Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Ahmadiyah dan Khilafah Spiritual


Ulil Abshar-Abdalla 19 hours ago 1,317 Views
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IslamLib – Hari ini, saya diundang untuk memberikan ceramah di depan jamaah Ahmadiyah untuk memperingati satu abad gerakan ini. Suatu kehormatan yang benar-benar tak saya sangka. Saya bukan pengikut Ahmadiyah, meski saya punya simpati yang besar pada gerakan itu. Posisi saya mirip dengan Bung Karno. Seperti tampak dalam surat-surat yang ia tulis dari pengasingan, Bung Karno memiliki apresiasi yang besar pada Ahmadiyah, meski bukan pengikut gerakan itu.

Gerakan Ahmadiyah memiliki daya tarik tersendiri buat saya. Ada sesuatu yang istimewa pada gerakan ini yang tak saya jumpai pada gerakan-gerakan Islam yang lain. Menurut saya, ada banyak hal positif yang bisa dipelajari dari gerakan ini. Sayang sekali, kebencian sebagian kalangan Islam terhadap kelompok ini membuat mereka terhalang untuk melihat hal-hal yang positif di dalamnya.
Ciri pada Ahmadiyah yang jarang kita jumpai pada gerakan Islam yang lain ialah ketaatan yang nyaris total kepada sebuah otoritas pusat yang tunggal. Di dalam Ahmadiyah kita jumpai konsep mengenai khilafah atau kepemimpinan terpusat. Seluruh anggota Ahmadiyah yang konon jumlahnya sekitar 200 juta orang (jauh lebih banyak dari orang Wahabi, saya kira!) dan tersebar di seluruh dunia, tunduk pada khalifah tunggal.

Hanya saja, konsep khilafah Ahmadiyah bukan bersifat politik. Ini yang membedakan Ahmadiyah dengan gerakan Hizbut Tahrir (HT) yang juga mengusung konsep serupa. Tetapi yang diusung oleh HT adalah khilafah politik. Perbedaan pokok antara dua khilafah itu sangat mendasar. Khilafah politik mengandaikan adanya suatu teritori, wilayah yang jelas, yang dijaga dengan pasukan bersenjata.

Khilafah spiritual berbeda sama sekali. Anggota Ahmadiyah bisa tinggal di mana saja, dan tunduk kepada pemerintahan negeri-negeri di mana mereka tinggal. Tetapi, hati dan rohani mereka tunduk kepada kekuasaan spiritual, yaitu khalifah tunggal yang sekarang tinggal di London. Khilafah spiritual tak membutuhkan teritori. Yang dibutuhkan adalah hati yang mau tunduk dan taat kepada sebuah otoritas.

Khilafah politik berkuasa di tanah. Sementara khilafah spiritual berkuasa atas hati dan pikiran. Menciptakan khilafah spiritual tak mengandung resiko yang berat, karena tak ada keharusan untuk merebut kekuasaan politik yang berdarah-darah. Perjuangan khilafah spiritual bukan merebut kekuasaan duniawi, tetapi simpati hati dan pikiran publik. Khilafah Ahmadiyah adalah sejenis “Kingdom of heart“, sementara khilafah politik ala HT adalah “Kingdom of the body“.

Dalam hal ini, Ahmadiyah memiliki ciri-ciri yang mirip dengan Gereja Katolik. Dalam gereja Katolik kita kenal juga ketaatan yang nyaris tanpa “reserve” kepada otoritas tunggal yang berpusat di Vatikan. Kekuasaan Paus tak membutuhkan wilayah teritorial yang jelas batas-batasnya. Umat Katolik tersebar di seluruh dunia, tetapi mereka, dengan hati dan pikiran, tunduk kepada seorang “khalifah” tunggal.

Adakah kesamaan antara Ahmadiyah dengan Syiah? Bukankah dalam Syiah dikenal juga semacam otoritas yang disebut dengan marja’ dini atau rujukan keagamaan? Dalam Syiah memang ada otoritas yang ditaati oleh seluruh umat Syiah. Tetapi, tidak seperti dalam Ahmadiyah, marja’ di Syiah tidaklah tunggal, melainkan banyak. Meskipun keragaman otoritas dalam Syiah tidak seekstrim dalam masyarakat Sunni.

Dalam masyarakat Sunni, seperti yang terjadi di Indonesia, ada masalah dengan soal otoritas ini. Di era ketika otoritas tradisional dalam sosok kiai atau ustaz hancur karena perubahan struktur sosial yang berubah dalam masyarakat perkotaan, yang muncul adalah semacam anarki otoritas. Siapapun sekarang bisa menjadi “ustaz” tanpa kualifikasi yang jelas. Ini yang menjelaskan kenapa muncul da’i selebriti yang bisa mendadak populer berkat media televisi.

