questions: How did ulama in the past define and treat minority groups? How do contemporary Sunni ulama define and treat the Ahmadiyya? What is the status of this group under Islamic law? Are they apostates, heretics, or unbelievers? And what are the legal consequences of these charges? To answer these questions, this article employs two methods. First, for theoretical treatment of minority groups in the past, this article focuses its analysis on al-Ghazāli’s Fayṣal al-tafriqa and Faḍā’iḥ al-bāṭiniyya. Second, following a discussion of classical Islam, the article moves to contemporary time by analyzing fatwas against the Ahmadiyya from five institutions: the Rābiṭa al-‘Ᾱlam al-Islāmī, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Muhammadiyah, Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This article argues that, first, fatwas against the Ahmadiyya issued by these institutions were intended as a device to sustain orthodoxy of umma and, second, orthopraxy or devoutness in observing religious rituals, as practiced by the Ahmadis, does not exempt them from the charge of apostasy because theologically they are believed to deviate from orthodox beliefs.

Keywords: Ahmadiyya, Orthodoxy-orthopraxy, Apostasy, Religious minority, Fatwa, Ideological persuasion

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11562-013-0278-3

Religious Pluralism Versus Intolerance: Sectarian Violence in Indonesia

By Carool Kersten, King's College London | July 8, 2014

Religious pluralism has been under threat and sectarianism on the rise during the ten-year (2004-2014) tenure of outgoing president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (also known as SBY). During his two terms in office, Indonesia has seen rising tensions both between and within religious groups, increasing religious intolerance, and more cases of religiously inspired violence. This antagonistic climate has led to the closure and burning of churches, the displacement of Shi’i communities, physical violence against civil society activists campaigning for religious pluralism, and even the lynching of Ahmadis. Colluding local and regional authorities not only undermine the rule of law by failing to prosecute the perpetrators, but even seek to “resolve” tensions caused by the presence of minority groups by condoning—and sometimes stimulating—intimidation and hate crimes against them.^[1]

Significance of Indonesia and Its Relevance to MEI-MAP

These apparently domestic issues have wider significance for three reasons. First, in addition to being the largest Muslim nation-state in the world and a regional heavyweight in Southeast Asia, Indonesia also has the potential to become a global force on par with countries such as Russia and Brazil; second, its strategic location in an area where the United States, Chinese, and Indian interests meet makes it an important factor in the repositioning of a future world order;^[2] and finally, fifteen years of experience with a democratization process demonstrates that shaping a democratic political system for a pluralist society is hard work that must involve both institutional reform and the formation of a civil society capable of facilitating peaceful coexistence among diverse members of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population. As a self-proclaimed “natural bridge” between the Muslim world, Asia, and the West,^[3] Indonesia offers a cautionary lesson for other Muslim countries planning alternative political trajectories in the aftermath of regime change.

The History of Islam in Precolonial and Colonial “Indonesia”

Recent advances in historiography offer an important corrective to the persistent image of Indonesian Islam as a largely mystical veneer covering up older Hindu-Buddhist deposits. These findings provide a more varied and accurate picture that helps us understand religious tensions in Indonesia.
Indonesia’s way of dealing with what are the “two sides of the same coin” of religious plurality—coexistence and confrontation—is shaped by its longue durée history.^[4] As a political entity, the geographical space now known as Indonesia is a colonial and postcolonial construct encompassing a patchwork of regional cultures, which are politically dominated by the Javanese and collectively part of the greater maritime Southeast Asian milieu. While the majority of its peoples now self-identify as Muslims, this is the outcome of a lengthy and peaceful Islamization process that started relatively late. Even though Indonesian contact with the West and South Asia predates the advent of Islam, the religion did not gain a foothold among the locals until the 13th and 14th centuries. This was the beginning of a gradual process of adherence, conversion, adaptation, and interaction that continues to this day.^[5]
While giving rise to a Muslim culture unique to the island world of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, believers from this eastern periphery of the Dar al-Islam also stayed abreast of developments elsewhere through sustained contacts with the centers of Islamic learning and political power. The Indian Ocean functioned as the ecumenical contact zone of the Middle East-Asia nexus,^[6] allowing for intellectual and political exchanges that deeply impacted Indonesian society. Throughout the colonial period, Southeast Asian Muslim leaders had appealed to the Ottoman Caliph-Sultan for support against Western imperialism; in the early 19th century, pilgrims returning from Mecca to West Sumatra were inspired by Arabia’s Wahhabi movement to rise up against local notables and their colonial backers. At the start of the 20th century, Islamic leaders began establishing Muslim mass organizations (Ormas) for the emancipation of their constituencies, including the modernist Muhammadiyah in 1912, the puritanical reformist Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) in 1923, and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926. The support bases which some of these organizations can mobilize are unparalleled anywhere else. Muslim assertiveness was further stimulated by a number of other external factors, including a rise in Christian missionary activity, the arrival of movements such as the Ahmadiyya from other parts of the Muslim world, and the influx of alternative spiritual organizations, like the Theosophical Society.^[7]

