Sesat dan Menyesatkan

Kompas, Jum'at, 13 April 2012

Oleh Said Aqil Siroj

Ada celotehan yang muncul: mengapa perbedaan—khususnya di ranah internal agama—saat ini terlihat semakin ganas. Mudah bersitegang, tidak pernah tuntas, ujungnya saling menyalahkan. Jangan murka dulu. Keluh kesah itu layak ditanggapi secara bijak. Seeing is believing, fakta yang bicara.

Apanya yang fakta? Kepenasaran kembali meluncur. Bukankah beda pendapat dalam segala hal sah-sah saja?

Dunia ini diciptakan sudah bermacam rupa. Mustahil untuk bisa dipersatukan. Tuhan menciptakan manusia dan seisi alam ini beragam supaya manusia saling memahami dan mengenali satu sama lain (lita’arafu). Penyeragaman terjadi karena ulah manusia yang didasari unsur luaran, semisal kepentingan politik.

Menyejarah

Sulit dielak, fakta keragaman dalam pemahaman internal keagamaan sering kali mencuat. Sungguh, fakta tersebut sudah terjadi jauh-jauh silam.

Dalam sejarah Islam, perbedaan pemikiran bukan sesuatu yang ”najis”. Vonis penajisan hanya ”dibakukan” dalam kelompok yang meyakini kebenaran pendapatnya, lalu menvonis pihak lain sebagai sesat. Baku hantam pun kerap mewarnai perjalanan dalam pencarian kebenaran.

Sejarah juga mencatat, hiruk-pikuk polemik dan kontroversi telah mewarnai pemikiran umat Islam sedari dulu. Sengitnya perdebatan antara Muktazilah, Murjiah, Rafidhah, dan Ahlussunnah, misalnya, telah direkam rinci oleh Abdul Qohir ibn Thahir ibn Muhammad al-Baghdadi dalam kitab al-Farqu bain al-Firaq. Dalam kitab tersebut terpapar dengan jelas kemajemukan pemahaman keagamaan.

Masyhur diketahui, dulu ada sekte khawarij yang mengaku pembela Islam yang paling orisinal. Mereka ini berslogan ’la hukma illa Allah’, tidak ada hukum kecuali yang datang dari Allah. Mereka hendak memancangkan kedaulatan hukum Allah.

Saking militannya untuk membela Islam, mereka jadi kalap dan tega-teganya mengafirkan kubu Ali bin Abu Thalib dan kubu Muawiyah bin Abu Sufyan yang terlibat dalam Perang Shiffin. Dalihnya, kedua kubu tersebut telah keluar dari Islam karena menempuh ”tahkim” (arbitrase) demi mengakhiri perang saudara di antara mereka.

Bagi khawarij, model arbitrase dianggap identik dengan berhukum berdasar aturan manusia, bukan aturan Allah. Karena itu, hukum yang pantas adalah vonis kekufuran dan hukum mati. Tak ayal, pada Ahad pagi, 17 Ramadhan 40 H, Ali bin Abi Thalib dibunuh di Kuffah. Pembunuhnya adalah Abdurrahman Ibnu Muljam. Sebenarnya yang akan dibunuh ada dua orang lagi, yakni Gubernur Syam (Suriah) Muawiyah bin Abu Sofyan dan Gubernur Mesir Amr bin Ash. Kedua pemimpin Islam ini akan dibunuh masing-masing oleh Abdul Mubarok dan Bakr Attamimi.

Saat ini pun muncul jemaah-jemaah Islam yang dengan ”pede”-nya tidak henti memojokkan Muslim lain sebagai ahli bidah, bahkan musyrik. Presiden SBY dan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia ini pun sudah sering ditunjuk-tunjuk sebagai penguasa dan negeri thoghut karena tidak mau menerapkan hukum syariah. Tuduhan-tuduhan terhadap ulama di luar kelompoknya juga kerap meluncur seperti tuduhan ulama sesat (su’) hanya karena berbeda cara pengambilan dasar pemikiran (istinbath al-hukm). Ada pula doktrin dari suatu jemaah tertentu yang melarang menikahi seseorang yang jarang atau tidak pernah menjalankan shalat berjemaah. Kumpul-kumpul dengan kelompok yang dicap ahli bidah juga dilarang. Ukuran ’jidat hitam” atau beda cara berbusana pun bisa menjadi arena pertikaian.