Hal seperti ini tak akan mungkin terjadi dalam Ahmadiyah. Sebab semua hal yang berkaitan dengan kehidupan spiritual ada di bawah otoritas tunggal seorang khalifah. Kehidupan umat Ahmadiyah, tidak seperti umat Sunni, tak banyak goncangan dan turbulensi. Mereka menikmati stabilitas rohaniah berkat adanya otoritas tunggal itu.

Implikasi dari unifikasi otoritas ini sangat penting. Tidak seperti dalam masyarakat Sunni, gerakan Ahmadiyah benar-benar hidup berdasarkan pendanaan yang sepenuhnya independen. Saya pernah bertemu dengan seorang da’i Ahmadiyah yang berkisah bahwa ia ditawari bantuan sosial oleh instansi pemerintah. Mereka, dengan halus, menolak bantuan itu. Sebab, segala hal dalam gerakan ini “self financed“, didanai secara mandiri oleh jamaah. Anda tak akan pernah menengar anggota jamaah Ahmadiah mengajukan proposal untuk pembangunan masjid mereka.

Banyak diskusi yang saya ikuti di kalangan umat Islam mengenai pentingnya kemandirian finansial untuk menjaga otonomi organisasi. Sebetulnya mereka tak perlu pergi jauh. Di halaman rumah mereka sendiri ada contoh yang bisa mereka jadikan perbandingan. Contoh itu ada dalam gerakan Ahmadiyah.

Gerakan ini bisa melakukan mobilisasi dana yang demikian besar karena, saya kira, adanya ketaatan yang mutlak kepada seorang khalifah itu. Ketataan yang sukarela dan menyentuh komitmen terdalam itulah yang membuat anggota Ahmadiyah membiayai organisasi mereka dengan sepenuh hati. Dengan kata lain, ada daya/kekuatan intrinsik yang menggerakkan anggota Ahmadiyah untuk bersedekah. Daya itu berasal dari ketaatan pada otoritas tunggal.

Hal terakhir yang menarik saya adalah berikut ini: Ahmadiyah mungkin bisa saya sebut sebagai satu-satunya gerakan Islam dengan cakupan global yang dengan sengaja meninggalkan konsep penyatuan din (agama) dan daulah (negara). Gerakan ini, sampai kapanpun, tak akan memiliki proyek mendirikan negara. Ahmadiyah adalah gerakan yang sepenuhnya spiritual dan keagamaan.

Menurut saya, ini salah satu sumbangan penting Ahmadiyah dalam gerakan Islam modern. Kelompok-kelompok Islam yang lain masih punya ambisi, baik langsung atau tidak, untuk menguasai negara. Ahmadiyah sama sekali tidak. Mereka sudah memutuskan dari sejak menit pertama untuk menjatuhkan talak tiga pada “state project” — proyek mendirikan negara.

Kemampuan Ahmadiyah untuk memotong sama sekali “state project” ini mempunyai implikasi penting. Orang Ahmadiyah tak memiliki kesulitan apapun untuk mengembangkan jaringan gerakan mereka di negeri-negeri non-Muslim. Sebab Ahmadiyah memiliki prinsip “politik” yang penting: di manapun orang Ahmadiyah tinggal, dia harus taat pada hukum nasioanl di negeri itu. Prinsip ini membuat negeri-negeri Barat tak menaruh curiga apapun terhadap gerakan ini.

Anda tak akan pernah melihat anggota Ahmadiyah yang berjuang untuk pelaksanaan syariat Islam, baik di dunia Islam sendiri, atau –apalagi– di Barat. Sebab hukum yang berlaku buat anggota Ahmadiyah adalah hukum nasional di negeri bersangkutan.