The Tribulations of Indonesian Political Islam During Early Independence (1945-1965)

As the largest postcolonial Islamic political party until the NU secession in 1952, Masyumi managed to function as an umbrella organization bringing together different segments of Indonesia’s Muslim population. Although most Islamic parties accepted the building of a nation-state as a given, the insertion of a reference to Islamic law into the country’s constitution has been a persistent feature in their agendas. The failure of this initiative remains a constant source of frustration.
The so-called “Jakarta Charter”—an amendment designed to impose adherence to Shari’a on Indonesia’s Muslim citizens—was considered too divisive to be included in the constitution, both by Sukarno’s nationalists and more secular-minded Muslim politicians, including Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and one-time Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. Instead, the state espoused the Pancasila, or Doctrine of Five Principles, which insisted on the Belief in One God. Although this provision does not assume any particular religious tradition, it gave formal acknowledgment only to Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. This left indigenous beliefs and Confucianism without official recognition, and failed to resolve or account for lingering sectarian tensions between and within religious traditions.
For radical Islamists of the Darul Islam, led by Kartosuwiryo, this was reason to proclaim a renegade Islamic state in parts of West Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi in 1949.^[8] In addition, new waves of Christianization in the 1950s—and again in the 1960s and 1970s—along with the influence of “non-standard Islams,” remained a cause for concern among Muslim leaders.^[9] When Masyumi politicians sided with these secessionists after the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1959, Sukarno completed his power grab by banning the party.

Redefining the Role of Islam Under New Order (1965-1995)

The military-dominated New Order regime of General Suharto continued to clamp down on all forms of political Islam, forcing former Masyumi activists to change tactics and switch to religious proselytization (da’wah) and puritanical religious training (tarbiyah) on university campuses. Meanwhile, certain Muslims and technocrats were co-opted by the government to take part in its economic development policy, and given space to articulate an Islamic discourse that accepted the Pancasila Doctrine and advocated religious pluralism. This preferential treatment, combined with a disproportionately prominent role for Christians, ethnic Chinese, and “non-standard Muslims” in trade, finance, economic advisory teams, the upper echelons of the military apparatus, and security think tanks, bred resentment among “Shari’a-minded” Muslims.^[10]

Regime Change and the Early Reformasi Years (1999-2004)

Consequently, Suharto’s efforts to play up his own Islamic credentials in the face of an unmistakable Islamization of Indonesian society and public life amounted to too little too late. Ethnic and religious motivations were blurred in the political violence that marred the prelude to regime change.^[11] Events also pointed to the deepening schism within the Muslim bloc. On the one hand, the free election of progressive NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid as president and his more pragmatic Muhammadiyah counterpart, Amien Rais, as speaker of the consultative assembly signaled the rise of the Muslim intelligentsia. On the other hand, Islamic political parties captured only one-third of votes in parliamentary elections.
The momentary power vacuum and breakdown of law and order in the immediate aftermath of New Order’s collapse also saw a re-emergence of secessionism in staunchly Islamic Aceh and the rise of blatantly intolerant Muslim militias and vigilantes such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). Often in active collusion with the security apparatus, which consisted of military and police forces disoriented after a decade in power, Laskar Jihad became involved in violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in the Eastern Islands. At the same time, FPI began terrorizing religious minority groups and moderate Muslims in cities and provincial towns throughout the country.
While Islamic parties on the national level failed once again to secure the insertion of an “Islamic referent” in the constitution, the devolution of power from the central government to provincial and local authorities offered a window of opportunity to regional administrations for introducing and enforcing elements of Islamic law in regions such as Aceh, Banten, West Java, and certain parts of Sulawesi. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks by Muslim radicals on Bali and in Jakarta drew Indonesia’s domestic and international security polices more closely into the U.S.-led global “War on Terror,” providing the tools to act against religious extremists.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s “Religious Nationalism” (2004-2014)

