Fatwa dan Rekomendasi tentang Ahmadiyah 1984

Tempo, 17 Maret 1984

Satu fatwa, empat rekomendasi

HANYA satu fatwa yang dikeluarkan oleh Rakernas MUI tahun ini. Sidang yang berlangsung 4-8 Maret itu, di Jakarta, mengesankan memberi perhatian kepada berbagai permasalahan sosial yang jauh lebih luas dari sekadar masalah hukum - hal yang juga sudah terasa pada Munas 1980.

Menarik adalah ceramah Adi Sasono, Direktur Lembaga Studi Pembangunan, yang mengetengahkan pendekatan masalah dan alternatif operasional bagi dakwah pembangunan yakni dakwah yang merupakan "keseluruhan upaya pengembangan masyarakat dalam mewujudkan tatanan sosial ekonomi dan kebudayaan menurut ajaran Islam."

Fatwa yang diputuskan dalam jangka sidang lima hari itu hanya tentang adopsi. Di situ adopsi dianggap sebagai amal saleh, alias kebajikan besar, bila ia berarti "pengangkatan anak dengan tidak mengubah statusnya", alias tetap mengakui hubungan darahnya dengan orangtuanya yang asli. Melanggar itu, maka adopsi haram.

Di bawah fatwa, terdapat empat rekomendasi. Salah satunya tentang Syiah (lihat: Syiah Kalau-Kalau Datang). Tapi yang juga menarik adalah tentang pendayagunaan tanah warisan. Intinya: agar tanah warisan yang sedikit, khususnya dl desa-desa, tidak dibagi-bagi di antara ahli waris. Melainkan: dimanfaatkan secara kooperatif atau dibeli oleh salah satu dari mereka yang mampu atau oleh pemilik tanah tetangganya. Atau, bila semua butir urutan itu tak bisa dipenuhi, dijual kepada orang sedesa yang Muslim - agar, bila kemudian bisa dijadikan ladang atau sawah, zakatnya bisa di manfaatkan para tetangga. "Ahli waris yang kemudian tidak mendapat tanah, dan hanya menerima uang penjualan bagiannya, supaya bersedia bertransmigrasi," kata K.H. Syukri Ghozali, Ketua Umum MUI, dalam laporannya tentang hasil-hasil Rakernas. Semua itu dengan pertimbangan bahwa tanah di Jawa sudah sangat sempit.

Semua rekomendasi itu memang berdasar maslahat. Soal haji, misalnya. Di sini MUI mengimbau umat agar "menghayati bahwa ibadah haji itu diwajibkan hanya sekali" - itu pun bagi yang mampu. Sehingga untuk haji yang sunah, alias tambahan, dianjurkan umat menggantinya dengan amal jariah "yang dapat dirasakan manfaatnya oieh umum".

Dalam pidato pembukaan Rakernas, Kiai Syukri malah mengemukakan hasil keputusan sidang Majma'ul Buhutsil Islamiyah yang berkedudukan di Mesir. Keputusan itu menyatakan bahwa buah amal jariah, di akhirat, lebih besar dari pahala haji sunah. "Mekah dan Mina itu sangat sempit tidak mungkin diperluas," kata Kiai Syukri. Dan itulah alasan pokok.

Rekomendasi keempat adalah tentang Jamaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) alias aliran Qadian. MUI, untuk itu, minta kepada yang berwewenang untuk meninjau kembali Surat Keputusan Menteri Kehakiman RI tahun 1953, yang memberi status badan hukum kepada JAI. Dasarnya: kepercayaan Qadiani, yang membawa nama Islam itu, "bertentangan dengan ajaran agama Islam".

Ahmadiyah Qadiani adalah yang menganggap Ghulam Ahmad nabi. Pertemuan para ulama yang dilangsungkan di Mekah sendiri, beberapa tahun lalu, menyatakan jemaah itu berada di luar Islam. Langkah yang sejajar kemudian diambil pemerintah Pakistan, asal kelahiran aliran ini. Tetapi Ahmadiyah yang aliran Lahore, yang tidak menganggap Ghulam Ahmad nabi, dikecualikan oleh keputusan Mekah maupun MUI, sementara pemerintah Pakistan tidak membedakan dua-duanya.

 Menteri Agama sendiri dalam pidatonya juga meminta perhatian majelis kepada jemaah yang, menurut Kiai Syukri, "perkembangannya kita lihat memang pesat" itu. Yang menarik, dalam rekomendasi itu tak ada kalimat permintaan pelarangan - kepada Kejaksaan Agung, misalnya. Tetapi, seperti dikatakan Kiai Syukri, Rakernas mengharapkan agar pemerintah RI, seperti juga Pakistan, "memperlakukan Jemaah Ahmadiyah Qadian sebagai non-Islam".

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The origins of intolerance to ward Ahmadiyah

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post   |  Fri, 02/10/2012 5:43 PM  |  

Jeremy Menchik
This week marks the one-year anniversary of the tragedy of Cikeusik in Banten, when members of the Cikeusik Muslim Movement killed three members of the Muslim-minority sect Ahmadiyah. Since then, Indonesian human rights organizations have launched a conversation about the place of religious tolerance in society.

Unfortunately, this conversation is rife with uncertainty. The origins of intolerance to ward Ahmadiyah, the attitudes of the civil society organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah toward Ahmadiyah, and the state policies toward Ahmadiyah are poorly understood. This ambiguity makes it difficult to pinpoint the cause of the violence, let alone try and stop the violence.

In explaining the origins of contemporary intolerance toward Ahmadiyah, most commentators point to 2005, when the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) reissued their fatwa (edict) declaring Ahmadiyah a deviant sect. Yet polemics against Ahmadiyah began much earlier.

The famous Islamic reformer Hamka reports that his father, Haji Rasul, launched the first polemic against Ahmadiyah in Yogyakarta in 1925. The charges against Ahmadiyah were that they followed a prophet other than Muhammad and that they denied the death of the Prophet Jesus.

These charges were repeated in Pembela Islam magazine throughout the 1930s, and by self-proclaimed Anti-Ahmadiyah groups connected to Persatuan Islam (Persis) and established in Bandung, Bogor, Medan, Padang, Priok, Leles, Ciledug, Cirebon, Gorontalo and Garut. Pembela Islam called Ahmadiyah members as deviant (sesat), apostates (murtad), infidels (kafir), crazy, and labeled Mirza Ghoelam Ahmad a false prophet.

These polemics were not limited to Islamic reformers like Persis. President Sukarno denounced Ahmadiyah, stating that while he admired them for their modernism, they were also “devoted to British imperialism”. NU’s magazine reprinted an article from Pembela Islam denouncing Ahmadiyah. And NU used the question of Ahmadiyah to decry ijtihad, a method of Koranic interpretation involving setting aside past interpretations.

Abandoning past interpretations, NU argued, would inevitably lead to the kind of deviance seen among followers of Ahmadiyah. NU further protested the inclusion of an Ahmadiyah branch in the country’s first important Islamic political coalition, the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (Al-Madjlisoel-Islamil-A’laa Indonesia, MIAI). NU ran a series of essays attempting to expose the Ahmadiyah movement for their alleged collusion with British imperialism and for Ghoelam Ahmad’s claim to prophecy.

In response, the MIAI excluded the Ahmadiyah branch. And after the MIAI was transformed into Masyumi, leaders of Masyumi staffed the Religious Affairs Ministry and again rejected the Ahmadiyah movement’s appeal for recognition. Rather than being a recent development, history suggests that intolerance toward Ahmadiyah precedes the establishment of the state.

Muhammadiyah and NU are widely seen as the backbone of Indonesia’s culture of tolerance. Yet, they have not protected members of Ahmadiyah, something most commentators attribute to their inability to combat the militants.

This assumption is inaccurate. Survey data that I collected in 2010 with branch-level leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU demonstrates that an overwhelming majority do not believe members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to hold public office, build houses of worship, or teach in schools.

The data revealed that 75 percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 59 percent of NU leaders say no members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to become the mayor in Jakarta; 80percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 67 percent of NU leaders say that no members of Ahmadiyah should be allowed to build a house of worship in Jakarta; 88 percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 82 percent of NU leaders say that no members of Ahmadiyah should be permitted to teach Islamic studies in public schools.

These views are not indicative of endemic intolerance; those same leaders believe that Christians, Hindus and Buddhists are entitled to religious and political freedom. The closest parallel to their intolerance of Ahmadiyah is in their views of the rights of Communists.

This similarity between Ahmadiyah and Communists points to the most important reason why intolerance toward Ahmadiyah has persisted for decades; state policy, specifically long-standing policies promulgated by the Religious Affairs Ministry with the backing of NU and Muhammadiyah. Religion is a privileged category according to the ministry and syncretic movements like the Javanese kebatinan and heterodox movements like Ahmadiyah are denied recognition.

The ministry’s privileging of religious orthodoxy was given presidential sanction in 1965 when Sukarno passed a decree stating that there were only six officially recognized religions and that any group who threatened these religions would be dissolved. That decree is still in force; PNPS No. 1/1965 was upheld in 2010 by the Constitutional Court with the backing of the Religious Affairs Ministry, NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, numerous political parties, the Confucian group Matakin, the Buddhist group Walubi, the Hindu group PHDI, MUI, and many conservative Islamic groups.

Most accounts of sectarian conflict in Indonesia argue that the issue of Ahmadiyah pits the peripheral militant Islamic groups against the majority of Indonesian moderates. Others point to the 2008 joint ministerial decree as fostering intolerance. This history and survey data suggest otherwise.

Anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment is broader and more deeply institutionalized than the shallow dichotomy between moderates and militants would suggest. The exclusion of Ahmadiyah is built into the structure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Despite President Yudhoyono’s frequent speeches about tolerance, official state policy is that members of Ahmadiyah are not given the same protection as orthodox religions. The coalition backing the Constitutional Court decision, and survey data of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, suggests that this policy has broad public support.

As a result, it should come as no surprise that the state and the police are unwilling to intervene to protect the lives of members of Ahmadiyah. While this does not mean that violence against Ahmadiyah members is inevitable, it does mean that institutional changes, such as to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, must be central to programs designed to reduce conflict.