Menurut saya, untuk untuk sementara umat Islam harus membuang jauh-jauh kecurigaan dan kebencian mereka kepada Ahmadiyah. Sebab banyak hal dalam gerakan ini yang patut dijadikan sebagai bahan pelajaran untuk memperbaiki model gerakan dalam masyarakat Islam, terutama masyarakat Sunni yang sekarang ini mengalami problem dengan “anarki otoritas”.[]

http://islamlib.com/mazhab/ahmadiyah/ahmadiyah-dan-khilafah-spiritual/

International Peace Symposium UIN Jakarta

International Peace Symposium on "Implementation of Tolerance for Humanity and Harmony" organized by PB JAI and Fakultas Ushuluddin & Filsafat UIN Jakarta in the Auditorium Harun Nasution, UIN Jakarta, 30 September 2015






Wednesday, September 23, 2015

Governing Religion Democratically in Indonesia

The Jakarta Globe,

Announcements by Religious Affairs Minister Lukman Hakim Saifuddin and Home Minister Tjahjo Kumolo that they plan to change the way that the government regulates religious affairs is a promising sign that the administration of President Joko Widodo will work to improve the rights of religious minorities. At the same time, this reform has sparked concern among Islamic civil society groups like Muhammadiyah that reforming the regulation of religion means abandoning the country’s commitment to the promotion of Belief in God. These proposals have also prompted suggestions that the reforms should follow the model of Malaysia, a troubling argument given that Indonesia has had more success than its neighbor in transitioning to a more open model of governance. At the heart of this debate is a simple question: how do democracies regulate religious affairs?

While some activists feel that the best regulation of religion is the least regulation of religion, this is not the policy of most states. Most states, including most democracies, are heavily involved in the management of religion. These democracies manage to synthesize their commitments to individual human rights with the promotion of the religious values that are central to the country’s national identity and sociopolitical institutions. In other words, the Indonesian state need not become secular in order to protect minority rights; it simply needs to learn from the policies of consolidated democracies like Greece, Austria, Switzerland, Senegal, Romania and India.

Discrimination in schools
For example, religious education in schools has been an important part of the Indonesian nation developing common values and communal ties. Indonesia is not unusual in making religious education mandatory; 14 other democracies do the same. This policy is tolerant to the recognized minority religions, but discriminates against students whose faiths fall outside those recognized by the state, like the Sunda Wiwitan. Members of unrecognized faiths have kept their children out of schools rather than subject them to mandatory education in one of the recognized religions.

Such discrimination is not inherent to governing religion. The 1965 blasphemy law states that other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism cannot be banned in Indonesia, and makes clear that the Religious Affairs Ministry could simply recognize additional religions. Another policy that could remedy this discrimination is for students of unrecognized religions to be accommodated in a class on comparative religions or ethics; Indonesia is unusual among democracies in not providing an option to take comparative religions or ethics, nor allowing students to withdraw on request.

Greece has compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools but students may be exempted upon request. In Austria, attendance in religious instruction is mandatory for all students unless they formally withdraw at the beginning of the school year. In some Swiss cantons religious education is mandatory although parents can submit a waver and have their children withdraw. Senegal provides formal education in multiple religions with an option to withdraw. In sum, democracies can mandate religious education in schools as long as students have a choice in which religion they are incorporated including an option to study comparative religions or ethics.

Registration of religious groups
Another potentially useful policy is a multi-tiered registration system for religious groups, with different privileges attached to different tiers. In Romania, registered religious denominations are recognized as public utilities that benefit the entire population. The state recognizes eighteen denominations that enjoy the right to build houses of worship, perform rights of baptism, marriage, or burial, a guarantee to state noninterference, and protection against public stereotypes and negative media campaigns. The second tier is composed of religious associations that also get tax breaks but do not otherwise enjoy the advantages of recognition. A similar example is Austria, which has three tiers of registration.  The highest are religious societies, which have the authority to participate in mandatory church contributions programs, provide government-funded religious instruction in schools, and bring religious workers into the country. The second tier is reserved for confessional communities, which must have 300 members, a written version of their doctrine and must differ from other societies or confessional communities. Religious groups that do not qualify for the first two tiers may become legal associations, which have juridical standing and can own real estate but cannot receive government funding.

This tiered registration system is an example of an institutional mechanism for promoting religious values without persecuting minority faiths. Democratic states that demand registration may promote orthodox religious values through recognized privileges, but they must also allow heterodox groups like Shiites and the Baha’i to register and receive protection from persecution. A multi-tiered registration system is informally already in effect through the differing recognition systems of the Religious Affairs Ministry and the Home Affairs Ministry; formalizing this process and allowing all registered groups to list their religious identification on their identity card (KTP), or to leave the column blank, would be consistent with the protection of individual rights, the promotion of communal values, and the transparency that befits Indonesia’s consolidated democracy.