A partial return to New Order seemed evident when retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected president along with Jusuf Kalla, leader of the erstwhile government party Golkar, as vice president. A statement issued by the president indicating that he would heed the advice of the semi-official Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in all religious matters encouraged the head of the council’s fatwa drafting committee, conservative NU scholar Ma’ruf Amin, to orchestrate the release of a series of fatwas in July 2005. These declarations condemned the concepts of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism as “un-Islamic”; they also opposed interfaith prayers and stigmatized minority Muslim groups, such as the Shi’a and Ahmadis, as “deviants.”
Although formally outranked by Sahal Mahfudh—the moderately progressive but meek General Chairman of MUI and General President of the NU—Ma’ruf Amin succeeded by teaming up with MUI Secretary General and puritan Muhammadiyah prominent, Din Syamsuddin. This conservative-reactionary coalition was further consolidated when, in the same year, Syamsuddin took over as Muhammadiyah chairman, ousting his moderate predecessor Ahmad Syafii Maarif as well as progressive intellectuals Amin Abdullah and Abdul Munir Mulkhan.^[12]
Opponents of the fatwas responded by establishing the National Alliance for the Freedom of Religion and Belief (AKKBB), a broad coalition of progressive Muslim and non-Muslim civil society activists who used Pancasila Memorial Day 2006 to advocate religious pluralism and protection of religious minority groups. Support from the notoriously indecisive SBY was lackluster, and he actually continued to court the Islamic bloc with his party’s vague slogan of “religious nationalism.” Meanwhile, an ineffective security apparatus and notoriously inept judiciary have been unable to mete out proper justice against the most notorious Muslim radicals and hate preachers. This polarized setting has inspired Muslim vigilante groups to not only persecute Christians, Ahmadis, and Shi’a—in 2008 they even attacked an AKKBB rally.^[13] Because many of the NGOs in this alliance draw upon universal human rights standards and receive foreign funding, they also stand accused of being Western stooges.^[14]
Thanks to the efficient management of Jusuf Kalla, a Muslim businessman with good relations in both Islamic and military circles who had already impressed the public with his handling of 2003 Tsunami crisis and significant contributions to the political resolution of the Aceh problem, SBY was able to secure landslide re-election victory for himself and his Democrat Party. In his second administration, he failed to capitalize on his mandate to defuse interreligious tensions, decrease intra-Muslim polarization, and bolster religious tolerance. Instead, he allowed his interior minister, Gamawan Fauzi, to characterize the FPI as an “asset to the nation” that needs to be “empowered” to play a role in the state’s social policy strategies—a position that effectively vindicated the violence and hate crimes committed by such vigilante organizations.^[15] Advocates of religious freedom feel abandoned after the U.S.-based Appeal to Conscience Foundation inexplicably decided to confer the statesman’s award for religious tolerance in 2013.^[16]

Conclusions

Indonesia’s ethno-religious plurality and the historical role of political Islam provide the setting for the story of inter and intra-communal relations. The oscillation between religious toleration, sectarianism, and religiously motivated violence is enabled by a variety of factors, including the unprecedented openness of the public sphere after the regime change of 1999; the concomitant political-religious polarization resulting from the emergence of Islamic militias and vigilante organizations along with the establishment of NGOs and other civil society initiatives that advocate religious pluralism; the devolution of powers from the central government to provincial and local authorities under Reformasi; the government’s ambiguous attitude toward protecting religious plurality; and the state’s backing of controversial MUI rulings.
____________________
Notes:

^[1] Carool Kersten, Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values (London and New York: Hurst Publishers and Oxford University Press, 2014).