The writer is a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University, and will be an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University beginning in 2013.
— JP

Copyright © 2012 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

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Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/10/the-origins-intolerance-ward-ahmadiyah.html

Pakistan, Ahmadiyah and democracy

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post   |  Wed, 03/16/2011 7:33 PM  |  Opinion

Sanaullah

Referring to the article written by Mohd Yasir Alimi titled the “Pakistanisation of Indonesia” in The Jakarta Post of March 7, 2011, anyone asking for the right of expression should avoid using abusive language.

The tenor of the article is so grossly tendentious that it looks as if Yasir had not intentionally defi ned the parameters of a failed state to cover up the emptiness of his so-called arguments. Pakistan has a vibrant democratic government, an independent and powerful judiciary with an equally vocal and forceful media.

Economically, the country has the highest foreign exchange reserve despite the ravages of the unprecedented fl oods of last year, which displaced 2 million people and incurred a loss of US$9.5 billion. The country is showing growth and attracting a reasonable amount of FDI.

On a political level Pakistan enjoys a status that is the envy of many countries. Non-stop high level foreign visits mark the prestige and respect the country enjoys in the comity of nations. On matters of religion, one should ponder deeper and more intensely before passing shallow comments.

With reference to the Declaration of Ahmadiyah as a minority, Yasir wrongly chastises President Zia-ul- Haq for declaring them non-Muslim.

The step was in fact undertaken by a very progressive and moderate Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto, in 1974, not in 1984 as claimed. Why did he do so? The issue was agitating Muslims in the subcontinent for 94 years by then. It needed to be resolved to create religious harmony.

According to the Muslim majority, the Ahmadis do not believe in the fi nality of the Prophet-hood of Muhammad. They contest this assertion and believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad succeeded Muhammad as prophet. How come the choice of the majority be declared an abuse while minorities, in this case Ahmadis, be allowed to fl aunt the religion’s sensitivities of mainstream Islam.

It must be kept in mind that as non-Muslims they are allowed to pray freely and abide by their faith, provided they do not use Muslim rituals and symbols. They are permitted to establish their houses of worship and follow their own religious decrees and traditions without any restriction.

The writer should have checked the facts before maligning Pakistan as a “laboratory of abuse in the name of religion”. I ask, is Pakistan the only country that has declared Ahmadiyah a non-Muslim community? Would not the author care to consult liberal Indonesian Muslim scholars such as the heads of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to determine the difference between Muslims and Ahmadis?

If Pakistan allows the publication of religious books belonging to Hindus, Christians and Ahmadis, and their distribution, how can it then be termed as abusing minority religions? Our national laws do not allow blasphemous remarks against prophets including Muhammad, Jesus and Moses. Irrespective of faith anyone making such remarks is liable to stern punishment under the blasphemy law. More than any minority members, more Muslims were tried under this law. From 2007 to 2010, 253 persons have been convicted under the blasphemy law, out of which 244 were Muslims and only 9 were non-Muslims.

The constitution of Pakistan guarantees freedom of religion and fundamental rights to each citizen of Pakistan under articles 20, 21, 22, 26, 27 and makes no distinction on the basis of religion and creed. If I may quote here, section 295 of the Pakistan Penal Code (blasphemy law) is non-discriminatory and it applies to offending Muslims and non- Muslims equally. The government takes measures to prevent the abuse of the blasphemy law.

One needs to be mindful of the fact that although the minorities constitute 2.5-3 percent of the population, the government has fi xed a 5 percent quota for minorities in all federal services. The government has also made a special budgetary allocation for the grant of scholarships to needy students from minority communities.

Indonesia is a liberal, moderate and progressive state that thrives on its national ideology of Pancasila. There must be some reason why West Java, East Java and now the Jakarta governor is mulling over a ban on Ahmadiyah’s preaching in public. Would the attitude of these three governors infringe on the national ideology? Ahmadiyahs have the right to abide by their faith and they must be protected. Simultaneously, they should not offend the majority’s sentiments in public. This is the essence of democracy.

The Pakistan of today is fortifi ed by democracy. Our government draws its strength from freedom of expression. We need to realize that over the past nine years, Pakistan has lost more than 10,000 civilians and 3,000 personnel of the security forces against extremists and terrorists. More than 17,000 civilians of security forces have been injured.

The problem of militancy has plagued the whole world, it is an international phenomenon. It is not just a Pakistan- or an Indonesia-specific issue. We need to combine our efforts to root out this evil.

Pakistan has shouldered the responsibility in regard to the war on terror for about 10 years now. It needs support from the international community not point scoring utterances, to overcome the problem. The chaos created by the menace should not be used to discredit the state of Pakistan. In this regard, the international community needs to understand Pakistan’s position and support its efforts to curb extremism.

At the same time, the international community should make an endeavor to eradicate the root causes of extremism. The soul of Pakistan is liberal. Our national ethos is progressive. Our mindset is democratic. Aberrations cannot defeat what is inherently the strength of our national identity.

The writer is the Ambassador of Pakistan.
— JP

Copyright © 2012 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

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Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/16/pakistan-ahmadiyah-and-democracy.html

Menangnya Mirza Ghulam

Tempo, 25 Agustus 1990

KETERSINGGUNGAN itu dinyatakan menang. Di Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat, akhir Juli lalu, majelis hakim memutuskan bahwa Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, sebagai penggugat, dinyatakan memenangkan perkara perdata atas pemimpin redaksi dan penanggung jawab majalah Serial Media Dakwah, Jakarta.

Itulah perkara panjang yang bermula pada Oktober 1988. Pada edisi Oktober itu bulanan Serial Media Dakwah (SMD) menampilkan Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, pendiri Ahmadiyah yang oleh para pengikutnya disebut "nabi", dalam foto yang tak sebagaimana biasanya. Tokoh ini tak sekadar ditampilkan berserban dan berjenggot tebal, tapi ada sesuatu yang ditambahkan. Dikepala sang pendiri digambarkan ular kobra yang melilit dan siap mematuk. Dibawah gambar ada teks, bunyinya: "Riwayat Hitam Nabi Palsu Mirza Ghulam Ahmad."

Mirza Ghulam sendiri memang tak marah, karena ia sudah meninggal pada 1908. Tapi rasa beragama Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) rupanya terserempet. "Gambar itu sangat menghina orang yang kami sucikan," kata Ir. Pipip Sumantri, Sekjen JAI. Ketersinggungan tak berhenti pada pernyataan, melainkan berlanjut ke Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat. H. Buchari Tamam, pemimpin redaksi dan penanggungjawab majalah tersebut, beserta penerbitnya, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, tampil sebagai tergugat I dan II.

Di pengadilan soal ketersinggungan agama tak diutik-utik. Majelis hakim melihat persoalan ini dari sudut penghinaan, "karena soal agamanya bukanlah urusan pengadilan," kata Iman Parwis Syafii, S.H., salah seorang anggota majelis hakim yang menyidangkan perkara ini. Ahmadiyah, kepada pengadilan, memang menyatakan merasa nama baiknya tercemar oleh gambar tersebut. Dalam sidang-sidangnya majelis memang tidak mempertimbangkan segi-segi agamanya. Misalnya sikap MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), yang menganggap sesat Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia. Juga pendapat Jaksa Agung RI pada 29 Mei 1980 dan 31 Oktober 1980, yang menilai akidah Ahmadiyah mengenai kenabian bertentangan dengan yang dianut mayoritas umat Islam Indonesia. Itu bukan karena majelis hakim tidak tahu soal tersebut. Melainkan, soal "itu bukan urusan kami," kata Iman Parwis.

Maka, di pengadilan, Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, organisasi yang didirikan pada 1925 itu, diakui keberadaannya. Dengan kata lain, JAI dipandang punya hak-hak sebagaimana organisasi yang sah, termasuk beperkara di pengadilan. Bahkan majelis hakim menekankan organisasi ini belum pernah dibubarkan pemerintah Indonesia sebagai lembaga keagamaan yang mengembangkan agama Islam dan ajaran Nabi Muhammad saw. menurut Quran, sunah, dan hadis -- ini sesuai dengan pasal 3 ayat 2 Anggaran Dasar Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia. Majelis hakim mengesampingkan hal yang menjadi perdebatan antara mayoritas Muslim Indonesia dan Jemaah Ahmadiyah. Yakni soal Imam Mahdi yang dijanjikan Nabi Muhammad saw. Jemaah Ahmadiyah bilang, Imam Mahdi itu sudah datang, yang tak lain adalah Mirza Ghulam itulah. Sedangkan umat yang lain, ada yang mengatakan imam itu akan datang nanti pada hari kiamat.

Melihat gambar dan teks, dipandang dari segi hukum, kata Iman Parwis, memang kurang wajar atau kurang patut. Adapun kekurangpatutan itu dirumuskan oleh majelis hakim sebagai "tiap-tiap gangguan dari keseimbangan, tiap-tiap gangguan pada barang-barang kelahiran dan kerohanian dari milik hidup seorang atau gerombolan orang. Maka, majelis hakim menyatakan, antara lain: majalah Serial Media Dakwah dan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah telah melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum.

Dan majelis menghukum para tergugat untuk memasang iklan permohonan maaf kepada Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia di majalah Serial Media Dakwah itu sendiri, tiga kali berturut-turut. Besar iklan itu mesti sama dengan besar gambar Ghulam Ahmad yang dimuat majalah bulanan tersebut. Juga, ukuran huruf permintaan maaf mesti juga sama dengan besar huruf teks yang menyertai gambar Mirza Ghulam yang dimuat pada Oktober 1988.

Buchari Tamam, pemimpin redaksi yang digugat itu, tentu saja menolak keputusan ini. Ia akan naik banding. Alasannya, sudah bisa ditebak, soal keabsahan Jemaah Ahmadiyah itulah. "Organisasi ini oleh Majelis Ulama Indonesia sudah dilarang di beberapa daerah," kata Buchari kepada Dwi S. Irianto dari TEMPO. Pihak Serial Media Dakwah dan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah mengajukan saksi-saksi ahli, termasuk dari Majelis Ulama Indonesia. Majelis hakim menolak saksi-saksi ahli itu, tanpa menjelaskan alasannya.