Sebenarnya, jauh sebelumnya, di negeri kita muncul beberapa kelompok Islam yang kehadirannya menghebohkan sehingga dilarang. Contoh yang terkenal adalah Islam Jamaah, DI/TII, Baha’i, Inkarus Sunnah, Darul Arqam, gerakan Usroh, aliran-aliran tasawuf berpaham wahdatul wujud, tarekat Mufarridiyah, juga gerakan Bantaqiyah (Aceh). Termasuk di dalamnya Ahmadiyah dan Syiah.

Sederet fakta di atas kiranya bisa jadi gambaran betapa sikap saling sesat-menyesatkan terus bergulir selaju derap perkembangan zaman. Porosnya adalah sikap yang mengklaim terhadap kebenaran pendapatnya serta merasa diri sebagai yang paling benar dan selamat (firqah al-najy).

Di balik penyesatan

Kelompok yang divonis sesat atau sempalan selalu dipandang sebagai kelompok yang memisahkan diri dari ortodoksi yang berlaku. Di sini menebal keyakinan bahwa yang sesat adalah sesat; ada fatwanya atau tidak. Dulu, kita ingat saat panas-panasnya ribut antara kalangan Islam modernis dan kalangan tradisionalis, selalu muncul sikap saling tuding sesat-menyesatkan. Dari sudut pandangan ulama tradisional, kaum modernis adalah sesat, sedangkan kaum modernis justru menuduh lawannya menyimpang dari jalan yang lurus.

Kelompok yang dituduh sesat tentu saja juga menganggap dirinya lebih benar daripada lawannya. Biasanya mereka justru merasa lebih yakin akan kebenaran paham atau pendirian mereka. Bahkan, sering kali mereka cenderung eksklusif dan kritis terhadap para ulama yang mapan.

Sepanjang sejarah Islam telah terjadi berbagai pergeseran dalam paham dominan, yang tidak lepas dari situasi politik. Dalam banyak hal, ortodoksi didukung oleh penguasa, sedangkan paham yang tak disetujui dicap sesat. Persoalan ortodoksi atau otoritas keagamaan terlihat sebagai sesuatu yang bisa berubah menurut zaman dan tempat. Ada kadar kontekstual.

Paham Asy’ariyah pada masa Abbasiyah pernah dianggap sesat saat ulama Mu’tazililah yang waktu itu didukung penguasa merupakan golongan yang dominan. Bahwa akhirnya paham Asy’ari-lah yang menang juga tidak lepas dari faktor politik.

Contoh lain di Iran. Syiah berhasil menggantikan Ahlussunnah sebagai paham dominan baru lima abad belakangan. Seperti diketahui, Syiah Itsna ’asyara kini merupakan ortodoksi di Iran. Sampai abad ke-10 H (abad ke-16 M), mayoritas penduduk Iran masih menganut mazhab Syafi’i. Paham ini baru dominan setelah dinasti Safawiyah memproklamasikan Syiah sebagai mazhab resmi negara dan mendatangkan ulama Syi’ah dari Irak Selatan.

Komunikasi

Dalam agama selalu ada yang sifatnya dogma (ma’lumun min al-diny bi al-dharurah). Ini jangan diulik-ulik, sebaliknya harus dihampiri dengan iman. Makanya, ketika muncul aliran-aliran ”aneh” seperti Lia Eden atau Al-Qiyadah yang mengaku-aku ”nabi” dengan menafikan ajaran yang sifatnya ritual, seperti tak wajib shalat lima waktu, sontak disikapi secara tandas. Aliran-aliran tersebut dihukum melenceng dari ajaran Islam yang baku.

Kata ”sesat” sendiri di dalam Al Quran berasal dari akar kata dhalalah, yang dengan segala bentuk derivasinya disebutkan 193 kali. Bermacam-macam sifat dan perilaku manusia oleh Al Quran dinyatakan sebagai orang-orang yang sesat. Jangan lupa, ”penyesatan” juga dibidikkan kepada orang-orang zalim serta orang yang suka hidup mewah, berlebihan, dan korupsi.