^[2] Nasir Tamara, Indonesia Rising: Islam, Democracy and the Rise of Indonesia as a Major Power (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2009); Anthony Reid, Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012).
^[3] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Indonesia: Global Reach, Regional Role,” Lecture at the London School of Economics, 31 March 2009, accessed 15 April 2014.
^[4] Eric Tagliacozzo (ed.), Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement and the Longue Durée (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
^[5] Syed Farid Alatas, “Notes on Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago,” The Muslim World 75, 162-175.
^[6] Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern ‘Ulamā’ in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai’i Press, 2004); Michael Laffan, The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011).
^[7] Yudi Latif, Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 114-115.
^[8] Chiara Formichi, Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosurwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia (Leiden: KILTV Press, 2012).
^[9] Jan Sihar Aritongan and Karel Steenbrink (eds.), A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Robert W. Hefner, “Where Have All the Abangan Gone? Religionization and the Decline of Non-standard Islam in Contemporary Indonesia,” Michel Picard and Remy Madinier (eds.), The Politics of Religion in Indonesia (London & New York: Routledge, 2011), 71-91.
^[10] Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans and Heretics; New Muslim Intellectuals and the Study of Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 78.
^[11] John T. Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006).
^[12] In 2014 he also succeeded the deceased Sahal Mahfudh as General Chair of MUI.
^[13] François Raillon, “The return of Pancasila: secular vs. Islamic norms, another look at the struggle for state dominance in Indonesia,” Michel Picard and Remy Madinier, 92-113.
^[14] Julian Millie, “Impossible ideal?“, Inside Indonesia, 115, accessed 17 April 2014.
^[15] Ezra Sihite, “Home Minister Clarifies Comments Calls for FPI to Be ‘Empowered,” Jakarta Globe, 29 October 2013.
^[16] “Franz Magnis-Suseno: Religious Tolerance is SBY’s Responsibility,” Tempo, 4 June 2013.
____________________
Carool Kersten is Senior Lecturer in the Study of Islam & the Muslim World at King’s College London. In addition, Dr. Kersten is Deputy Research Director of the Centre for Religion Theology and Public Life and a member of the Centre for the Study of Divided Societies. He is also a research associate of the Centre for South East Asian Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Dr. Kersten is the author of Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values (Hurst, 2014); co-editor with Susanne Olsson of Alternative Islamic Discourses and Religious Authority (Ashgate, 2014); and co-editor with Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin of Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts (Oxford University Press, 2012). This article was originally published in the Middle East Institute.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Epoch Times.

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/793024-religious-pluralism-versus-intolerance-sectarian-violence-in-indonesia/

Pluralitas dan Ortodoksi dalam Pilpres 2014

Ahmad Najib Burhani*

Dalam visi, misi, dan program capres/cawapres yang diserahkan ke KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), pasangan Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa secara eksplisit hanya menyebut satu program yang berkaitan dengan Islam, yaitu “mendirikan lembaga tabung haji”. Program ini pun lebih berkaitan dengan persoalan ekonomi daripada soal keagamaan karena ia diletakkan dalam sub-judul “ekonomi kerakyatan”. Memang ada program lain yang bersinggungan dengan agama seperti ajakan menjunjung tinggi toleransi agama dan perbaikan kualitas pesantren/pendidikan agama. Namun program ini juga lebih berhubungan dengan penguatan karakter bangsa dan peningkatan sumber daya manusia daripada isu keislaman an sich, sebagaimana yang dibayangkan oleh kelompok Islamis. Tentu saja ini mengejutkan beberapa orang yang sebelumnya menyebut koalisi Prabowo-Hatta sebagai “koalisi syariah”.

Pertanyaannya, seperti apakah corak keislaman dari koalisi Prabowo-Hatta itu? Apa yang tertulis di visi, misi, dan program seakan berbeda dari suasana ketika deklarasi pasangan ini. Pada deklarasi di Rumah Polonia, simbol-simbol keislaman terlihat begitu dominan. Dimulai dengan pembacaan Al-Qur’an, teriakan takbir (Allahu akbar) sering terdengar bersambungan, ditutup dengan do’a, pakaian dari peserta yang hadir didominasi warna putih, dan ketika berangkat ke KPU untuk mendaftarkan capres/cawapres mereka menyempatkan mampir ke Masjid Sunda Kelapa untuk shalat Dhuhur berjamaah dengan diimami oleh Suryadharma Ali.