Bagi Buchari Tamam, gambar yang mengakibatkan majalah yang dipimpinnya dan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah kepengadilan hanyalah gambar biasa saja. Dan gambar tersebut dimuat bukanlah mengada-ada, melainkan untuk menyambut kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia dalam merayakan ulang tahun ke-100 Ahmadiyah. Adapun gambar ular yang ditambahkan pada gambar Mirza Ghulam, kata Buchari Tamam, sesuai dengan kebudayaan India, tempat asal sang pendiri Ahmadiyah itu. Jadi, apa salahnya gambar itu?

Tapi Buchari tidak sukses. Ia tak berhasil membawa pengadilan mempersoalkan keabsahan Ahmadiyah, dan karena itu mempersoalkan segi agamanya. Ia juga gagal meyakinkan majelis hakim bahwa gambarnya (tergugat tak menyebut-nyebut teksnya) tak bermaksud menghina. Adakah hal itu akan jadi pertimbangan pengadilan tinggi, nanti? Bila demikian, bisa jadi masalahnya akan berkepanjangan misalnya mempersoalkan eksistensi Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia. Julizar Kasiri, Wahyu Muryadi

Retrieved from : http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1990/08/25/AG/mbm.19900825.AG19291.id.html

The Banning Of The Ahmadiyah In Indonesia – Analysis

Written by: IPCS

Eurasia Review, December 31, 2011

By Tri Susdinarjanti

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad founded the Ahmadiyah movement in India in 1889, and his teachings gradually spread to different parts of the world. The teachings of Ahmad gradually spread to different parts of the world. In Indonesia, there are two groups of the Ahmadis. One is the Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement founded in 1930, which puts forward only Ahmad as the Mujaddid or reformer, and not as a messiah. The other is Jemaah Ahmadiyah, founded in 1953, which believes that Ahmad is a messiah who came after Prophet Mohammad. The presence of both groups in Indonesia created controversy, particularly among other Islamic groups, resulting in the expulsion of the leader of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement from Muhammadiyah – one of the larger Islamic groups in Indonesia. Jamaah Ahmadiyah has also been targeted recently, either by Islamic hardliners, or the state through regulations. In 2011, the group suffered from various violent attacks carried out by Indonesian paramilitary groups and was not granted any protection by the state apparatus

Moreover, the sect was officially banned through a Joint Decree signed on 9 June 2008. The decree severely curtails the freedom of the sect and its members. For instance, the second point of the Decree prohibits Ahmadiyah members from the interpretation and practice of activities that deviate from the fundamental teachings of Islam. The decree also states that those who ignore the warning would be punishable under law. As a result of the decree, local authorities have tried to limit the Ahmadiyah’s activities in several areas in Indonesia. They have ordered the Ahmadis to take down signs that indicate their mosques and schools and encouraged other Islamic groups to re-educate and re-integrate the Ahmadis within mainstream Islam. Local authorities have also notably encouraged other people in the area to monitor the activities of the Ahmadis.

The Decree has provided justification for the misconduct of the state apparatus towards the Ahmadiyah, especially at the time of its implementation. The failure of the state to protect the Ahmadis from violence reflects its failure to protect the religious freedom of its citizens. The current situation has been relegated to one of state-sponsored violence against the Ahmadis. The strong influence of the Islamic hardliners on the Ministry of Religion and its policies and actions has contributed immensely towards this. As far back as 1980, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or Indonesian Ulema Council issued a fatwa against the Jamaah Ahmadiyah denouncing them for deviating from fundamental Islamic teachings. The fatwa was reinforced in 2005, and the MUI officially asked the government to ban the spreading of Ahmadiyah’s teachings, freeze the organization and close all the Jamaah’s activities.

The use of violence, especially one that is state-sponsored, against the Ahmadis, is a very recent trend. It raises several questions: Why is the Jamaah Ahmadiyah being targeted right now? And in comparison to other sects, what makes the Ahmadiyah more politically important for it to be banned? In the Indonesian political context, the New Order (1966 to 1998) predominantly targeted two groups – the communists (left wing) and Islamic groups (right wing). It was only in the 1990s that Suharto as president during the New Order started to engage with the Islamic groups. The growing influence of the ICMI (Indonesian Moslem Scientist Association) on the government can explain this development. The influence stayed strong when BJ Habibie took over as president from Suharto after the 1998 political reforms. However, their influence has faded substantially and unfortunately replaced by the presence of some hard-line groups such as the FPI or Islamic Defender’s Front.

The FPI was accused of being responsible for the violent attacks on Jamaah Ahmadiyah. The group reportedly has links with the military and this is a worrying development for the society due to the FPI’s tendency for perpetrating violence. The FPI has, in fact, become a major threat to the practice of multiculturalism and religious freedom in Indonesia. For example, in June 2008 the group also carried out attacks against supporters of multiculturalism during a campaign organized by the National Alliance towards Religious Freedom and Belief. Despite the 1998 political reforms, it seems that the Indonesians (still) have to bear with paramilitary groups that are used by certain groups to further their political interests. And unfortunately, it is the fate of Jamaah Ahmadiyah to be used as a political scapegoat.

Tri Susdinarjanti
Research Intern, IPCS
email: didin30@yahoo.com

Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiareview.com/31122011-the-banning-of-the-ahmadiyah-in-indonesia-analysis/

Indonesia Risks Taking Pakistan’s Path to Intolerance

OPINION

Ali Dayan Hasan | April 18, 2011

Radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, currently on trial on terrorism charges, is a symbol of religious intolerance in Indonesia. (Reuters Photo/Beawiharta)

Were a hundred Indonesians to die in a suicide bombing, one would expect Indonesian politicians, political parties and religious groups to condemn it no matter who the victims were. But when such an attack occurred last year in Pakistan, silence ruled the day. The one political leader who spoke out was the target of vitriol from religious parties and groups. Frighteningly, the series of events that led Pakistan down this path appears to be repeating itself in Indonesia.

On May 28, 2010, Islamist militants attacked two Ahmadiyah mosques in the central Pakistani city of Lahore with guns, grenades and suicide bombs, killing 94 people and injuring well over a hundred. The Punjabi Taliban, a local affiliate of the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, claimed responsibility. The Taliban have targeted not just Ahmadis but all Pakistanis — regardless of religious or sectarian affiliation. The Pakistani opposition leader Nawaz Sharif condemned this attack on “brothers and sisters who are Pakistani citizens.”

Yet his statement was greeted with anger by religious political parties and groups led by the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Pakistan branch of the Khatm-e-Nabuwat — an international Islamist umbrella organization dedicated to the “preservation of the finality of the Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood,” which considers Ahmadis heretics. It was a very ugly moment for Pakistani society.

The Ahmadiyah community has long been persecuted in Pakistan. What has happened in Pakistan is instructive in understanding the nature and potential objectives of those attacking — verbally and physically — the Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia. The situation for Ahmadis in Indonesia suggests a similar pattern of systematic persecution and a similar trend toward legalized discrimination against all Ahmadis for their religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, there are clear and specific ideological links between anti-Ahmadi organizations in Pakistan and Indonesia.

In 1974, Pakistan’s Parliament introduced constitutional amendments that defined the term “Muslim” in the Pakistani context and listed groups that were, under the law, to be considered non-Muslim. The amendment, which went into effect on Sept. 6, 1974, explicitly deprived Ahmadis of their identity as Muslims.

In 1984, five ordinances in Pakistan’s penal code were amended to explicitly target religious minorities: a law against blasphemy; a law punishing the defiling of the Koran; a prohibition against insulting the wives, family or companions of the Prophet of Islam; and two laws specifically restricting the Ahmadis’ activities. On April 26, 1984, Pakistani dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq issued these last two laws as part of Martial Law Ordinance XX.

Ordinance XX undercut the activities of religious minorities generally, but struck at Ahmadis in particular by prohibiting them from “indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim.”

Ahmadis thus could no longer profess their faith, either orally or in writing. Pakistani police destroyed Ahmadi translations of and commentaries on the Koran and banned Ahmadi publications, the use of any Islamic terminology on Ahmadi wedding invitations, the offering of Ahmadi funeral prayers and the displaying of the Kalima — the statement that “there is no god but Allah, Muhammad is Allah’s prophet,” the principal creed of Muslims — on Ahmadi gravestones.

In addition, Ordinance XX prohibited Ahmadis from declaring their faith publicly, propagating their faith, building mosques or making the call for Muslim prayer. In short, virtually any public act of worship or devotion by an Ahmadi could be treated as a criminal offense.

With the passage of the Criminal Law Act of 1986, Parliament added Section 295-C to the Pakistan Penal Code. The “Blasphemy Law,” as it came to be known, prescribed the death penalty for blasphemy. With Section 295-C, Zia and the Pakistani government institutionalized the persecution of Ahmadis as well as other minorities in Pakistan. The Ahmadi belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is considered blasphemous insofar as it “defiled the name of Prophet Muhammad.” Therefore, theoretically, Ahmadis can be sentenced to death for simply professing their faith.

As a consequence, Ahmadi mosques have been burned, their graves desecrated and their very existence criminalized. Since the 1980s, hundreds of Ahmadis have been formally charged in criminal cases for professing their religion. Scores of Ahmadis have been specifically charged with blasphemy; several have been convicted and face life imprisonment or death sentences, pending appeal. The offenses included wearing an Islamic slogan on a shirt, planning to build an Ahmadi mosque in Lahore and distributing Ahmadi literature in a public square. As a result, thousands of Ahmadis have fled Pakistan to seek asylum abroad.

Not surprisingly, anti-Ahmadiyah prejudice remains widespread in Pakistan. The foundation of legalized discrimination laid by the Pakistani state has played into the hands of the Taliban and other militant sectarian groups. The suicide bombings and other attacks on Ahmadis by these groups in recent times are only a deadly extension of the Pakistani state’s legal regime against its Ahmadi citizens since 1974. And all Pakistanis are affected: the Taliban demand that either Pakistanis accept their version of Islam as the true faith or face discrimination, flee or live in fear for their lives.