Blasphemy and heresy
A third useful policy would be to differentiate between blasphemy and heresy. Indonesia’s blasphemy law is not unusual in forbidding instigation of religious hatred through speech, press or disturbing religious rituals; 14 other democracies have blasphemy laws. Indonesia is unusual, however, in that the law is extended to prosecute heresy by small sects like Lia Eden, Amanat Keagungan Ilahi, and to individuals like Herison Riwu. India provides a good example of how splinter groups like Ahmadiyah can exist without being endorsed by the majority or persecuted. India distinguishes acts of blasphemy (defiling religions) from acts of heresy (belief that runs counter to orthodox doctrines). The Kerala High Court has ruled that Ahmadis cannot be prosecuted for blasphemy despite differences from orthodox Sunni doctrine. In other words, India manages to punish acts of blasphemy that are intended to foster communal violence without persecuting small religious sects for holding beliefs that differ from the majority.

These are three examples of strategies modern democracies employ to balance the promotion of religious values with their obligation to protect individuals who hold views that are contrary to the majority. While the United States receives an inordinate amount of attention from supporters and opponents of secular government, it is an empirical oddity among modern democracies. Instead, scholars, policy makers, and activists in Indonesia would benefit from studying Romania, Austria, India, Greece, Senegal, Switzerland, and other religious democracies in order to discern more productive examples of how to govern religion.

Jeremy Menchik is an assistant professor in the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. His forthcoming book, "Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance Without Liberalism," explores the meaning of tolerance to leaders of the Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam.

http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/opinion/governing-religion-democratically-indonesia/

Tuesday, September 22, 2015

The origins of intolerance to ward Ahmadiyah

The Jakarta Post,
 
Jeremy Menchik, Boston | Opinion | Fri, February 10 2012, 10:43 A

This week marks the one-year anniversary of the tragedy of Cikeusik in Banten, when members of the Cikeusik Muslim Movement killed three members of the Muslim-minority sect Ahmadiyah. Since then, Indonesian human rights organizations have launched a conversation about the place of religious tolerance in society.

Unfortunately, this conversation is rife with uncertainty. The origins of intolerance to ward Ahmadiyah, the attitudes of the civil society organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah toward Ahmadiyah, and the state policies toward Ahmadiyah are poorly understood. This ambiguity makes it difficult to pinpoint the cause of the violence, let alone try and stop the violence.

In explaining the origins of contemporary intolerance toward Ahmadiyah, most commentators point to 2005, when the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) reissued their fatwa (edict) declaring Ahmadiyah a deviant sect. Yet polemics against Ahmadiyah began much earlier.

The famous Islamic reformer Hamka reports that his father, Haji Rasul, launched the first polemic against Ahmadiyah in Yogyakarta in 1925. The charges against Ahmadiyah were that they followed a prophet other than Muhammad and that they denied the death of the Prophet Jesus.

These charges were repeated in Pembela Islam magazine throughout the 1930s, and by self-proclaimed Anti-Ahmadiyah groups connected to Persatuan Islam (Persis) and established in Bandung, Bogor, Medan, Padang, Priok, Leles, Ciledug, Cirebon, Gorontalo and Garut. Pembela Islam called Ahmadiyah members as deviant (sesat), apostates (murtad), infidels (kafir), crazy, and labeled Mirza Ghoelam Ahmad a false prophet.

These polemics were not limited to Islamic reformers like Persis. President Sukarno denounced Ahmadiyah, stating that while he admired them for their modernism, they were also “devoted to British imperialism”. NU’s magazine reprinted an article from Pembela Islam denouncing Ahmadiyah. And NU used the question of Ahmadiyah to decry ijtihad, a method of Koranic interpretation involving setting aside past interpretations.

Abandoning past interpretations, NU argued, would inevitably lead to the kind of deviance seen among followers of Ahmadiyah. NU further protested the inclusion of an Ahmadiyah branch in the country’s first important Islamic political coalition, the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (Al-Madjlisoel-Islamil-A’laa Indonesia, MIAI). NU ran a series of essays attempting to expose the Ahmadiyah movement for their alleged collusion with British imperialism and for Ghoelam Ahmad’s claim to prophecy.

In response, the MIAI excluded the Ahmadiyah branch. And after the MIAI was transformed into Masyumi, leaders of Masyumi staffed the Religious Affairs Ministry and again rejected the Ahmadiyah movement’s appeal for recognition. Rather than being a recent development, history suggests that intolerance toward Ahmadiyah precedes the establishment of the state.

Muhammadiyah and NU are widely seen as the backbone of Indonesia’s culture of tolerance. Yet, they have not protected members of Ahmadiyah, something most commentators attribute to their inability to combat the militants.

This assumption is inaccurate. Survey data that I collected in 2010 with branch-level leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU demonstrates that an overwhelming majority do not believe members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to hold public office, build houses of worship, or teach in schools.