Apakah keislaman dalam koalisi yang secara resmi menyebut dirinya sebagai “koalisi merah-putih” ini hanya menjadi semacam gincu atau lipstik, tampak jelas bagi orang lain tapi tak terasa bagi penggunanya? Apakah keislaman mereka lebih ditekankan dalam simbol-simbol saja, sementara untuk program mereka berlandaskan sesuatu yang sifatnya universal? Dalam Dialog Kenegaraan yang diadakan di Gedung DPD RI pada 28 Mei 2014, Drajat Hari Wibowo, salah satu juru bicara koalisi Prabowo-Hatta, menegaskan bahwa selain pendirian lembaga tabung haji, program keislaman lain yang akan digarap oleh Prabowo-Hatta jika nanti terpilih sebagai presiden/wakil presiden adalah menjadikan Indonesia pusat fashion muslimah dunia dan pusat perbankan syariah.

Berdasarkan visi-misi, acara deklarasi, dan beberapa program yang disampaikan Drajat Wibowo, maka bangunan simbolis keislaman dari koalisi Prabowo-Hatta tentu lebih kuat daripada pasangan Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. Seperti disebutkan Wibowo, simbol itu merefleksikan isi, antara symbol dan substansi tak bisa dipisahkan. Inilah diantaranya daya tarik dari capres/cawapres ini bagi kelompok Islamis di PPP, PKS, PAN, dan PBB serta para aktivis Islam semisal Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, dan FPI (Front Pembela Islam). Meski visi-misi dan program dari capres/cawapres kedua ini jauh lebih tebal (42 halaman) dibandingkan yang diajukan Prabowo-Hatta (9 halaman), namun tidak ada program yang secara eksplisit menyebut Islam atau berkaitan erat dengan Islam.

Jokowi-JK menjadikan isu intoleransi sebagai satu dari tiga masalah pokok bangsa yang krusial untuk diatasi. Mereka bahkan menegaskan bahwa “Jati diri bangsa terkoyak oleh merebaknya konflik sektarian dan berbagai bentuk intoleransi” (h. 2). Kehidupan keberagamaan yang plural dari bangsa ini, sebagaimana disebutkan dalam visi-misi Jokowi-JK, saat ini terancam oleh primordialisme, fundamentalisme, konservatisme, dan kekerasan berbasiskan keagamaan (h. 40). Intinya, Jokowi-JK menekankan keberagamaan yang majemuk, menghargai perbedaan dan keragaman, serta menentang penyeragaman.

Posisi Jokowi-JK dalam hal keagamaan itu tentu bersebarangan dengan kelompok yang meyakini bahwa tidak ada persoalan dengan toleransi di Indonesia, mereka yang kadang memiliki kesadaran bahwa kelompok agama mayoritas di negeri ini justru belum mendapat peran sesuai dengan kuantitasnya. Program Jokowi-JK itu juga secara diametral berhadapan dengan Manifesto Perjuangan Partai Gerindra bidang agama (h. 40) yang menekankan penyeragaman dan pemurnian: “Negara juga dituntut untuk menjamin kemurnian ajaran agama yang diakui oleh negara dari segala bentuk penistaan dan penyelewengan dari ajaran agama”. Makna pemurnian di sini, dan dipertegas dalam berbagai pernyataan yang disampaikan oleh Fadly Zon dan pimpinan Gerindra lain, ditujukan kepada kelompok yang dianggap memiliki pandangan keagamaan menyimpang seperti Ahmadiyah, Syiah, Mormon, dan Saksi Jehovah. Sikap ini tentunya sejalan dengan pandangan beberapa partai pendukung koalisi dalam melihat Ahmadiyah dan Syiah seperti tercermin dalam sikap dan pernyataan Suryadharma Ali baik dalam kapasitasnya sebagai pribadi, pimpinan partai, maupun Menteri Agama.