Secara teoretis kita bisa meramalkan, semakin dekat ortodoksi kepada kemapanan politik dan ekonomi, semakin kuat kecenderungan radikalisme gerakan kelompok yang diinisiasi sesat. Nah, disinilah perlunya dialog dan komunikasi secara terus-menerus, tidak hanya bereaksi dengan melarang-larang. Terputusnya komunikasi akan mengandung bahaya. Para tokoh agama perlu kembali memberikan perhatian lebih kepada umat dengan memberikan pemahaman keagamaan yang lebih mendalam agar masyarakat merasakan keteduhan dalam beragama serta meminimalkan ketegangan yang merusak harmoni keindonesiaan.

Said Aqil Siroj Ketua Umum PBNU

Ahmadiyah dan Bahaya Plagiator Agama

Hidayatullah.com, Kamis, 07 April 2011


Oleh: Dr. M. Abdurrahman, MA

HIRUK PIKUK pemberitaan yang selama ini ikut meramaikan dunia para pebisnis media dan pembela akidah. Kasus ini, tak urung menjadikan perilaku umat atau bangsa Indonesia yang selama ini terkenal santun dan memiliki kepedulian tolong menolong identik suka melakukan "perlawanan". Namun umumnya, pertengakaran, konflik, dan peperangn dari dahulu sampai sekarang pun karena berkaitan dengan hak-hak seseorang yang diganggu, harta, tahta, material, spiritual, malahan "cinta dan wanita" yang sebenarnya "sepele".

Suatu istilah yang berkaitan dengan mengganggu hak orang lain yang akrab dan dekat ditelinga kita ialah, istilah penghinaan, cemooh, pencemaran nama baik yang berkaitan, baik fisik maupun non-fisik, seperti istilah ghasab, pencurian termasuk plagiat dan lain-lain yang berkaitan dengan penguasaan hak kekayaan material dan intelektual tanpa dasar. Jangankan urusan "keyakinan" yang selama ini terjadi, urusan-usrusan keduniaan yang berkaitan dengan nama lembaga, businis, bahkan pada nama seseorang yang amat sederhana pun bila ada yang menyamainya akan menjadi biang konflik.

Dalam mata uang Indonesia rupiah, misalnya dahulu ada peringatan tertulias pada uang dengan ancaman pidana bagi yang memalsukannya. Karena itulah banyak perusahaan memasang himbaun yang berbunyi, "Awas barang tiruan!".

Di Surabaya ada seorang Doktor dicabut gelarnya karena pada disertasinya ada pengambilan tulisan dari orang lain yang tidak disebut sumbernya. Di Bandung ada suatu universitas memecat dan mencabut gelar guru besarnya karena yang bersangkutan menjiplak tulisan orang lain dan tidak ada foot note-nya.Dalam karya ilmiah saja seseorang harus mendapatkan kode ISBN sebagai tanda hak cipta.

Dalam karya-karya Timur Tengah ada ungkapan, “Jami’ul huquq mahfuzhah”, semua hak-hak dilindungi. HAK CIPTA ini tidak boleh diganggu oleh siapapun, baik nama maupun substansi, malahan ada lembaga yang disebut HAKI.

Namun rupanya, masalah PALSU dan ASLI tak hanya terjadi pada barang dagangan atau produk. Dalam agama juga ada. Dalam kasus Ahmadiyah dengan umat Islam Indonesia,  termasuk terkait antara yang ASLI dan yang PALSU.

Hukuman bagi Plagiator
Di Negara mana pun plagiat atau pembajakan apapun namanya, termasuk karya ilmiyah dilarang dan akan dikenai sanksi hukum. Setiap pengambilan karya ilmiah di Indonesia, misalnya akan dihukum dengan peraturan perundang-undangan, yaitu UU nomor 19 tahun tahun 2002 tetang Hak Cipta dengan pidana masing-masing paling singkat 1 (satu) bulan dan/atau denda paling banyak Rp. 5.000.000.000 (lima milyar rupiah).

Untuk masalah agama, Indonesia sudah menetapkan beberapa peraturan perundangan undangan yang berkaitan dengan penodaan terhadap agama, seperti UU PNPS no 1 tahun 1965 tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama yang ditetapkan dan diundangkan di Jakarta pada tanggal 27 Janauari 1965, kemudian dimasukkan dalam Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1965 Nomor 3. Isinya pada Pasal 1, “Setiap orang dilarang dengan sengaja di muka umum menceritakan, menganjurkan atau mengusahakan dukungan umum,untuk melakukan penafsitran tentang suatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia atau melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan keagamaan yang menyerupai kegiatan-kegiatan keagamaan dari agama itu, penafsiran dan kegiatan mana menyimpang dari pokok-pokok ajaran agama itu”.