The data revealed that 75 percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 59 percent of NU leaders say no members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to become the mayor in Jakarta; 80percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 67 percent of NU leaders say that no members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to build a house of worship in Jakarta; 88 percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 82 percent of NU leaders say that no members of Ahmadiyah should be permitted to teach Islamic studies in public schools.

These views are not indicative of endemic intolerance; those same leaders believe that Christians, Hindus and Buddhists are entitled to religious and political freedom. The closest parallel to their intolerance of Ahmadiyah is in their views of the rights of Communists.

This similarity between Ahmadiyah and Communists points to the most important reason why intolerance toward Ahmadiyah has persisted for decades; state policy, specifically long-standing policies promulgated by the Religious Affairs Ministry with the backing of NU and Muhammadiyah. Religion is a privileged category according to the ministry and syncretic movements like the Javanese kebatinan and heterodox movements like Ahmadiyah are denied recognition.

The ministry’s privileging of religious orthodoxy was given presidential sanction in 1965 when Sukarno passed a decree stating that there were only six officially recognized religions and that any group who threatened these religions would be dissolved. That decree is still in force; PNPS No. 1/1965 was upheld in 2010 by the Constitutional Court with the backing of the Religious Affairs Ministry, NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, numerous political parties, the Confucian group Matakin, the Buddhist group Walubi, the Hindu group PHDI, MUI, and many conservative Islamic groups.

Most accounts of sectarian conflict in Indonesia argue that the issue of Ahmadiyah pits the peripheral militant Islamic groups against the majority of Indonesian moderates. Others point to the 2008 joint ministerial decree as fostering intolerance. This history and survey data suggest otherwise.

Anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment is broader and more deeply institutionalized than the shallow dichotomy between moderates and militants would suggest. The exclusion of Ahmadiyah is built into the structure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Despite President Yudhoyono’s frequent speeches about tolerance, official state policy is that members of Ahmadiyah are not given the same protection as orthodox religions. The coalition backing the Constitutional Court decision, and survey data of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, suggests that this policy has broad public support.

As a result, it should come as no surprise that the state and the police are unwilling to intervene to protect the lives of members of Ahmadiyah. While this does not mean that violence against Ahmadiyah members is inevitable, it does mean that institutional changes, such as to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, must be central to programs designed to reduce conflict.

The writer is a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University, and will be an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University beginning in 2013. - See more at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/10/the-origins-intolerance-ward-ahmadiyah.html#sthash.lUyzHHMd.dpuf
 This week marks the one-year anniversary of the tragedy of Cikeusik in Banten, when members of the Cikeusik Muslim Movement killed three members of the Muslim-minority sect Ahmadiyah. Since then, Indonesian human rights organizations have launched a conversation about the place of religious tolerance in society.

Unfortunately, this conversation is rife with uncertainty. The origins of intolerance to ward Ahmadiyah, the attitudes of the civil society organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah toward Ahmadiyah, and the state policies toward Ahmadiyah are poorly understood. This ambiguity makes it difficult to pinpoint the cause of the violence, let alone try and stop the violence.

In explaining the origins of contemporary intolerance toward Ahmadiyah, most commentators point to 2005, when the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) reissued their fatwa (edict) declaring Ahmadiyah a deviant sect. Yet polemics against Ahmadiyah began much earlier.

The famous Islamic reformer Hamka reports that his father, Haji Rasul, launched the first polemic against Ahmadiyah in Yogyakarta in 1925. The charges against Ahmadiyah were that they followed a prophet other than Muhammad and that they denied the death of the Prophet Jesus.

These charges were repeated in Pembela Islam magazine throughout the 1930s, and by self-proclaimed Anti-Ahmadiyah groups connected to Persatuan Islam (Persis) and established in Bandung, Bogor, Medan, Padang, Priok, Leles, Ciledug, Cirebon, Gorontalo and Garut. Pembela Islam called Ahmadiyah members as deviant (sesat), apostates (murtad), infidels (kafir), crazy, and labeled Mirza Ghoelam Ahmad a false prophet.

These polemics were not limited to Islamic reformers like Persis. President Sukarno denounced Ahmadiyah, stating that while he admired them for their modernism, they were also “devoted to British imperialism”. NU’s magazine reprinted an article from Pembela Islam denouncing Ahmadiyah. And NU used the question of Ahmadiyah to decry ijtihad, a method of Koranic interpretation involving setting aside past interpretations.