Dari paparan di atas, barangkali sudah terlihat corak keberagamaan dari kedua capres/cawapres itu jika kelak memimpin negeri ini. Tentu saja orang boleh bertanya apakah visi, misi, dan program itu betul-betul dibuat sendiri oleh capres/cawapres. Orang juga bisa berkilah bahwa itu semua hanya dibuat di masa kampanya. Nanti begitu dipilih menjadi presiden dan wakil presiden, mereka tentu akan memodifikasi dan menyesuaikan dengan kebijakan yang lain. Tapi paling tidak visi, misi, dan program itulah yang ditawarkan dan menarik bagi beberapa calon pemilih yang nantinya bisa ditagih. Jika pemilih menghendaki gebyar Islam dan kemapanan ortodoksi agama, maka pilihlah Prabowo-Hatta. Jika orang memimpikan pluralitas dan kebebasan beragama, maka pilihlah Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla.

-oo0oo-

*Peneliti LIPI

The KTP Quandary: Islam, the Ahmadiyya, and the reproduction of Indonesian Nationalism

Contemporary Islam, June 2014, DOI: 10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2

Daniel C. Bottomley (dbott@udel.edu)
Institute for Global Studies, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA

AbstractThe history of Islam and Indonesian nationalism has been one of constant contestation and acquiescence. Although a new openness in discussing Islamic issues has emerged within Indonesia since President Suharto’s rule came to an end, past logics of national cohesion have not dissipated and have in fact contributed to the upheaval over the Ahmadiyya’s position as Indonesian Muslims and Indonesians. Exploring Indonesian Identification Cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, otherwise known as KTP), which currently require every applying Indonesian citizen to self-identify with one of six religious options: (1) Islam; (2) Christianity; (3) Catholicism; (4) Hinduism; (5) Buddhism; and (6) Confucianism, I argue that despite the 2008 Indonesian Joint-Ministerial Decree categorizing the Ahmadis as deviant Muslims, KTP offers the group an opportunity to publically declare and receive official recognition of their Muslim identity from the Indonesian government. Thus, a situation has emerged in which contradictory governmental action problematizes religious categories and illuminates the paradoxical nature of Indonesian nationalism.

Link of the article

Isu Minoritas dalam Pilpres 2014

Koran Sindo, 9 Mei 2014
Ahmad Najib Burhani*

Dimana posisi kelompok minoritas dalam demokrasi? Apakah mereka harus selalu dalam posisi yang kalah? Apakah dalam demokrasi kelompok mayoritas bisa bertindak semena-mena terhadap minoritas? Kalau itu yang diharapkan, maka demokrasi adalah sistem pemerintahan yang pasti tak diidealkan oleh banyak orang. Memang, secara teknis dalam sistem demokrasi kelompok mayoritas hampir selalu menjadi pemenang. Namun demikian, salah satu esensi dari demokrasi adalah agar tidak terjadi apa yang disebut dengan tirani mayoritas. Demokrasi adalah sistem pemerintahan yang diharapkan agar suara dari setiap penduduk bisa didengar, agar kelompok minoritas bisa hidup dengan tenang dan terlindungi hak-haknya.

Kadangkali terjadi, ketika isu minoritas diangkat dalam suasana pesta demokrasi seperti saat ini, muncul resistensi dari beberapa kelompok dari golongan mayoritas. Mereka merasa bahwa bahwa posisi mereka sebagai mayoritas baru bisa dinikmati beberapa dekade belakangan saja. Mereka merasa tidak fair jika kelompok minoritas mendapat peran yang lebih besar di negara ini seperti terjadi pada masa lalu. Mereka mencoba mengungkit memori tahun 1970an dan 1980an, ketika ada kelompok minoritas yang seakan memiliki kekuasaan lebih dari kelompok mayoritas, ketika ada kelompok agama minoritas lebih banyak berperan mengatur negara daripada kelompok yang mayoritas. Kondisi yang mirip terjadi di Irak ketika rezim Saddam Husein berkuasa, yaitu ketika kelompok Sunni yang minoritas lebih banyak duduk di pemerintahan dan mengatur negara daripada kelompok Syiah yang mayoritas. Fenomena ini seringkali mereka sebut sebagai tirani minoritas.