Kemudian, dalam KUH Pidana secara eksplisit berbunyi, “Pasal 56 a. “Dipidana dengan Pidana Penjara selama-lamanya lima tahun barangsiapa dengan senagaja di muka umum mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan, a. yang pokoknya bersifat permusuhan. Penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama di Indonesia. Atas dasar itu, maka MUI telah mengeluarkan Fatwa bahwa ajaran Ahmadiyah Qodiyan sesat menyesatkan dan di luar Islam. Surat edaran Dirjen Bimas Islam dan Urusan Haji nomor D/BA.01/3099/84 tanggal 20 September 1984.

Dalam kasus Ahmadiyah ini, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad termasuk plagiator di dunia dalam bidang keagamaan, baik gelar yang dimiliki maupun kitab suci-nya. Dalam gelar dia mengaku Nabi, Rasul, Isa al-Masih, Mujaddid, al-Mahdi, seperti tertulis dalam karya-karyanya. Syeikh Manzhur Ahmad Chinioti dari Pakistan dalam karyanya, Keyakinan al-Qadhiyani terbitan LPPI - 2002 (a-Qadiyani wa Mu'taqidatuh- judul asli,), yang di antara kutipan keyakinannya mengatakan;

Pertama, mengaku mujaddid, al-mahdi, al-Masih, Nabi, dan Rasul.
"Rahim Allah mengeluarkan cahaya langit, Akulah cahaya itu, al-Mujaddid yang dapat perintah, hamba yang ditolong, al-Mahdi yang dikenal, al-Masih yang dijanjikan. Dan sesungguhnya aku berada dalam posisi yang sangat mulia di sisi Tuhanku, tak ada seorangpun yang mengetahuinya (Khutbah Ilhamiyah Ruhani Khazain 16/15 karya al-Qadiyani).

"Dan Allah yanag sebenarnya. Dialah yang mengutus Rasul-Nya di Qadiyan ((Daifi'ul Bala 11 RK 231).

“Akulah al-Masih yang dijanjikan yang telah ditentukan kedatangannya di akhir zaman oleh Allah yang Maha bijak. Akulah orang yang diberi nikmat yang disebutkan dalam surat al-Fatihah pada saat muncul dua golongan tersebut.” (Khutbah Ilhamiyah, Ruhani Khazain16/179.

Kedua, ia melakukan pasal penghinaan. Di antaranya poenghinaan pada Isa al-Masih ibn Maryam dan pada Allah.

"Lihatlah aku datang sesuai yang dikabarkan oleh Nabi sallallahu alaihi wa sallalah, Isa tidak mampu untuk meletakkan kakinya di atas mimbarku." (Izalah al-Auham 158 R-K 240).

Ketiga, penjiplakan pada Al-Quran
Ahmadiyah juga ikut menjiplak al-Quran yang menurutnya diwahyukan kepadanya oleh Allah, yang disebutnya, Tazdkirah. Dalam halaman 1 kitab Tadzkirah tertulis: “Tadzkirah ya'ni Wahyu Muqaddas: Ru'ya wa Kusyuf Hadhrat Masil al-Mau'ud Alaihis salatu wa sallam, Tadzkirah adalah wahyu yang disucikan, ru'ya (-mimpi-ilham), dan kusyuf (melihat langsung), hadrah (di depan) Masih yang dijanjikan." Di antara contoh lain plagiat Mirza terhadap al-Quran, sebagaimana dikutip di bawah ini.

1. Tadzkirah hal: 33 plagiat dari al-Quran surat al-Baqarah/2: 23 yaitu:
Ayat diplintir dan dijiplak dengan menggunakan kalimat setelah lafal, 'ala 'abdina dengan kalimat, 'Fa'tu bisyifa'in min mislih……..Inkuntum shadiqin dibuang.

2. Tadzkirah hal: 40 plagiat dari al-Quran surah Maryam: 25: 19 yaitu:
Ayat yang diplintir dan dijiplak dengan cara mengubah tanda kasrah pada muhkatahab untuk muannast (perempuan) huzzi dengan huzza, kaf yang dikasrah "ki" dengan fathah (mudzakkar) yaitu "ka". Jadi, ayat ini berbunyi” Huzza ilaika bijidz’innakhlati tusaqith alaika ruthaban janniya”. Perkataan, hudzdzi mnjadi hudzadza, ilaiki menjadi ilaika.