The horrific example of Pakistan should instill fear in the heart of every Indonesian. Last week’s suicide bombing attack on the Cirebon Police mosque in West Java provides an ominous foretaste of what lies ahead unless extremism nurtured by bigotry is checked before it consumes Indonesian society. For, much like their Pakistani counterparts, those who espouse extremism in Indonesia are turning on their own state and its security forces.

In Indonesia, as in Pakistan, Ahmadis are easy targets in times of religious and political insecurity. Following the June 2008 national decree that bans the Ahmadiyah from publicly practicing their faith, punishable by up to five years in prison, provincial governments have increasingly issued anti-Ahmadiyah bans —16 provinces and regencies have done so since 2006.

These provincial bans on Ahmadiyah activities breed intolerance, discrimination and, as the increasing attacks against Ahmadis in Indonesia show, violence. In February, Islamist militants beat three Ahmadis to death in Cikeusik village, Banten. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should immediately void the 2008 national decree and all the provincial decrees. He should ensure that the police act quickly to protect the Ahmadiyah from violence and hold perpetrators accountable. Indonesia’s reputation as a tolerant society is at grave risk.

Today it’s the Ahmadis, tomorrow, as in Pakistan, it could be you.

Ali Dayan Hasan is the senior South Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch.

Copyright 2010 The Jakarta Globe
Source:	www.thejakartaglobe.com/commentary/indonesia-risks-taking-pakistans- path-to-intolerance/435924

Fatwa NU yang Mendukung Keyakinan Ahmadiyah

Masyhuri, ʻA. ʻAziz. 2004. Masalah keagamaan: hasil muktamar dan munas ulama Nahdhatul Ulama kesatu-1928 s/d ketiga puluh, 2000 = [Ahkamil fuqahai : fimaqarrata muhtamarot Nahdhatul Ulama wa musyaawaraatihaa]. Depok: Diterbitkan atas kerjasama PP RMI dan Penerbit Qultum Media. pp. 30-31

Keputusan Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-3, di Surabaya pada tanggal 12 Rabiul Tsani 1347 H / 28 September 1928 M.

"Nabi Isa akan turun kembali ke dunia sebagai Nabi dan Rasul"

Soal: 
Bagaimana pendapat Muktamar tentang Nabi Isa as. setelah turun kembali ke dunia. Apakah tetap sebagai Nabi dan Rasul? Padahal Nabi Muhammad SAW adalah Nabi terakhir. Apakah madzhab empat itu akan tetap ada pada waktu itu?

Jawab:
Kita wajib berkeyakinan bahwa Nabi Isa as. itu akan diturunkan kembali pada akhir zaman nanti sebagai Nabi dan Rasul yang melaksanakan syariat Nabi Muhammad SAW. Hal itu, tidak berarti menghalangi Nabi Muhammad SAW sebagai Nabi yang terakhir, sebab Nabi Isa AS hanya akan melaksanakan syariat Nabi Muhammad SAW, sedang madzhab empat pada waktu itu hapus (tidak berlaku).

download fatwa

Ahmadiyah bans: Legal justification for intolerance?

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post   |  Sat, 12/10/2011 4:27 PM  |  Opinion

Ati Nurbaiti
As of September this year, at least 26 regencies and municipalities have passed bylaws restricting or banning the Ahmadiyah sect, 11 of them in West Java alone, according to a list from the National Commission on Violence Against Women.

Some were issued after the murderous assault on the sect in Pandeglang regency, Banten, in February 2011; including the Banten bylaw itself. The Commission has said women and children of the sect were the most vulnerable in the attacks, which according to the Setara Institute have included 342 cases of assault from 2007 to 2011. This also includes the resettlement of an entire Ahmadiyah community to an island off Lombok.

The local regulations justify other citizens and authorities into closing down Ahmadi mosques, forcing them out of their homes, or ordering them to denounce Islam if they insist on their beliefs. Unlike mainstream Muslims, the Ahmadiyah do not believe that Muhammad is the last prophet, saying they differentiate between prophets and messengers.

However, Muslims have said this is their excuse to hide their real beliefs; that the Ahmadiyah have frequently violated the joint ministerial decree on their sect by proselytizing; and that the attacks on them would stop — if only they would drop their teachings, or declare that they are no longer Muslims.

The bylaws and the joint ministerial decree, revived in 2008, refer to the 2005 non-binding fatwa of the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) which states the Ahmadiyah is deviant; and also the 1965 Law on Blasphemy, which was upheld in 2005 by the Constitutional Court in its ruling against a group of human rights advocates who wanted it annulled. The plaintiffs had said the blasphemy law was no longer relevant for a democracy since it was issued under martial law in 1965.

The movement to annul the 1965 law and those advocating an end to prosecuting minorities, pursue entirely different reasoning from groups who are sealing the Ahmadiyah mosques, often accompanied by local police.

The first argues that the state of a democratic country should not decide which Islam is “right”. The second wonders out loud why the state is leaving Muslims to take matters into their own hands, because, they say, it is evident that Ahmadiyah should be banned, based on the 1965 law, the joint ministerial decree and the MUI fatwa.

A glimpse at news reports in the wake of the Feb. 6 attacks shows that a number of these reports asserted or implied that the real victims were not the Ahmadiyah, whose three members were mobbed and killed, with helpless police officers looking on — all on display to the world thanks to YouTube.

According to the sources in the reports, such as in CyberSabili and hidayatullah.com, the real victims were the Muslims, because the Ahmadis, who insulted Islam, and blatantly defied all civilized requests to stop proselytizing, gained all the sympathy. The “victimization” of Muslims is traced to the marginalization and suppression of Islamic expression by Soeharto, apart from reports of intelligence operations against Muslim activists.

That the Ahmadiyah were not the real victims in the February assault would not necessarily be the majority view; a poll involving 3,000 respondents found most rejecting violence in the name of religion. The July poll by the Setara Institute was conducted in 47 regencies and municipalities in 10 provinces.

But if most Indonesians agreed with these respondents, it doesn’t explain all those bylaws restricting the Ahmadiyah, emerging right under the nose of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The passing of the bylaws had no difficulty, it seemed, even though the regional autonomy law states that religion should be regulated by the state. But similarly, Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali and Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi have voiced their opinions that the state should ban or dissolve the Ahmadiyah instead of only restricting their activities.

So are Indonesia’s Muslims becoming increasingly intolerant? Many say tolerance is not the issue, for the Ahmadiyah has insulted Islam.

Leading lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution told a recent discussion in Canberra that he had a hard time convincing President Yudhoyono that the Ahmadiyah had constitutional rights as a minority — and thus the President may have been persuaded against an outright ban. The ministers overseeing the joint ministerial decree restricting the Ahmadiyah also have a constitutional reference; that religious freedom is limited in respect of followers of other faiths.

The International Crisis Group had recommended an independent body to work out a strategy for religious tolerance; such a body would have to deal with this legal confusion stemming from demands to “protect” the Muslim majority against “deviants”, through rulings such as a state ban on the Ahmadiyah.

Malaysia may seem tragic to many of us as its activists say ordinary citizens, including Muslims themselves, cannot speak out against increased state regulation of Islam, lest they would be considered un-Islamic.

But the incidences of Malaysians’ violence against minorities do not come anywhere close to our long list. Should we be proud of outdoing Malaysia?

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.
— JP

Copyright © 2011 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

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Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/10/ahmadiyah-bans-legal-justification-intolerance.html

NU, Ahmadiyah, dan FPI

AntaraNews.com, Sabtu, 5 Maret 2011 11:22 WIB | 5905 Views

Edy M. Ya`kub 


Surabaya (ANTARA News) - Hanya dalam satu bulan Februari 2011 tercatat tiga kerusuhan bernuansa agama yakni di Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten (6/2), Temanggung, Jateng (8/2), dan Pasuruan, Jatim (15/2).

Rentetan peristiwa itu agaknya membuat Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono bersikap keras dengan mengeluarkan "warning" tentang kemungkinan pembubaran ormas anarkis.

Dalam sikapnya, Presiden tidak menyebut ormas yang dimaksud secara spesifik.

Walhasil, tiga kerusuhan bernuansa agama itu akhirnya tidak hanya berhenti pada penegakan hukum, melainkan juga mendorong persoalan mengerucut pada polemik tentang Ahmadiyah di berbagai daerah, bahkan para petinggi Front Pembela Islam (FPI) pun turut meramaikan polemik itu.

Adalah Gubernur Jawa Timur Soekarwo yang merupakan kepala daerah yang pertama mengeluarkan Surat Keputusan Nomor 188/94/KPTS/013/2011 tentang Larangan Aktivitas Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di wilayahnya.

Surat tertanggal 28 Februari 2011 itu disampaikan Gubernur di depan anggota Forum Pimpinan Daerah (Forpimda) dan pimpinan sejumlah media massa di Gedung Negara Grahadi, Surabaya (28/2/2011).

Dalam SK tersebut terdapat tiga pasal. Pertama, melarang aktivitas JAI yang dapat memicu dan/atau menyebarkan terganggunya ketertiban masyarakat Jawa Timur.

Pasal kedua berisi empat poin; a) menyebarkan ajaran Ahmadiyah secara lisan, tulisan, maupun melalui media elektronik; b) memasang papan nama organisasi JAI di tempat umum; c) memasang papan nama pada masjid, mushalla, lembaga pendidikan, dan lain-lain dengan identitas JAI; dan d) menggunakan atribut JAI dalam segala macam bentuknya.

Gubernur Soekarwo menegaskan bahwa pihaknya tidak berwenang membubarkan ajaran Ahmadiyah.

"Kami hanya bisa melarang aktivitasnya, bukan membubarkan, karena pusat yang berwenang (membubarkan). Urusan agama merupakan salah satu dari lima kewenangan pusat," ujarnya.

Sikap gubernur Jatim yang juga mendorong sikap serupa di Jabar dan provinsi lain itu mengundang protes dari Jaring Masyarakat Anti-Kekerasan (Jamak) dan Aliansi Anak Bangsa Peduli HAM.

"Dari diskusi panjang lebar tentang kekerasan dalam beragama, kami mendesak Gubernur Jatim untuk mencabut SK Larangan Aktivitas JAI," kata Presidium Jamak Jatim, Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, di Surabaya (3/3).