Baik tirani mayoritas maupun tirani minoritas adalah tindakan yang bertentangan dengan esensi demokrasi dan karena itu harus dihindari. Namun demikian, yang seringkali terjadi dan orang seakan memaklumi atau menganggap sebagai sesuatu yang “wajar” adalah ketika kelompok mayoritas menjadi tiran dan bertindak sewenang-wenang terhadap kelompok minoritas. Ini misalnya terjadi ketika beberapa kelompok garis keras Islam menggunakan retorika demokrasi untuk memaksakan kehendaknya kepada pemerintah untuk membubarkan Ahmadiyah atau meminta pemerintah menutup gereja tertentu.

Kejadian yang masih segar diingatan kita adalah Deklarasi Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah yang diadakan di Bandung pada 20 April 2014. Kegiatan ini diadakan diantaranya sebagai respon terhadap terpilihnya seorang tokoh Syiah, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, menjadi anggota DPR RI dari Bandung melalui Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP). Sebelumnya telah terjadi berbagai upaya dari kelompok garis keras Islam untuk menjegal Jalaluddin Rakhmat melalui berbagai cara agar tak mendapat suara dalam pemilu. Namun demikian, upaya-upaya itu tak mampu membendung suara dukungan ke Jalaluddin Rakhmat pada Pemilu 9 April yang lalu. Sekarang, menjelang Pilpres, diciptakan ketakutan yang berlebihan bahwa jika Joko Widodo terpilih menjadi presiden, maka Jalaluddin Rakhmat akan diangkat menjadi menteri agama. Fenomena ini menunjukkan ketidaksiapan kita menerima demokrasi. Ada ketakutan luar biasa jika ada wakil dari kelompok agama minoritas di pemerintahan, seakan dia akan menggunakan kekuasaan itu untuk membasmi kelompok mayoritas atau membuat kebijakan yang hanya menguntungkan kelompok agama minoritas.

Isu minoritas dalam demokrasi di Indonesia menjadi persoalan yang semakin serius bila dikaitkan dengan Manifesto Perjuangan Partai Gerindra dalam bidang agama yang berbunyi: “pemerintah/negara wajib mengatur kebebasan di dalam menjalankan agama atau kepercayaan. Negara juga dituntut untuk menjamin kemurnian ajaran agama yang diakui oleh negara dari segala bentuk penistaan dan penyelewengan dari ajaran agama” (h. 40). Kalimat ini mengindikasikan bahwa partai ini akan banyak terlibat dalam upaya “pemurnian agama” jika mereka berkuasa. Gerindra akan melakukan intervensi teologis dalam urusan ortodoksi (benar) dan heterodoksi (sesat) ajaran keagamaan dan menjadi hakim akidah untuk konflik teologis. Bila diimplementasikan, maka kebijakan ini akan menjadi ancaman bagi kelompok minoritas seperti Ahmadiyah dan Syiah yang selama ini sering dituduh melakukan penistaan dan penyelewangan terhadap ajaran Islam.

Penilaian di atas sejalan dengan pernyataan Fadly Zon, salah satu perumus Manifesto dan juga juru bicara Gerindra, yang menyebutkan bahwa pemerintah harus memberi otoritas atau wewenang lebih besar kepada MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), dan Muhammadiyah untuk menentukan sesat dan tidaknya ajaran atau kelompok agama tertentu. Jika dinyatakan sesat, maka pemerintah dituntut untuk melarangnya (Tempo 2014; Arrahmah 2014). Sebagai akademisi yang menekuni tema pluralitas dan minoritas, penulis merasa memiliki tanggungjawab moral dan terpanggil untuk menyampaikan ini kepada publik. Ada potensi ancaman terhadap kelompok minoritas agama jika Manifesto Perjuangan itu tak direvisi.