3. Tadzkirah hal: 43 plagiat dari surah al-Anfal/8: 17, yaitu ayat:
Ayat tersebut yang kata dia Mirza ada ilham dan perintah kepadaku, dengan menambah ungkapan, "Ya Ahmad barakallahu fika-M ramaita idz ramaita walakinnallaha rama". Ayat ini langsung dipotong ujung ayant ini, malah langsung disambung setelah menggun akan tanda-dengan ayat lain dari syurah ar-Rahman/55: 1-2 yang isinya: Arrahman, allamal Quran. Lalu, disambung lagi dengan ayat lain surah lain, yaitu sepotong surah Yasin/36: 6.

4. Tadzkirah hal: 50 plagiat dari surah at-Thur/52: 48 yaitu,
Ayat pada surat ini, selain dibuang sebagian ditambahi oleh Mirza dengan kalimat, “Ya Ahmad, fadhat ar-rahmatu ala syfataika-ditambah dengan sebagian ayat di atas dengan “innaka biayunina” .

5. Tadzkirah hal: 51 plagiat dari ayat al-Quran surah al-Muddtasir/74: 1-3.
Yaitu Ayat ini ditambah dengan kalimat, "Yatimmu ismuka wala yatimmu ismi-kun fiddunya ka annaka gharibun aw abirus sabilin –wa kun minas shalihin was shiddiqin".

6. Tadzkirah hal: 637 plagiat dari al-Quran surah al-Isra/17: 105 yaitu
Ketika menjiplak ayat ini Mirza G. Ahmad la'anahullah, menyatakan, “Sesunggunya Kami telah menurunkan kitab suci Tadzkirah ini dekat dengan Qadiyan-India dan dengan kebenaran kami menurunkannya dan dengan kebenaran dia turun”.
Inilah sekedar contoh beberapa plagiat Mirza G. Ahmad nabinya Amadiyah dari kitab sucinya Tazkirah.

Bias HAM
Pada tanggal 26 Maret 2009 Dewan HAM PBB menyatakan bahwa, “Penistaan Agama adalah Melanggar HAM. Berdasarkan resolusi HAM Pasal 18 ayat 3 negara berhak melakukan pembatasan hokum dalam kebebasan HAM. “Defamation of religion is violating Human Right, Penodaan agama adalah kejahatan kemanusiaan”.

Dengan mengacu pada ini, jelas Ahmadiyah sudah menodai ajaran Islam dengan mengaku “Muslim”, padahal punya Nabi sendiri dan kitab sucinya sendiri pula. Mereka lebih berhak dinamai sebagai non-muslim.

Tapi, deklarasi HAM PBB itu rupanya dilanggar juga oleh para aktivis LSM yang mengatasnamakan dirinya “Pembela HAM”. Ia justru tetap meminta agar eksistensi Ahmadiyah di Indonesia ada, meski itu menodai agama dan telah melakukan plagiat.
Untuk banyak hal, Barat tidak sungguh-sungguh menerapkan apapun resolusinya, termasuk masalah penodaan agama ini. Kasus terbaru di mana burqa (cadar) dilarang di Prancis.
Persis sendiri sudah menolak sejak awal keberadaan Ahmadiyah sebagai Muslim di Indonesia, seperti dalam debat A. Hassan dengan tokoh Ahmadiyah, Rahmat Ali dan Abu Bakar Ayub pada tanggal 29 September 1933.

Majalah Pembela Islam menerbitkan rekaman yang kemudian dicetak ulang 40 tahun kemudian (1973). Bapak H. Ir. Soekarno-almarhum yang selanjutnya menjadi Presiden RI Pertama menulis artikel pada tanggal 25 November 1935 berjudul, “Tidak Percaya Bahwa Mirza Ghulam Ahmad adalah Nabi”.

Masalahnya, bila sekedar HAK CIPTA saja seseorang bisa mendapatkan sanksi dan hukuman berat, bagaimana dengan orang/kelompok yang melakukan plagiat pada Wahyu Allah atas namanya sendiri?