Mereka menganggap SK tersebut salah alamat dan harus dicabut, karena SK itu seharusnya bukan dialamatkan kepada JAI, melainkan kepada kelompok-kelompok masyarakat yang selama ini melakukan kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah.

"Ahmadiyah selama ini selalu menjadi korban. Penerbitan SK pelarangan Ahmadiyah menunjukkan kalau pemerintah kalah dengan kelompok tertentu. Khususnya negara sudah kalah dengan masyarakat yang kalap. Negara juga sudah gagal dalam memberikan jaminan keamanan kepada masyarakatnya, terlebih pada masyarakat kelompok minoritas," katanya.

Menanggapi protes itu, gubernur mempersilakan para pemprotes untuk menggugatnya secara hukum, karena upaya hukum lebih bagus daripada demonstrasi (demo).

"Yang jelas, esensi SK hanya melarang aktivitas JAI di Jatim dan bukan membubarkan organisasinya. Akidah dan ritualnya tidak bisa dilarang. Hanya aktivitasnya, seperti pemasangan `plang` (papan nama) dan penyebaran melalui lisan dan tulisan. Itu juga sesuai SKB Menag, Mendagri, dan Jakgung," ujarnya.

Sikap yang sama dikeluarkan Gubernur Jawa Barat melalui Pergub Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Pelarangan Kegiatan Jamaah Ahmadiyah di Jabar yang esensinya sama dengan SK Gubernur Jatim tentang Ahmadiyah.

Sikap NU

Di tengah polemik itu, pandangan Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dalam menyikapi tiga kerusuhan (6-15/2) itu agaknya cukup menarik untuk disimak, termasuk soal Ahmadiyah dan FPI itu sendiri.

Hal itu karena NU merupakan organisasi kemasyarakatan (ormas) Islam terbesar di Indonesia, sehingga sikapnya menjadi rujukan bagi ormas lain untuk menilai konflik legalitas Ahmadiyah (Cikeusik), konflik antaragama (Temanggung), dan konflik Sunni-Syiah (Pasuruan).

Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama (PWNU) Jawa Timur mendukung pembekuan kegiatan Jamaah Ahmadiyah sebagaimana tertuang dalam Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB) Menteri Agama, Jaksa Agung, Menteri Dalam Negeri tertanggal 9 Juni 2008.

"Soal keyakinan itu tidak dapat dipaksakan, namun bisa didialogkan. Karena itu kami mendukung SKB Ahmadiyah yang intinya membekukan kegiatan Ahmadiyah yang menyimpang," kata Sekretaris PWNU Jatim HM Masyhudi Muchtar kepada ANTARA di Surabaya (21/2).

SKB Ahmadiyah itu antara lain berbunyi peringatan kepada jamaah Ahmadiyah untuk menghentikan penyebaran penafsiran dan kegiatan yang menyimpang dari pokok-pokok ajaran Agama Islam yaitu penyebaran faham yang mengakui adanya Nabi dengan segala ajarannya setelah Nabi Muhammad SAW.

Didampingi Rais Syuriah PWNU Jatim KH Miftachul Akhyar, Masyhudi Muchtar mengatakan Ahmadiyah itu menyimpang dari ajaran Islam dan paham NU, karena jamaah Ahmadiyah dari aliran Qadian dan Lahore itu sama-sama mengakui Mirza Ghulam Ahmad pernah menerima wahyu untuk menerima tugas sebagai Imam Mahdi atau Isa Almasih.

"Kami mendukung SKB Menag, Mendagri, dan Jaksa Agung, karena pelarangan atau pembekuan itu merupakan peluang pemerintah dan tokoh agama untuk bertindak sesuai porsi masing-masing yakni pemberintah menindak secara hukum dan tokoh agama melakukan pembinaan atau dialog dengan jamaah Ahmadiyah," katanya.

Hal itu penting, karena keyakinan agama itu merupakan keyakinan asasi yang tidak bisa dipaksakan kepada orang lain, tapi perlu dilakukan kompromi melalui dialog. "Islam sendiri mengajarkan `mauidhoh hasanah` atau cara-cara yang baik dan menjauhi cara-cara kekerasan. Hidayah itu hak Tuhan," katanya.

Menanggapi hal itu, Ketua Forum Cendekiawan Ahmadiyah Jatim Ustadz Hamid Ahmad kepada ANTARA di Surabaya (28/2) mengaku siap berdialog, karena Ahmadiyah itu menggunakan Al Quran, membaca syahadat, kiblat untuk shalat, nabi, dan hal-hal lainnya yang sama dengan umat Islam pada umumnya.

"Kalau dibilang kami punya kitab suci Tadzkirah itu nggak betul, karena kita suci kami tetap Al Quran. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad itu juga bukan nabi, tapi penerus nabi seperti Imam Mahdi atau Isa Almasih," paparnya.

Namun, Rais Syuriah PBNU KH Hasyim Muzadi berpendapat sebaliknya. Ia menilai aktivitas dan penyebaran Ahmadiyah ini memang harus dilarang dan dihentikan seperti SK Gubernur Jatim atau SKB Menag, Mendagri, dan Jakgung itu.

"Ajaran Ahmadiyah itu memang harus dihentikan, karena rawan terhadap umat Islam itu sendiri, kecuali kalau Ahmadiyah itu menjadi satu agama sendiri dan bukan Agama Islam. Itu (Ahmadiyah) tidak ada kaitannya dengan kebebasan beragama, tapi justru penodaan agama," ucap mantan Ketua Umum PBNU itu.

Tapi, kata Sekjen International Conference of Islamic Scholar (ICIS) tersebut, kebebasan hidupnya sebagai warga negara tetap dilindungi dan SK atau SKB itu justru melindungi mereka dari oknum yang menggunakan atau memanfaatkan kerawanan untuk memicu konflik.

Senada dengan itu, Ketua Umum PBNU KH Said Aqiel Siradj menegaskan bahwa Ahmadiyah memang menyimpang dan tidak sejalan dengan NU, karena pandangan yang menganggap ada nabi setelah Nabi Muhammad SAW itu tidak sejalan dengan akidah NU (Aswaja).

"Namun pembubaran Ahmadiyah adalah domain Pemerintah dan NU tidak berada dalam wilayah itu. Selain itu, perbedaan keyakinan tidak bisa menjadi pembenar untuk melakukan tindakan kekerasan atau kesewenang-wenangan," katanya.

Agaknya, NU selalu bersikap "jalan tengah" (tawassuth, i`tidal, musawah, tasamuh). NU menyalahkan ajaran Ahmadiyah, tapi tidak menyalahkan pemeluknya terkait hidayah Tuhan.

NU menyalahkan cara kekerasan FPI, tapi NU tidak menyalahkan atau membubarkan organisasinya terkait hidayah Tuhan juga.
(*)

Editor: AA Ariwibowo

COPYRIGHT © 2011

Retrieved from: http://www.antaranews.com/berita/248702/nu-ahmadiyah-dan-fpi

Religious ‘deviancy’ and law

Inside Indonesia, Thursday, 25 August 2011 15:12, Melissa Crouch, Stories

The escalation of violent attacks prompts some local governments to ban the activities of Ahmadiyah

An anti-Ahmadiyah poster: ‘Ahmadiyah is the enemy of Islam…’ Melissa Crouch

Melissa Crouch

In February 2011, three Ahmadi followers were killed and at least five were injured in a brutal attack on an Ahmadiyah community in the subdistrict of Cikeusik in the province of Banten. Graphic footage of this disturbing attack circulated widely on the internet and brought the issue of Ahmadiyah, an Islamic sect, to the attention of international media.
The plight of Ahmadiyah remains an ongoing issue of concern. The Cikeusik incident has not only prompted renewed debate about Ahmadiyah, but also led to the enactment of measures by provincial and district governments to further restrict Ahmadiyah activity. This is at odds with the history of relatively peaceful co-existence that Ahmadiyah has enjoyed in Indonesia throughout much of the twentieth century.

Origins of the movement

Ahmadiyah has been present in Indonesia since the 1920s, when Ahmadi teachers first came as part of the Ahmadi missionary movement from India. This religious movement originated in India in the mid-1800s, and was named after its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. From the beginning, Ahmad declared Ahmadiyah to be an Islamic movement. His teachings, however, differ in several respects from traditional Islamic doctrine and have therefore been a source of tension for many conservative Islamic religious leaders. The greatest conflict with orthodox Islam is caused by Ahmad’s claim that revelation did not cease with the Prophet Muhammad, but that he himself was the spirit of the Prophet incarnate or the mahdi, the Messiah expected by Muslims to arrive before the end of the world to lead the faithful.

Since Ahmad’s death in 1908, there have been ongoing differences within Ahmadiyah over the leadership of the group and over the status and authority of the founder. As a consequence of disagreements about these issues, Ahmadiyah split into two factions, Lahore and Qadiani. Ahmadiyah Lahore, named after the birthplace of its first leader, Muhammad Ali of Lahor, accepts the founder Ahmad as a reformer, but not as another prophet after the Prophet Muhammad. On the other hand, Ahmadiyah Qadiani, named after the birthplace of Ahmad, accepts Ahmad’s claims to prophethood.

These two factions are known in Indonesia as Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), which is the Lahore branch, and Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), which is the Qadiani branch. Although the disputes concerning Ahmadiyah in Indonesia have primarily involved the Qadiani branch, which is the larger group, those who oppose Ahmadiyah do not always distinguish between the two streams. Together, these groups claim a membership of between 100,000 to 300,000 followers across the archipelago.

Opposition to Ahmadiyah

Since its arrival in Indonesia, some mainstream Islamic religious leaders have denounced Ahmadiyah and its teachings as ‘deviant’. Most prominent among its opponents is the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) which issued a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) against Ahmadiyah in 1980 and again in 2005. Many radical Islamic groups continue to express their opposition to Ahmadiyah in the form of demonstrations and violent attacks.

One of the most prominent incidents was the attack on supporters of Ahmadiyah by radical Islamic groups that took place on 1 June 2008 at the National Monument in Jakarta. On this day, a peaceful rally was held by activists of the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith, a coalition representing over 70 organisations in support of the right to religious freedom. During this rally, around 400 members of radical Islamic groups, including the Islamic Defenders Front, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia and the Islamic Community Forum, violently attacked the Alliance demonstrators with clubs and sticks. Around 70 people were injured, some hospitalised, with many also suffering trauma as a result of the attack.

