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OPINION
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Ali Dayan Hasan | April 18, 2011
Radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, currently on trial
on terrorism charges, is a symbol of religious intolerance in
Indonesia. (Reuters Photo/Beawiharta)
Were a hundred Indonesians to die in a suicide
bombing, one would expect Indonesian politicians, political parties and
religious groups to condemn it no matter who the victims were. But when
such an attack occurred last year in Pakistan, silence ruled the day.
The one political leader who spoke out was the target of vitriol from
religious parties and groups. Frighteningly, the series of events that
led Pakistan down this path appears to be repeating itself in Indonesia.
On May 28, 2010, Islamist militants attacked two
Ahmadiyah mosques in the central Pakistani city of Lahore with guns,
grenades and suicide bombs, killing 94 people and injuring well over a
hundred. The Punjabi Taliban, a local affiliate of the Pakistani
Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, claimed responsibility. The Taliban
have targeted not just Ahmadis but all Pakistanis — regardless of
religious or sectarian affiliation. The Pakistani opposition leader
Nawaz Sharif condemned this attack on “brothers and sisters who are
Pakistani citizens.”
Yet his statement was greeted with anger by religious
political parties and groups led by the Jamaat-e-Islami and the
Pakistan branch of the Khatm-e-Nabuwat — an international Islamist
umbrella organization dedicated to the “preservation of the finality of
the Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood,” which considers Ahmadis heretics.
It was a very ugly moment for Pakistani society.
The Ahmadiyah community has long been persecuted in
Pakistan. What has happened in Pakistan is instructive in understanding
the nature and potential objectives of those attacking — verbally and
physically — the Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia. The situation for
Ahmadis in Indonesia suggests a similar pattern of systematic
persecution and a similar trend toward legalized discrimination against
all Ahmadis for their religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, there
are clear and specific ideological links between anti-Ahmadi
organizations in Pakistan and Indonesia.
In 1974, Pakistan’s Parliament introduced
constitutional amendments that defined the term “Muslim” in the
Pakistani context and listed groups that were, under the law, to be
considered non-Muslim. The amendment, which went into effect on Sept. 6,
1974, explicitly deprived Ahmadis of their identity as Muslims.
In 1984, five ordinances in Pakistan’s penal code
were amended to explicitly target religious minorities: a law against
blasphemy; a law punishing the defiling of the Koran; a prohibition
against insulting the wives, family or companions of the Prophet of
Islam; and two laws specifically restricting the Ahmadis’ activities. On
April 26, 1984, Pakistani dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq issued these last
two laws as part of Martial Law Ordinance XX.
Ordinance XX undercut the activities of religious
minorities generally, but struck at Ahmadis in particular by prohibiting
them from “indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim.”
Ahmadis thus could no longer profess their faith,
either orally or in writing. Pakistani police destroyed Ahmadi
translations of and commentaries on the Koran and banned Ahmadi
publications, the use of any Islamic terminology on Ahmadi wedding
invitations, the offering of Ahmadi funeral prayers and the displaying
of the Kalima — the statement that “there is no god but Allah,
Muhammad is Allah’s prophet,” the principal creed of Muslims — on Ahmadi
gravestones.
In addition, Ordinance XX prohibited Ahmadis from
declaring their faith publicly, propagating their faith, building
mosques or making the call for Muslim prayer. In short, virtually any
public act of worship or devotion by an Ahmadi could be treated as a
criminal offense.
With the passage of the Criminal Law Act of 1986,
Parliament added Section 295-C to the Pakistan Penal Code. The
“Blasphemy Law,” as it came to be known, prescribed the death penalty
for blasphemy. With Section 295-C, Zia and the Pakistani government
institutionalized the persecution of Ahmadis as well as other minorities
in Pakistan. The Ahmadi belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
is considered blasphemous insofar as it “defiled the name of Prophet
Muhammad.” Therefore, theoretically, Ahmadis can be sentenced to death
for simply professing their faith.
As a consequence, Ahmadi mosques have been burned,
their graves desecrated and their very existence criminalized. Since the
1980s, hundreds of Ahmadis have been formally charged in criminal cases
for professing their religion. Scores of Ahmadis have been specifically
charged with blasphemy; several have been convicted and face life
imprisonment or death sentences, pending appeal. The offenses included
wearing an Islamic slogan on a shirt, planning to build an Ahmadi mosque
in Lahore and distributing Ahmadi literature in a public square. As a
result, thousands of Ahmadis have fled Pakistan to seek asylum abroad.
Not surprisingly, anti-Ahmadiyah prejudice remains
widespread in Pakistan. The foundation of legalized discrimination laid
by the Pakistani state has played into the hands of the Taliban and
other militant sectarian groups. The suicide bombings and other attacks
on Ahmadis by these groups in recent times are only a deadly extension
of the Pakistani state’s legal regime against its Ahmadi citizens since
1974. And all Pakistanis are affected: the Taliban demand that either
Pakistanis accept their version of Islam as the true faith or face
discrimination, flee or live in fear for their lives.
The horrific example of Pakistan should instill fear
in the heart of every Indonesian. Last week’s suicide bombing attack on
the Cirebon Police mosque in West Java provides an ominous foretaste of
what lies ahead unless extremism nurtured by bigotry is checked before
it consumes Indonesian society. For, much like their Pakistani
counterparts, those who espouse extremism in Indonesia are turning on
their own state and its security forces.
In Indonesia, as in Pakistan, Ahmadis are easy
targets in times of religious and political insecurity. Following the
June 2008 national decree that bans the Ahmadiyah from publicly
practicing their faith, punishable by up to five years in prison,
provincial governments have increasingly issued anti-Ahmadiyah bans —16
provinces and regencies have done so since 2006.
These provincial bans on Ahmadiyah activities breed
intolerance, discrimination and, as the increasing attacks against
Ahmadis in Indonesia show, violence. In February, Islamist militants
beat three Ahmadis to death in Cikeusik village, Banten. President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should immediately void the 2008 national
decree and all the provincial decrees. He should ensure that the police
act quickly to protect the Ahmadiyah from violence and hold perpetrators
accountable. Indonesia’s reputation as a tolerant society is at grave
risk.
Today it’s the Ahmadis, tomorrow, as in Pakistan, it could be you.
Ali Dayan Hasan is the senior South Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch.
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Copyright 2010 The Jakarta Globe
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Source:
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www.thejakartaglobe.com/commentary/indonesia-risks-taking-pakistans-
path-to-intolerance/435924 |
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