Abandoning past interpretations, NU argued, would inevitably lead to the kind of deviance seen among followers of Ahmadiyah. NU further protested the inclusion of an Ahmadiyah branch in the country’s first important Islamic political coalition, the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (Al-Madjlisoel-Islamil-A’laa Indonesia, MIAI). NU ran a series of essays attempting to expose the Ahmadiyah movement for their alleged collusion with British imperialism and for Ghoelam Ahmad’s claim to prophecy.

In response, the MIAI excluded the Ahmadiyah branch. And after the MIAI was transformed into Masyumi, leaders of Masyumi staffed the Religious Affairs Ministry and again rejected the Ahmadiyah movement’s appeal for recognition. Rather than being a recent development, history suggests that intolerance toward Ahmadiyah precedes the establishment of the state.

Muhammadiyah and NU are widely seen as the backbone of Indonesia’s culture of tolerance. Yet, they have not protected members of Ahmadiyah, something most commentators attribute to their inability to combat the militants.

This assumption is inaccurate. Survey data that I collected in 2010 with branch-level leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU demonstrates that an overwhelming majority do not believe members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to hold public office, build houses of worship, or teach in schools.

The data revealed that 75 percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 59 percent of NU leaders say no members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to become the mayor in Jakarta; 80percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 67 percent of NU leaders say that no members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to build a house of worship in Jakarta; 88 percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 82 percent of NU leaders say that no members of Ahmadiyah should be permitted to teach Islamic studies in public schools.

These views are not indicative of endemic intolerance; those same leaders believe that Christians, Hindus and Buddhists are entitled to religious and political freedom. The closest parallel to their intolerance of Ahmadiyah is in their views of the rights of Communists.

This similarity between Ahmadiyah and Communists points to the most important reason why intolerance toward Ahmadiyah has persisted for decades; state policy, specifically long-standing policies promulgated by the Religious Affairs Ministry with the backing of NU and Muhammadiyah. Religion is a privileged category according to the ministry and syncretic movements like the Javanese kebatinan and heterodox movements like Ahmadiyah are denied recognition.

The ministry’s privileging of religious orthodoxy was given presidential sanction in 1965 when Sukarno passed a decree stating that there were only six officially recognized religions and that any group who threatened these religions would be dissolved. That decree is still in force; PNPS No. 1/1965 was upheld in 2010 by the Constitutional Court with the backing of the Religious Affairs Ministry, NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, numerous political parties, the Confucian group Matakin, the Buddhist group Walubi, the Hindu group PHDI, MUI, and many conservative Islamic groups.

Most accounts of sectarian conflict in Indonesia argue that the issue of Ahmadiyah pits the peripheral militant Islamic groups against the majority of Indonesian moderates. Others point to the 2008 joint ministerial decree as fostering intolerance. This history and survey data suggest otherwise.

Anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment is broader and more deeply institutionalized than the shallow dichotomy between moderates and militants would suggest. The exclusion of Ahmadiyah is built into the structure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Despite President Yudhoyono’s frequent speeches about tolerance, official state policy is that members of Ahmadiyah are not given the same protection as orthodox religions. The coalition backing the Constitutional Court decision, and survey data of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, suggests that this policy has broad public support.

As a result, it should come as no surprise that the state and the police are unwilling to intervene to protect the lives of members of Ahmadiyah. While this does not mean that violence against Ahmadiyah members is inevitable, it does mean that institutional changes, such as to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, must be central to programs designed to reduce conflict.

The writer is a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University, and will be an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University beginning in 2013. -

See more at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/10/the-origins-intolerance-ward-ahmadiyah.html#sthash.lUyzHHMd.dpuf

Monday, September 21, 2015

Tantangan Nasionalisme Bertuhan


KOMPAS, 20 September 2014
Oleh: R William Liddle,

DALAM masalah kebebasan beragama, sejauh mana kita bisa harapkan kebijakan yang lebih baik dari pemerintahan Presiden Joko Widodo ketimbang pendahulunya?

Pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sudah lama dituding membiarkan para Islamis garis keras bertindak sewenang-wenang. Menurut Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ”kekerasan terhadap kelompok minoritas beda keyakinan masih terus berulang beberapa tahun terakhir. Rekomendasi ditujukan langsung kepada Presiden SBY dalam kasus Ahmadiyah di Mataram dan Syiah di Sampang, tetapi pelaksanaan rekomendasi itu tidak kunjung dilakukan”.

Perihal presiden terpilih Jokowi, ekspektasi masyarakat sudah tinggi sekali. Alasannya, selaku Gubernur DKI Jakarta, dia sudah membuktikan, misalnya dalam kasus Lurah Susan, bahwa dia berani mengambil dan melaksanakan keputusan sulit yang menyangkut minoritas agama. Lagi pula, koalisi partai yang sedang dibangunnya hampir tak mungkin merangkum Partai Keadilan Sejahtera yang konon merupakan sumber utama keengganan Presiden SBY bertindak.