Penulis adalah Guru Besar Fak. Syariah-Universitas Islam Bandung, Ketua Umum PP Persis dan anggota dewan ulama internasional - pembebasan al-Quds, wakil Asia Tenggara

Retrieved from: http://www.hidayatullah.com/read/16245/07/04/2011/--ahmadiyah-dan-bahaya-plagiator-agama.html

Ahmadiyah bans: Legal justification for intolerance?

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post   |  Sat, 12/10/2011 4:27 PM  |  Opinion

Ati Nurbaiti
As of September this year, at least 26 regencies and municipalities have passed bylaws restricting or banning the Ahmadiyah sect, 11 of them in West Java alone, according to a list from the National Commission on Violence Against Women.

Some were issued after the murderous assault on the sect in Pandeglang regency, Banten, in February 2011; including the Banten bylaw itself. The Commission has said women and children of the sect were the most vulnerable in the attacks, which according to the Setara Institute have included 342 cases of assault from 2007 to 2011. This also includes the resettlement of an entire Ahmadiyah community to an island off Lombok.

The local regulations justify other citizens and authorities into closing down Ahmadi mosques, forcing them out of their homes, or ordering them to denounce Islam if they insist on their beliefs. Unlike mainstream Muslims, the Ahmadiyah do not believe that Muhammad is the last prophet, saying they differentiate between prophets and messengers.

However, Muslims have said this is their excuse to hide their real beliefs; that the Ahmadiyah have frequently violated the joint ministerial decree on their sect by proselytizing; and that the attacks on them would stop — if only they would drop their teachings, or declare that they are no longer Muslims.

The bylaws and the joint ministerial decree, revived in 2008, refer to the 2005 non-binding fatwa of the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) which states the Ahmadiyah is deviant; and also the 1965 Law on Blasphemy, which was upheld in 2005 by the Constitutional Court in its ruling against a group of human rights advocates who wanted it annulled. The plaintiffs had said the blasphemy law was no longer relevant for a democracy since it was issued under martial law in 1965.

The movement to annul the 1965 law and those advocating an end to prosecuting minorities, pursue entirely different reasoning from groups who are sealing the Ahmadiyah mosques, often accompanied by local police.

The first argues that the state of a democratic country should not decide which Islam is “right”. The second wonders out loud why the state is leaving Muslims to take matters into their own hands, because, they say, it is evident that Ahmadiyah should be banned, based on the 1965 law, the joint ministerial decree and the MUI fatwa.

A glimpse at news reports in the wake of the Feb. 6 attacks shows that a number of these reports asserted or implied that the real victims were not the Ahmadiyah, whose three members were mobbed and killed, with helpless police officers looking on — all on display to the world thanks to YouTube.

According to the sources in the reports, such as in CyberSabili and hidayatullah.com, the real victims were the Muslims, because the Ahmadis, who insulted Islam, and blatantly defied all civilized requests to stop proselytizing, gained all the sympathy. The “victimization” of Muslims is traced to the marginalization and suppression of Islamic expression by Soeharto, apart from reports of intelligence operations against Muslim activists.

That the Ahmadiyah were not the real victims in the February assault would not necessarily be the majority view; a poll involving 3,000 respondents found most rejecting violence in the name of religion. The July poll by the Setara Institute was conducted in 47 regencies and municipalities in 10 provinces.

But if most Indonesians agreed with these respondents, it doesn’t explain all those bylaws restricting the Ahmadiyah, emerging right under the nose of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The passing of the bylaws had no difficulty, it seemed, even though the regional autonomy law states that religion should be regulated by the state. But similarly, Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali and Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi have voiced their opinions that the state should ban or dissolve the Ahmadiyah instead of only restricting their activities.

So are Indonesia’s Muslims becoming increasingly intolerant? Many say tolerance is not the issue, for the Ahmadiyah has insulted Islam.

Leading lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution told a recent discussion in Canberra that he had a hard time convincing President Yudhoyono that the Ahmadiyah had constitutional rights as a minority — and thus the President may have been persuaded against an outright ban. The ministers overseeing the joint ministerial decree restricting the Ahmadiyah also have a constitutional reference; that religious freedom is limited in respect of followers of other faiths.

The International Crisis Group had recommended an independent body to work out a strategy for religious tolerance; such a body would have to deal with this legal confusion stemming from demands to “protect” the Muslim majority against “deviants”, through rulings such as a state ban on the Ahmadiyah.