Demonstrators assembled at the National Monument in Jakarta on 1 June 2008 to show support for Ahmadiyah. The banner reads ‘Stop violence in the name of religion’ Salbiyah Mushanif

This incident prompted the Department of Religion, the Attorney General and the Department of Home Affairs to issue a joint regulation several days later as a ‘warning’ to followers of Ahmadiyah. It made four key points. First, it warned citizens not to support or conduct activities that ‘deviate’ from the teachings of the six state-sponsored religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism). Second, it warned followers of Ahmadiyah not to promote ‘deviant’ teachings, namely the belief in a prophet after Muhammad. Third, it informed followers of Ahmadiyah that if they did not comply with this warning they would be liable to penalties under existing laws, although such penalties were not specified in any further detail. Fourth, it prohibited vigilantism, presumably in response to the National Monument incident, by warning the public that vigilante action against Ahmadiyah would not be tolerated.

This warning, however, has failed to prevent further violent attacks against Ahmadis, such as the incident in Cikeusik. In addition, the warning has provided justification for local government authorities intent on banning Ahmadiyah.

Banning Ahmadiyah

Provincial and district regulations that seek to ban Ahmadiyah are not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, with at least 40 district or provincial governments passing bans on the group’s activities since the 1970s.

There has, however, been an increase in the number of district and provincial governments that have issued regulations to limit the activities of Ahmadiyah. On 28 February 2011, for example, the Governor of East Java issued a ban on Ahmadiyah in that province. It prohibited the spread of the teachings of Ahmadiyah in written, oral or electronic form. It also banned the use of the name ‘Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia’, the largest Ahmadiyah organisation in Indonesia, on public sign boards, or on billboards marking mosques and educational institutions.

At least 40 district or provincial governments have passed bans on Ahmadiyah or its activities since the 1970s

Just three days later, on 2 March, the Governor of West Java issued a regulation banning the activities of Ahmadiyah in the province. This regulation borrows some key provisions from the East Java regulation, and extends its scope by creating an investigative team with the specific task of monitoring the Ahmadiyah community in the province. The regulation also gives power to local authorities – including the police, local government, community leaders and the Indonesian Ulama Council – to inform and educate the community about this regulation.

In addition to provincial governments, a number of district governments have passed regulations banning Ahmadiyah. One of the most recent of these was issued in Depok, where 300 Ahmadis have been under investigation by the Department of Religion, the Indonesian Council of Ulamas and State Intelligence since November 2010. As a result of this investigation, on 9 March 2011 the mayor, Nurmahmudi Ismail, banned Ahmadiyah activity in the district. There are also plans for a special enforcement team to oversee and monitor the activities of Ahmadiyah in Depok.

Human rights groups and Ahmadiyah have indicated that they may challenge these regulations. If a case for judicial review were taken to court, one of the main issues would be whether local governments have the power to make laws on matters of religion. Under Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance, the national government has the right to legislate on several key matters of national concern, including religion. To prove local governments are acting outside these powers, it would need to be shown that these regulations on Ahmadiyah attempt to address matters of religion.

Radical Islamic groups attacked peaceful demonstrators at the National Monument on 1 June 2008 Salbiyah Mushanif

Local authorities claim a number of legal justifications for the laws. One of these is the argument that the regulations are not about religion, but about public order and social harmony. Law No. 32/2004 does grant provincial and local governments the power to make regulations in regard to these issues. Some governments claim that this gives them authority to issue regulations on Ahmadiyah. Human rights groups argue that if this is the case, governments should ban the radical Islamic groups who perpetrate violent attacks on Ahmadiyah rather than their victims.

Another possibility is based on the 2008 national Joint Decree on Ahmadiyah. Some provincial and local governments claim that the decree delegates powers on this issue to local authorities. A Joint Circular from the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home Affairs, issued in August 2008, permitted local governments to take necessary steps to ensure compliance with this decree, such as monitoring the Ahmadiyah community to ensure they do not ‘deviate’ from the teachings of Islam.

A final justification might come from Presidential Decree No. 1/1965, which is commonly referred to in Indonesia as the Blasphemy Law. Under this law, only the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General and the Minister of Home Affairs have the power to issue a warning to a religious group which, if not complied with, could lead to a ban by the President. The Blasphemy Law, however, does not grant provincial or local governments the right to warn or ban a group.

These issues have yet to be brought before a court, but what is clear is that these recent provincial and district regulations reflect the increasingly conservative positions being expressed at ministerial level. In October 2010 – the same month that the national government announced that it was reviewing the 2008 decree – the Minister of Religion, Suryadharma Ali, publically declared that the best solution to the problem was to ban Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. In February 2011, the Department of Home Affairs was reported in the media as stating that local governments are allowed to pass regulations on Ahmadiyah as long as they do not conflict with the 2008 decree. This statement appeared to legitimise the actions of local governments that have passed such regulations, despite unresolved questions over whether they hold the legal power to do so.

Future challenges

In stark contrast to some other Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan, where Ahmadiyah followers are constantly subject to violent attacks and charges of blaspheming Islam, Ahmadiyah has existed in relative peace in Indonesia for over 80 years. Ongoing pressure from radical Islamic groups and from leaders of some mainstream Islamic organisations now threaten its existence.

The ongoing vigilante attacks against Ahmadis, combined with local regulations banning the activities of Ahmadiyah, should not be viewed as unrelated events. In fact, incidents such as the killing in Cikeusik appear to have inspired an increasing number of local governments to introduce bans. The unwillingness of law enforcement agencies to prevent attacks, combined with the inaction of the national government, contributes to the uncertain future of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. That future requires the government and religious leaders to negotiate an outcome that is consistent with Indonesia’s rich history of pluralism and tolerance.

Melissa Crouch (m.crouch@unimelb.edu.au) is a Research Fellow at the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne. She is a principal research assistant on Professor Tim Lindsey’s Federation Fellowship project, ‘Islam and Modernity’ in the same faculty.

Inside Indonesia 105: Jul-Sep 2011

Retrieved from: http://www.insideindonesia.org/stories/religious-deviancy-and-law-28081471

The Special Case: Ahmadiyya Muslims

Global Politician, 5/12/2007

By Wolfgang Bruno

There are movements within Islam, or groups of people who at least identify themselves as Muslims, that are indeed somewhat more tolerant and less violent that mainstream Muslims. One such movement is the Ahmadiyya community.

The Ahmadiyya movement was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889. He taught that jihad “by the sword” had been replaced by jihad “of the pen,” and wanted to synthesize all religions under the banner of Islam. He claimed to be the "Reformer of the age" but did not bring any new revelation. After a schism in 1914, his followers split into two groups: The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, with its center in Lahore in what is today Pakistan. The main body, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (sometimes called the Qadiani after the village where the founder was born) claimed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet, although he didn't bring any new laws. The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, on the other hand, presented themselves as an Islamic reform movement and maintained the normal Muslim view that Muhammad was "the seal of the prophets" and that there would be no new prophet after him. Both branches, however, agree that Ghulam Ahmad was the Mahdi and the Messiah. They also believe that the Koran contains no abrogations.

Ahmadis still follow traditional Muslim rituals such as prayer and fasting, but among mainstream Muslims there is deep suspicion towards them, chiefly because the main body of Ahmadiyyas have affirmed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet, a claim that is considered heretical by most Muslims. The largest concentration of Ahmadiyyas is found in the Indian subcontinent, in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both groups are viewed as heretical by Saudi authorities, and are thus not allowed to go on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

At alislam.org, their official website, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community says about themselves:

“The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam is a religious organization, international in its scope, with branches in over 178 countries in Africa, North America, South America, Asia, Australasia, and Europe. At present, its total membership exceeds 200 million worldwide [note: it is impossible to verify this number, which is almost certainly inflated], and the numbers are increasing day by day. This is the most dynamic denomination of Islam in modern history. The Ahmadiyya Movement was established in 1889 by Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) in a small and remote village, Qadian, in the Punjab, India. He claimed to be the expected reformer of the latter days, the Awaited One of the world community of religions (The Mahdi and Messiah). It [the movement] advocates peace, tolerance, love and understanding among followers of different faiths. It firmly believes in and acts upon the Qur'anic teaching: "There is no compulsion in religion." (2:257) It strongly rejects violence and terrorism [emphasis in the original] in any form and for any reason. After the demise of its founder, the Ahmadiyya Movement has been headed by his elected successors - Khalifas.”

Precisely because they champion an unorthodox and somewhat more peaceful version of Islam, Ahmadis are frequently persecuted by traditional Muslims in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Under Pakistan's strict blasphemy laws the Ahmadiyya are not allowed to preach, nor even to call themselves Muslims.

Under the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) -led government, discrimination and violence against the Ahmadis has intensified. "It's a dangerous moment in Bangladesh when the government becomes complicit in religious violence," said Brad Adams, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division. "The authorities have emboldened extremists by failing to prosecute those engaged in anti-Ahmadi violence and by banning Ahmadiyya publications."

In October 2004 Muslim fanatics razed an Ahmadiyya mosque. The mob vandalized and robbed Ahmadiyya houses, injuring at least 11. One of the injured, Shabju Mia, 52, imam of the mosque, ended up in hospital. Witnesses said local BNP leader led the raiders.

In July 2006, the Bangladeshi newspaper the Daily Star carried a story on Ahmadis who had been victimized, but the article was later removed, probably following pressures from powerful anti-Ahmadiyya forces. The police had accused four Ahmadis of preaching publicly in a village in the Punjab. The villagers protested against "unabated preaching" of the Ahmadiyya faith in their village, and urged the police to ensure the arrest of those accused. The minority sect condemned law enforcers for being reluctant to act in two assault incidents on Ahmadis that same summer. The movement believed this encouraged the bigots to be more aggressive. The Ahmadiyyas had become confined to their houses and refrained from going to work after fanatics threatened to attack them.