Kendala budaya politik
Ekspektasi saya sendiri tidak setinggi itu, atau setidaknya bercampur dengan keprihatinan. Sebab, ada kemungkinan lain, yaitu bahwa perilaku SBY dibentuk oleh suatu kendala budaya politik. Alih-alih merupakan hasil perhitungan politik sadar, ketidaktegasan SBY mungkin lebih tepat dimengerti selaku reaksi semi-otomatis kepada sebuah konsensus nasional tentang peran agama dalam politik. Jangan-jangan presiden terpilih Jokowi akan merasa terbelenggu pula oleh budaya politik tersebut.

Keprihatinan saya berasal dari analisis Jeremy Menchik, Indonesianis muda di Universitas Boston, yang menerbitkan sebuah artikel, ”Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia (Intoleransi Produktif: Nasionalisme Bertuhan di Indonesia)”, dalam jurnal Comparative Studies in Society and History, Juli 2014.

Istilah nasionalisme bertuhan diciptakan Menchik untuk menjelaskan kenapa sekte Ahmadiyah, minoritas kecil dan terpinggirkan, semakin sering diserang oleh kelompok-kelompok militan. Penjelasan sarjana lain, bahwa yang bertanggung jawab adalah kaum Islamis radikal belaka, tidak memuaskan Menchik. Sebaliknya, ia menegaskan bahwa kaum Ahmadiyah diserang karena mereka berada di luar sebuah konsensus umum tentang hubungan yang wajar antara agama dan negara. Hubungan itu dirincikannya sebagai ideologi nasionalisme bertuhan.

Menurut Menchik, nasionalisme bertuhan mengandung tiga unsur pokok. Pertama, teisme, kewajiban semua warga negara untuk menganut salah satu dari enam agama yang sah. Hal itu berarti bahwa nasionalisme bertuhan berbeda dengan nasionalisme religius, seperti terdapat di Israel atau beberapa negara Muslim, tempat hanya satu agama dianggap sah. Namun, warga negara Indonesia tidak diperbolehkan menjadi ateis.

Kedua, bagi setiap agama sah, negara berhak menentukan keyakinan dan ibadah mana yang ortodoks atau patut diterima sebagai bagian resmi dari agama tersebut. Ketiga, penentuan itu dilakukannya bersama-sama dengan organisasi-organisasi yang mewakili agama masing-masing, seperti Nahdlatul Ulama dan Muhammadiyah dalam kasus Islam. Hal itu berarti bahwa keyakinan dan ibadah Ahmadiyah (juga Syiah dan banyak sekte lain) dianggap heterodoks, di luar Islam dan dengan sendirinya di luar perlindungan negara. Koersi dibenarkan dalam bentuk pelaksanaan hukum oleh polisi, jaksa, dan hakim, tetapi tentu tidak dalam bentuk tindakan liar oleh kelompok masyarakat di luar negara.

Nasionalisme bertuhan
Akar ideologi nasionalisme bertuhan dan perlawanan kepada Ahmadiyah dirunut sampai zaman penjajahan. Pada 1928, Muhammadiyah melarang penyebaran ajaran Ahmadiyah atas dasar sekte itu mengakui seorang nabi setelah Nabi Muhammad. Persatuan Islam (Persis) dan NU lekas menyusul. Menurut Menchik, hampir tidak ada yang disetujui tiga organisasi besar tersebut selain kesepakatannya bahwa Ahmadiyah berada di luar Islam!

Argumen Menchik yang paling meyakinkan adalah penjelasannya tentang ”Sukarno’s blasphemy law”, Penetapan Presiden No 1/1965 tentang penodaan agama, yang berhasil ”mengkristalisasikan pelembagaan nasionalisme bertuhan”. Hal itu terbukti pada 2010 ketika petisi Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan yang menentang undang-undang tersebut ditolak oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi.

Peran Soekarno penting sebab, selain menjabat presiden, dia melengkapi konsensus nasional sebagai wakil suara kaum abangan dan sekuler, sekitar separuh dari konstelasi politik zaman itu. Aliran itu diwarisi kini oleh Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, pemenang Pemilu 2014, dan presiden terpilih Jokowi. Di situlah terletak keprihatinan saya tentang masa depan kebebasan beragama di Indonesia.