Malaysia may seem tragic to many of us as its activists say ordinary citizens, including Muslims themselves, cannot speak out against increased state regulation of Islam, lest they would be considered un-Islamic.

But the incidences of Malaysians’ violence against minorities do not come anywhere close to our long list. Should we be proud of outdoing Malaysia?

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.
— JP

Copyright © 2011 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

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Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/10/ahmadiyah-bans-legal-justification-intolerance.html

Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh, Ahmadiyah Indonesia Spokesman

My Jakarta: Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh, Ahmadiyah Indonesia Spokesman

Jakarta Globa, Zack Petersen | August 05, 2010

Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh says that as a member of Ahmadiyah, he fears for his life, but that ultimately he is under God's protection. (JG Photo)

While most of the violence that has affected Ahmadiyah — a controversial sect that believes its founder was a prophet of Islam, a claim that contradicts the beliefs of mainstream Muslims — remains outside the capital, that doesn’t mean the nearly 10,000 members of Ahmadiyah here in Jakarta don’t feel intimidated.
Today, Zafrullah Ahmad Pontoh, the spokesman for Ahmadiyah Indonesia, talks to us from his mosque in Cideng, Central Jakarta, about the controversial attempts to close an Ahmadiyah mosque in West Java and his views on religious freedom.

What is the difference between Ahmadiyah and mainstream Islam here in Indonesia?

According to us, we are Sunnis because we understand that we follow the traditions of the holy prophet.

What differs between us and other Muslims is the interpretation of some of the verses of the holy Koran.

So in the Koran, as we understand it, there is the possibility of the coming of a prophet after the holy prophet of Islam.

What do you say to people who think members of Ahmadiyah are nonbelievers?

They are free to say that. But we believe that God accepts us as Muslims. Anyone can say anything they like.

We won’t say that they are nonbelievers because the holy prophet said that if you call a believer a nonbeliever, then you yourself are the nonbeliever.

Do you introduce yourself to people as a member of Ahmadiyah?

Yes. I just came from Sulawesi and most of my friends are not Ahmadiyah [members], but they saw the attacks in Kuningan and they said: “What kind of people would do this?”

You see, they don’t like this violence either.

Why were the people in Kuningan attacked?

What I understand is that the bupati [district chief] of Kuningan wished to close the mosque.

I understand that some people from outside Kuningan wanted the mosque closed. We had about 4,000 Ahmadiyah members there to protect the mosque in Manis Lor village.

And how do you feel about the church controversy in Bekasi?

Yesterday, I was at the House of Representatives. We are trying to gain religious freedom through dialogue not only for Ahmadiyah, but for all Indonesians.

Because Islam teaches us to live in harmony with others, and never to resort to violence.

The holy prophet never attacked nonbelievers first, he only defended and protected himself and Muslims. Islam is never spread by the sword.

How many Ahmadiyah members are there in Jakarta?

There are seven Ahmadiyah mosques here in Jakarta and around 10,000 Ahmadiyah members. Throughout Indonesia there are 500,000 Ahmadiyah members.

Do you ever fear for your safety?

As a human being, yes, but I still believe in the protection of God. I have no problem walking around the neighborhood here. I was out walking around before you came here.

Has there ever been an attack on this mosque?

The mosque has been here more than 70 years, and in 2006 some Muslims came and asked us to take down the name of the mosque, but I didn’t.

We have been trying to learn patience and love, but as human beings we have limitations, so to be patient is very hard.

I said: “Nobody can stop us from worshiping, God wants us to worship.” Nobody can tell us to stop doing what God wants us to do.

When there are clashes between Ahmadiyah and other Muslim groups, do you feel like the government gives you equal protection?

First, I should clarify that they are not clashes, but attacks. A clash means that there are two sides [fighting], but an attack is where we have to defend ourselves.

The Constitution gives freedom to every person to be a follower of any religion.

But it has to be one of the six official religions?

Yes, but we are Muslims.

Do you think that Ahmadiyah will ever be fully accepted and recognized in Indonesia?

Inshallah [God willing]. We always intermingle with people through love and I feel like love will overcome. Last year, nearly 1,000 people joined Ahmadiyah. You would be surprised how many people click on our Web site, www.alislam.org.

Didn’t the state come up with a law that said Ahmadiyah members are not allowed to worship in public?