The irony is that although Ahmadis are hardly even considered Muslims by other Muslims, the first and so far only Muslim to be awarded a Nobel Prize for science was an Ahmadi. According to Hugh Fitzgerald:

“Among the nearly 1000 recipients of Nobel Prizes in science (Physics, Chemistry, Medicine), only one appears to have gone to a ‘Muslim’ - Abdus Salam. Trained partly at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, and dying in Oxford (to which he had retired), Abdus Salam shared the prize with Sheldon Glashow and Steven Weinberg. One presumes that Abdus Salam deserved his 1/3 of the 1979 prize. But his entire career depended upon access to Western education. And while he wrote on the ‘Wisdom of Islam’ (just the kind of thing to win a Templeton Prize) he was both claimed, in Pakistan, as a ‘Muslim’ and yet belonged, as ah Ahmadiyya, to a sect regarded by many Muslims in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and elsewhere as not a real Muslim at all. It was a case of claiming not him, but rather his Nobel, for Islam, and then not discussing if just possibly, the reason he was the only Muslim Nobel-winner in science might have something to do with, precisely, the relatively greater mental freedom that Adhamiddya Islam may offer its adherents, compared to that available to those in orthodox Islam.”

The Ahmadis do in some ways represent an interesting case of a “reformed” Islam, but it is in my view unlikely whether their version of Islam could ever form a viable alternative to the majority of the world’s Muslims. They are simply too far removed from Islamic orthodoxy, especially the largest branch which considers their founder a prophet.

Wolfgang Bruno is a European author. He is writing a book about the Internet movement of ex-Muslims.

http://globalpolitician.com/22785-islam (Accessed 7/25/2011)

Blasphemy laws in Muslim-Majority Countries

Authors:
Uddin, Asma T.¹

Source:

Review of Faith & International Affairs; Jun2011, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p47-55, 9p

Document Type:

Article

Abstract:

In Pakistan, courts use blasphemy laws to bully religious minorities, as well as Muslims, and to justify broad censorship on speech. In Indonesia, officials impose criminal penalties on the Ahmadiyya and other groups whose teachings are deemed deviant from the state-sanctioned religions. In Egypt, officials use blasphemy laws to prevent conversions, inhibit proselytism, and silence critics. Such laws appease rather than control violent extremists and create a culture of impunity, where increasingly egregious crimes are committed with little or no consequences for the perpetrators. The United Nations Defamation of Religions Resolution similarly empowers states to limit religious expression and works counter to the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author Affiliations:

¹Attorney, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

Ahmadiyah’s Controversy in Indonesia — Vying for an Authority

Islamlib.com, 23/07/2008

By: Ulil Abshar-Abdalla

The whole furor and controversy over Ahmadiyah sect is just a parcel of a larger dynamic in the Indonesian politics. Over the last ten years after the unleashing of democratic movement in Indonesia, one development stands out to be worthy of our analysis, namely the radicalizing trend among Muslim society. This trends manifested in various form, including the vigorous campaign launched by Islamists to adopt and implement sharia or Islamic law. The entire campaign to dissolve Ahmadiyah, to me, cannot be analyzed separately from this larger trend.

Looking at Indonesia solely through its constitution, you cannot help but to think that it is a modern state whose facade is not so different from the United States or Western European countries. All basic requirements you need to create democracy are meticulously met by Indonesia, ranging from free and fair election, protection of basic civil rights, freedom of the press, freedom of association, to a robust civil society–every thing, you name it. Indonesian press is now entitled a relatively full freedom to publish whatever it thinks fit to put on its page, including, of course, criticizing the way government officers conduct public affairs–something that is hardly to happen in the previous regime.

Indonesian constitution lends also a full protection of religious freedom. Theoretically speaking, people are free to exercise their freedom to embrace any religion, faith, mazhab, and denomination of their choice. You are free to be Muslim, Christian, Hindus, Budhist, Confucian, and so forth. As a Muslim, you are also free to be Sunni or Shi’i, as well as free to affiliate with any Islamic organization you think fit to express your way of being Muslim.

But constitution is not the best lens to have a glimpse into the nature of any state and society, since it is only what Indonesia’s adage says “hitam di atas putih”, a mere ink on a paper. What is more important is to look at how that ink materializes into reality, and to what extent state policies live up to the lofty ideals espoused in the constitution. If this is the stick by which you judge Indonesia, I am afraid that it fails, particularly with respect to religious freedom.

The recent phenomenon is the whole furor over what is considered as a “deviant sect” in Islam called Ahmadiyah. The problem of Ahmadiyah has been around since early on even before Indonesian independence. This sect that was groomed in Pakistan came to Indonesia in 1925, and it spurred a controversy right away as it did anywhere it spread. This sect made a claim that raised the eyebrow of Muslim, namely that its founder is a new “prophet” that came after the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims who adhere to mainline Islam believe in the finality of prophecy in Islam. Ahmadiya’s doctrine on prophecy runs at odd with this doctrine. To say that new prophet possibly emerges is as odd to Muslim ear as to say that Jesus is not resurrected on the third day after his crucifixion to Christians.

From its early stage of its introduction to Indonesia, many Muslim scholars objected to the doctrine of Ahmadiyah, although Ahmadiyah should be credited with its good work to introduce Islam to the rank of Muslim intelligentsia in 30s in a way that resonates with Modern mind-set. Bung Karno, the first Indonesian president, befriended many intellectuals and activists who are either member or sympathetic to Ahamdiyah’s version of Islam. The first “official” translation of the Quran into Indonesian language conducted under the auspice of Ministry of Religious Affairs in 60s was pretty much influenced by Ahmadiyah’s writers. In nutshell, Ahmadiyah has successfully made an inroad into the Indonesian Islamic discourse through its committed missionaries and propagandists.

Throughout President Suharto’s rule (1968-1998), Ahmadiyah still enjoyed a full freedom to conduct its proselytizing activities which seems to be robust and aggressive as it is the case anywhere. In early 80s, the first “fatwa” or religious edict was being issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) in which this sect was for the first time officially deemed “deviant”. However, the edict didn’t go far as to demand the government to intervene to dissolve the movement.

The crucial shift occurred after reformasi (political reform) that followed the downfall of Suharto and his regime in May 1998. A series of attacks on Ahmadiyah’s mosques and its member escalated right after the issuance of a second fatwa by MUI on July 29th, 2005 in which Ahmadiyah is again labeled as deviant sect. However, the fatwa took different course this time. It was followed by a massive campaign conducted by radical and fundamentalist Islamic groups to press for the dissolution of Ahmadiyah as an organization and movement. There are certain groups that are worthy to be singled out as “engineers” of this campaign, namely Hizbut Tahrir, FUI (The Forum of Islamic Umma or Community) and and FPI (Front of Islam’s Defender).

The campaign succeeded to achieve its goal, marked by the issuance of the Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama, known as SKB) in June 9th, 2008. The decree falls short of fulfilling the demand of radical Islamists to dissolve forever the Ahmadiyah movement. It mandates instead to freeze the proselytizing activities of Ahmadiyah, particularly its doctrine of prophecy. As noted by many observers, the decree is quite ambiguous. The question that is left un-addressed is whether the Ahmadi people are still free to conduct their religious activities in their mosques and madrasahs.

No matter how you interpret the decree, the fact remains the same: the government seems to fall into the trap set up by the Islamist groups that seem to be exerting its role recently in the Indonesian political landscape. By all means, the decree is evidently at odd with the constitution that insures the freedom of religion and faith.

How do we interpret this recent development as it unfolds in the case of Ahmadiyah?

Ahmadiyah is not a major and mind-boggling issue for Muslim rank-and-file. Of course, Muslim believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet. However, many of them won’t roll in anger if somebody in the corner of Islamic world show up and claim to be a new prophet. They will certainly object to that claim, but will never ever run into an amok simply because of that minor issue. If the course of event proceeds in the opposite direction, something must have gone wrong in one way or another!

The whole furor and controversy over Ahmadiyah sect is just a parcel of a larger dynamic in the Indonesian politics. Over the last ten years after the unleashing of democratic movement in Indonesia, one development stands out to be worthy of our analysis, namely the radicalizing trend among Muslim society. This trends manifested in various form, including the vigorous campaign launched by Islamists to adopt and implement sharia or Islamic law. The entire campaign to dissolve Ahmadiyah, to me, cannot be analyzed separately from this larger trend.

The main actors in this campaign are obviously Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, FUI and FPI. Hizbut Tahrir is worth mentioning here. I venture to claim that Hizbut Tahrir is the only group that has the highest stake in this campaign for a simple reason, namely to gain a credibility and credential in the eye of Indonesian Muslim who are mainly Sunni as an “Islamic voice”. Hizbut Tahrir has been confronted with resistance and political repression throughout Muslim countries, particularly in the authoritarian monarchies in Middle East. Indonesia is the only country where it finds a fertile soil to thrive. The first international conference of caliphate (Islamic global state) was conducted in Jakarta on August 2006. After its kicking out from UK on the allegation of its involvement in London bombing in 2007, Hizbut Tahrir sought an alternative base to launch its global movement to establish the Islamic caliphate. Where else does it fit better than Indonesia?

Ahmadiyah issue is also being politically exploited by other Islamist groups to earn reputation as an “authority” that deserves the respect of Muslim society. There are two major Islamic organizations that represent Islamic moderation in Indonesia, i.e. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. However, the image of “moderation” is looked upon with deep suspicion by other Islamic groups, especially the Islamist and radical ones. Moderation, in their eye, amounts to being playing into the game of Washington. It is incumbent upon these groups to wrestle the authority to speak about Islam from these two moderate organizations.

In other words, the entire debate on deviant sect in Islam is not something that has a merit on its own, but rather a proxy for differing Islamic groups which vie for an authoritative position as the sole “voice” of Islam. What is regrettable is that Indonesian government slipped or deliberately let itself trapped in this dangerous game. As stated in the constitution, the Indonesian government is tasked with only one thing, i.e. to respect and guarantee the right of all its citizens to exercise their freedom to embrace any religion and faith of their choice. The state has no stake whatsoever in delineating what is “straight” and what is “crooked” with respect to religious doctrinal debate within any community![]

http://islamlib.com/en/article/ahmadiyahs-controversy-in-indonesia-vying-for-an-authority/ (Accessed 7/23/2011)

Ahmadiyah and Indonesian Democracy

The Jakarta Globe

Wim Tangkilisan | March 11, 2009

Democracy is not just about elections. Even more essential is the way minorities are treated by the majority.