Tentu saja kita wajib bersyukur terhadap capaian demokrasi kita saat ini. Jika dibandingkan dengan apa yang terjadi di Timur Tengah pasca Arab Spring, maka bangsa ini patut berbangga atas demokrasinya. Mesir, Suriah, dan Libya, misalnya, masih terlibat konflik berdarah berkepanjangan pasca Arab Spring. Pasca Reformasi 1998 di Indonesia, transisi pemerintahan dari militer ke sipil bisa berjalan relatif mulus. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono adalah jenderal, tapi dia adalah tokoh dibalik reformasi di tubuh militer. Namun demikian, demokrasi kita saat ini barulah demokrasi angka-angka atau demokrasi yang lebih mekanis. Secara esensi, masih banyak hal yang perlu ditingkatkan, diantaranya adalah sikap terhadap kelompok minoritas. Banyak bagian dari kelompok mayoritas yang tidak siap adanya perwakilan dari kelompok minoritas di pemerintahan. Nah, Manifesto Perjuangan Gerindra berpotensi memberi pelindungan hanya kepada kelompok agama mainstream dan mengancam eksistensi kelompok agama non-mainstream karena dianggap menodai kemurnian agama. Dan ini berpotensi mengancam substansi dari demokrasi.
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*Aktivis Muhammadiyah dan Doktor Bidang Agama dari University of California, Santa Barbara.
 
http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/2014/05/09/18/862005/isu-minoritas-dalam-pilpres-2014Or this link

Prophecy after the Prophet, albeit lesser prophets? The Ahmadiyya Jama’at in Pakistan

Contemporary Islam, DOI: 10.1007/s11562-014-0293-z

S. R. Valentine
Bradford, UK

Abstract
The Ahmadiyya Jama’at, a little known reform movement within Islam, has the majority of its estimated 12 million members living in Pakistan. Believing that there can be prophecy after the prophet Muhammad, albeit lesser prophets, the Movement has been subjected to vehement opposition from mainstream Muslims who regard Muhammad as the seal and the last of the prophets. This essay considers the history of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at in Pakistan, the legal and political context since partition in 1947, the Movement’s beliefs and practices and the reasons why there is ongoing persecution of the group in Pakistan today. Drawing on personal contact with the Ahmadi in the UK and America and visiting the Ahmadi at their centres at Rabwah, Pakistan, and Qadian, India, the author discusses the discrimination and marginalization faced by Ahmadi under the aforementioned legislation. The paper concludes with tentative suggestions and recommendations.

 Within this Article

    What is the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: towards a definition
    Ahmadi beliefs and the reasons for persecution
    What is the legal status of Ahmadi under Pakistani law and how are they persecuted?
    Specific examples of persecution of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at in Pakistan
    Conclusion
    References 

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11562-014-0293-z

Approaching conflict the Ahmadiyya way

Contemporary Islam, 2014, Vol 8, Issue 2, pp. 115-131.
DOI: 10.1007/s11562-014-0294-y

Emanuela C. Del Re
Niccolò Cusano University of Rome, Rome, Italy

Abstract
The role and incidence of the Ahmadiya community in Israeli society, with its around 2,000 members, is not related to the dimension of the community, its religious activities or its dissemination on the territory. It is related to the strong social and political engagement of the community not only in religious but also in civil society activities where it resides, despite all the difficulties that derive from its disputed role in Islam. The Ahmadiyya community in Haifa constitutes a relevant example of contribution to peaceful and productive coexistence. Haifa itself is characterized by a very interesting social and political climate, by which it is considered a “model” of coexistence in Israel, despite the fact that many contrasts and contradictions persist, such as forms of discrimination and inequalities. The civil society is particularly active, and institutions and NGOs devoted to the Arab-Jewish dialogue are many. Religious and political leaders communicate and participate together in various events, where their openness and mutual respect are intended to symbolize harmony with the intent of this being mirrored by the whole society. The Ahmadiyya Community plays an active role in this evolving process. The author, who has carried out qualitative research in Haifa to film a scientific documentary on the Holiday of Holidays and the validity of the Haifa model of coexistence, applied participant observation in the framework of grounded theory to analyze the role and impact of the Ahmadiyya community in the complex Israeli context, also on the basis of extensive in depth interviews with community members and leaders.

Keywords: Ahmadiyya, Israel, Grounded theory, Coexistence, Conflict resolution

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11562-014-0294-y