Menchik berpendirian lain. Bagi dia, nasionalisme bertuhan merupakan suatu ”intoleransi produktif”. Maksudnya, bangsa Indonesia telah menciptakan solusi orisinal atas masalah pertikaian agama yang masih mewabah di mana-mana. Solusi itu ”modern dan plural,” meski tidak sekuler atau liberal, dan patut dituruti oleh bangsa lain.

Tentu saya senang kalau ada prestasi Indonesia yang bisa dimanfaatkan bangsa lain. Namun, ongkosnya mungkin terlalu besar. Sebuah hak yang begitu asasi, hak setiap orang untuk merumuskan sendiri hubungannya dengan alam semesta, diabaikan begitu saja oleh Menchik dengan alasan politik praktis.

Alhasil, bagi saya, argumen bahwa Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 menjamin setiap warga bebas beragama tetap lebih kuat meski tidak diterima oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. ●

R William Liddle ; Profesor Emeritus, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, AS


http://print.kompas.com/baca/KOMPAS_ART0000000000000000008964452

Wednesday, September 2, 2015

Sectarian Translation of the Qur'an in Indonesia: The Case of the Ahmadiyya



Paper presented in the workshop on "Qur'anic Studies in Contemporary Indonesia", organized by LP2M UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2 September 2015.


Ahmad Najib Burhani
The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta

Abstract
Ahmadiyya translations of the Qur’an have some distinctive characteristics compared to the translations from Sunni Muslims. However, these translations, particularly Soedowo-Dutch translation of Muhammad Ali’s The holy Qur’an, have been influential in Indonesian Sunni community in the first half of the 20th century. Against the opposition from the Muhammadiyah and the fatwa from Muhammad Rashid Rida of Egypt, which prohibited the use of Ahmadiyya translation, the Soedewo-Dutch translation was widely used by Dutch-educated intelligentsia as a main source to know about Islam. This article specifically answers the following questions: Why did Ahmadiyya translations of the Qur’an have a significant place in Indonesia? What was the appeal of these translations to Indonesian intelligentsia? What is the contribution of these translations to the study of the Qur’an in this country? This paper argues that the success of Ahmadiyya translation, particularly the Dutch version, during the revolution era is based on three reasons: language (Dutch is the language of intelligentsia), content (it fit with the need of intelligentsia who seek a harmonious understanding between religie and wetenschap), and form (the only available rendering of the Qur’an in modern form of publication). In the context of ideology, the reception of Muslim intelligentsia was mainly for their contribution in defending Islam against the penetration of Christian mission and the coming of anti-religion ideologies, particularly materialism and atheism, by strongly challenging their doctrines.

Keywords: Ahmadiyya, sectarianism, Dutch-educated intelligentsia, wetenschap, rationalism.  

Tuesday, September 1, 2015

From Sufism to Ahmadiyya A Muslim Minority Movement in South Asia

Hardcover: 256 pages
Publisher: Indiana University Press (April 6, 2015)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0253015235
ISBN-13: 978-0253015235

The Ahmadiyya Muslim community represents the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), a charismatic leader whose claims of spiritual authority brought him into conflict with most other Muslim leaders of the time. The controversial movement originated in rural India in the latter part of the 19th century and is best known for challenging current conceptions of Islamic orthodoxy. Despite missionary success and expansion throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe, North America, and parts of Africa, Ahmadis have effectively been banned from Pakistan. Adil Hussain Khan traces the origins of Ahmadi Islam from a small Sufi-style brotherhood to a major transnational organization, which many Muslims believe to be beyond the pale of Islam.

Reviews:
"Offers a fresh and original historical analysis of the Jama’at-i Ahmadiyya based on a detailed reading and interpretation of original sources, some of which are made available to an English readership for the first time." —Michael Nijhawan, York University

"Adil Hussain Khan provides a remarkably comprehensive picture of the Ahmadiyya, examining both the specific aspects of internal development of the movement and also its involvement in modern global developments. His analysis of the evolution of a major religious movement from an old-style brotherhood into a modern politicized organization will be of help to all who are interested in the modern history of religious organizations." —John Voll, Georgetown University

Table of Contents:
Introduction
1. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani before Prophethood
2. The Prophetic Claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
3. Authority, Khilāfat, and the Lahori-Qadiani Split
4. Politics and the Ahmadiyya Movement under Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad
5. Religion and Politics after Partition: The Ahmadi Jihad for Kashmir
6. Early Opposition and the Roots of Ahmadi Persecution
7. Persecution in Pakistan and Politicization of Ahmadi Identity
Conclusion



https://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780253015297