The Koran is very clear that “in matters of faith there shall be no coercion.”

And it stresses that “if it had been the will of your Lord that all the people of the world should be believers, then all the people of the earth would have believed! Would you now compel humankind against their will to believe?”

Now comes a Muslim leader, Cholid Ridwan, a chairman of the Indonesian Council of Ulema, or MUI, who warns the President of Indonesia that if he does not outlaw Ahmadiyah, an Indonesian-based Islamic sect, the council will issue a fatwa, or religious edict, prohibiting Indonesian Muslims from voting for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the upcoming presidential elections.

Ahmadiyah is a sect of Indian origin, with some links to Sufism. It is controversial because of its claim that its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was the last of the prophets, contrary to the basic tenet of Islam that the final of the prophets is Muhammad.

The sect is not new to controversy. In the 1930s, it was rumored that independence hero and former President Sukarno had become a propagator of Ahmadiyah. He denied it in writing, but in the process he wrote a few words of praise for the good behavior of its adherents. He was emphatic, however, that he was not one of them.

Today there are Muslim circles in Indonesia that clamor for an outright ban against the sect. That is old news. What is new is the election-related threat of a fatwa against the president if he does not outlaw the sect.

Another Muslim leader, Umar Shihab, also a chairman of the MUI, says that Cholid speaks only for himself. Furthermore, he says no such fatwa is being prepared. No threat of one. But, in effect he says that it would be nice indeed if the president did outlaw the sect.

The presidential spokesman, Andi Mallarangeng, says that this is just one more sign that everyone has caught election fever. “We don’t need to worry about it at all,” he said.

What indeed is there to worry about then? We perhaps have more urgent things to concern ourselves with, like corruption in the House of Representatives and getting the economic stimulus package up and running.

But wait a minute. There are basic questions involved in this issue that need attention.

There is, of course, the question of what Islam really teaches about tolerance, about the command against coercion on matters of faith. Where does it say in the Koran or in the Hadith that an exception has to be made in the case of the Ahmadiyah? The Muslim faithful may wish to obtain some clarity on that.

Since I am not a Muslim, I should let this be a matter among Muslims. But as an Indonesian, I am most concerned about the political implications of the issue. And when I say political, I don’t mean electoral politics. President Yudhoyono, I think, will win or lose the election on the basis of his performance as leader of the nation, fatwa or no fatwa.

What I mean is Indonesian democracy. I mean Indonesia’s aspiration and claim to be the world’s third largest democracy. I mean the pride that the Indonesian people derive from our international reputation as living proof that Islam, democracy and modernization can flourish together.

I mean human rights. Freedom of thought. Freedom of speech. Freedom of association.

Democracy is not just about elections. Even more essential to democracy is the way minorities are treated by the majority — whether their rights are held sacred or trampled upon.

We take pride in our tradition of m usyawarah untuk m ufakat , or consultations leading to consensus, a process in which all views are spoken for and all interests are taken into account. But all I have been hearing about Ahmadiyah are the threats against them.

Wim Tangkilisan is the president and editor in chief of the Jakarta Globe.

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/ahmadiyah-and-indonesian-democracy/309657 (Acessed 7/22/2011)

A 'Way Out' for Ahmadiyah

Fake Prophet: Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Ahmadiyah (died 1908). Muhammad Iqbal saw Ahmadiyah as part of the colonial "split and rule" programme to keep the Muslims fighting among themselves. Picture: Wikimedia

Dr. Syamsuddin Arif
SHAH ALAM

The Brunei Times (http://www.bt.com.bn), Friday, May 16, 2008 - Page

' ' I do not believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, nor do I accept him as a mujaddid [religious reformer]," wrote the late Ir. Soekarno in his major book, Under the Banner of Revolution (2nd imp. Jakarta, 1963, vol.1, p.345).

For the past three months, Indonesia has been deeply involved in an endless debate on Ahmadiyah. Ir. Soekarno, the first Indonesian President, was neither the first nor the sole Muslim figure to express such unfavorable view.

Long before him, the celebrated thinker Sir Muhammad Iqbal when asked by Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India, concerning Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's propaganda, emphatically replied that "no Revelation the denial of which entails heresy is possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor to Islam" (Islam of And Ahmadism, repr. Islamabad, 1990, p.8).

Iqbal saw striking similarities between the Ahmadiyah movement in India and the Babism in Persia (Iran), whose founder also claimed to be a prophet. Because their creed was political servility, both movements were supported by the British and the Russian as part of the colonial 'split and rule' program to keep the Muslims fighting among themselves.

If the Russian government allowed Babism to establish their own mosque in Ishqabad, Turkmenistan, the British let the Ahmadiyah found their mission centre in Woking, Surrey.

According to Iqbal, Ahmadism or Qadianism --so he preferred to call it-- would only bring people back to stupidity. Its chief mission is but "to carve out, from the Ummat of the Arabian Prophet, a new ummat for the of Indian prophet." (page 2)

A prominent Indian scholar, Syed Abul Hasan Ali an-Nadwi, having made an extensive study of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's life and "evolution" from a simple student turning into a hero (1880), a "promised messiah" (1891) and a self-proclaimed prophet (1910), concluded that the Ahmadiyah movement has contributed nothing but adding burden to the Muslim people, dividing them, and rendering their problems even more complicated (See: Qadianism: A Critical Study, repr. Lucknow 1980, p. 155).

That the essence of Ahmadiyah lies in accepting Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood is attested by Yohanan Friedman of Hebrew University of Jerusalem in his book, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background, (Berkeley, 1989, p.119, 181 & 191).

Ahmadiyah was first brought into Indonesia sometime in 1925 by several students from Sumatra who had been converted and trained in Qadian, India. To help spread their dogma, the mission has published bulletins such as "Sinar Islam" (The Light of Islam - sic!), "Studi Islam" and "Fathi Islam". The resentment generated by the Ahmadi missionary activities used to drag them several times into an open debate 1933 in Bandung and other cities (See: Fawzy S. Thaha, Ahmadiyah Dalam Persoalan, Singapura, 1982).

Followers of Ahmadiyah had been declared aberrant and infidel (murtad - apostate) by Muslim scholars at the Fifth Congress of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1930 in Pekalongan as well as by the Ulama Association of East Sumatra in 1935.

After a long period of silence, the Ahmadiyah question resurfaced in late 1970s and early 1980s following the Pakistani parliament's resolution to treat the Ahmadis as non-Muslim under the law.

In 1980 the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Hamka issued a fatwa stating that Ahmadiyah is outside the fold of Islam, and its adherents apostate.

The decree was recently reaffirmed in an official statement signed by MUI chairman Prof. Dr. H. Umar Shihab and its secretary Prof. Dr. H.M. Din Syamsuddin. In addition, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1984 had also warned the Muslims against the danger of Ahmadiyah.

Finally, in April 16, 2008 the Supervision Committee on Cults and Sects (Bakorpakem), made known its findings that the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) has truly deviated from Islam and so urged the Minister of Religious affairs, Attorney General, and Minister of Home Affairs to take action against it.

Indeed, according to Atho Mudzhar, senior officer at the Religious Ministry and chief of the investigation team, during three months Bakorpakem had been observing 55 Ahmadiyah communites 33 districts. As many as 35 members of the team met 277 members of Ahmadiyah. Nothing has changed among them doctrinally, since they still affirm that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (MGA) is a prophet after Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.

They also believe that Tadzkirah is a collection of revelation received by MGA.

Advocates and followers of Ahmadiyah often put forth three arguments to support their position. First, an Ahmadi is also a Muslim because they have the same syahadat (faith declaration).

Try to compare this with the statement that the "orang Ahmadiyah" (Ahmadi man) is no different from "orangutan" because both are "orang" (human). Of course such thing is unacceptable.

It is clear in this case what matters is not their similarity, but rather their difference. What distinguishes orangutan from an Ahmadi is not so much its being-'orang' as its 'utan' characteristic. By the same token, what makes Ahmadiyah followers differ from the Muslims is not their apparent similarity in creed and rituals, but rather their belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

Second, it has been argued that like all other Indonesia citizens, the Ahmadiyah followers have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion so that to ban Ahmadiyah is to violate human rights and to act against the Constitution.

There is a logical twist here. To be sure, Article 29 of the very same Universal Declaration of Human Rights unequivocally states that in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

This means that abuse of freedom is not allowed which would disrupt order or bring damage to religion. Now what MGA and his Ahmadiyah did is like "building a new house inside someone's house" --that is to say, founding a religion within religion.

Their affirmation of MGA's prophethood is an insult to Islam. Consequently, as Dr Tony P. Chi points out in his study (1973, p.134-5): "Ahmadiyya preaching and propagation have instigated unrest and dissension in the Muslim world." Therefore, the only solution to Ahmadiyah problem is to expell it from the House of Islam and become a new religion like Mormonism in the United States.

Finally, to the suggestion that compassion should be preferred to violence in dealing with the Ahmadiyah, we reply that this advice is badly needed by the American and Israeli governments vis-a-vis the people of Iraq and Palestine.

"Abu Bakr As-Siddiq is the most compassionate among my folk (arhamu ummati)," said Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Yet when there arose a group of apostates, he did not hesitate to take action against them.

Islam guarantees one's freedom to embrace -- not to spoil, any religion. As for the Quranic verses: "There is no compulsion in religion" (translation of the Quran surah Al-Baqarah: 256) and "For you, your religion, and for me, my religion" (surah Al-Kafirun:6), these are referring to religions outside Islam. Thus, Prophet Muhammad told the impostors to choose either to repent or be punished to death (See: Imam Al-Mawardi, al-Hawi al-Kabir, vol.13, p.109).

* The writer is an assistant professor at the International Islamic University Malaysia

The Brunei Times

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Source URL: http://www.bt.com.bn/friday_special/2008/05/16/a_way_out_for_ahmadiyah (Accessed 7/22/2011)