Not a law made by the state, but there is a decree. I heard from some people that the current religious affairs minister said Ahmadiyah is straying from Islam.

He should not say that; he should understand how to protect our faith. But I believe he misunderstands the 2008 decree.

That decree only prohibits us from explaining publicly that there is a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad.

Isn’t that a violation of your religious freedoms?

Yes, but our leader said for the time being we should be quiet.

What would you say to the people who passed the decree?

I would tell them they are doing something different from the laws of the country. The decree says that we believe in the prophet, but it also hinders us.

Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/myjakarta/my-jakarta-zafrullah-ahmad-pontoh-ahmadiyah-indonesia-spokesman/389673

Religious orthodoxy and the blasphemy law

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post | Thu, 03/18/2010 5:00 PM | Opinion

Ahmad Najib Burhani

After the Constitutional Court began the first hearing of a judicial review filed by a number of human rights groups against the 1965 Blasphemy Law, numerous articles, views and interviews have been published in Indonesian news publications.

They see this issue from various perspectives such as political, legal, human rights, peace and violence. Unfortunately, as far as I can see, no one has tried to analyze this issue from a religious perspective. Indeed, this approach should be in first place in order to understand this law appropriately and clearly.

It is true that in the context of a judicial review, the discussion on the Blasphemy Law should be limited to the domain of law. But the core issues of this law are religious matters. Therefore, neglecting the religious perspective is like abandoning its core issue.

The rationale behind the 1965 Blasphemy Law is to maintain religious orthodoxy; to guarantee that the established religious teachings and dogma are secure; to protect religious doctrines from new or different understandings. Any group deviating from the orthodox would be called a “sect” and subject to blasphemy charges and persecution. No religious interpretation would be allowed beyond the orthodox interpretation.

In the current Islamic world, there are two main competing religious orthodoxies: Sunni and Shiite. The former call themselves Ahl Sunnah wal-Jamaah (the People of Tradition and Community), whereas the latter name their group Ahl al-`Isma wal-`Adalah (the People of Infallibility and Justice).

Shiite is the dominant group in Iran and Iraq and has a substantial number in Lebanon, while Sunni dominates the rest of the Muslim world. The concept of khilafa (caliphate), sharia, and umma are among the distinctive concepts in Sunni orthodoxy, whereas Imama (political and religious leaders should be on the hand of the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) is a unique concept in Shiite thinking besides their distinctive rituals and philosophy.

Historically, and persisting until today, these two groups accuse one another of being an unorthodox or deviant sect. Sunni people often call Shiite people rawafid (people who refuse the true teachings of Islam).

Therefore, it is no wonder that we have often heard that Indonesian Sunni Muslims do not want to accept Shiite Muslims as their brothers in religion. If they believe that a large religious group like the Shiite is a deviant sect, it is not surprising that they consider a smaller religious group like Ahmadiyah a heretical sect as well.

How do they maintain their orthodoxy? One of the common strategies is by collaboration with the government. During the time of the Caliph Al-Makmun in the Abbasid Caliphate, for instance, the Sunni was considered an unorthodox group and subject to persecution by the government. Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, one protagonist in Sunni orthodoxy and founder of Hanbali law school, was imprisoned and tortured by the government during the notorious time called mihna (inquisition).

Similar cases happen in Indonesia. During its initial stages, Muhammadiyah was perceived as a deviant sect by some Indonesian Muslims. This movement, which has now become the second-largest organization in Indonesia, was bullied, abused and threatened by many Muslim in the 1910s. It is only because of its ability to prove its orthodoxy and to face any external and internal challenges that Muhammadiyah exists today.

In fact, orthodoxy is not an exclusive concept in Islam. Christianity and other religions have similar ideas on orthodoxy. A number of inquisitions occurred in European Christian history which aimed to suppress heresy against the Catholic Church. At that time, the church worked with the authorities to punish heretics. Almost everyone knows that Protestantism was also considered heresy at that time. Among other things, it was because of the help from German authorities that Protestantism could face the charge of heresy from Catholic Church.

The 1965 Blasphemy Law is a continuation or a modern concept of an inquisition. It has been upheld not only to maintain Islamic orthodoxy, but also Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and perhaps Confucian orthodoxy. As the case of Protestantism and Shiite, Kebatinan (Javanism) Aliran Kepercayaan (Javanese mysticism) and Lia Eden would not be considered heretical, from a political perspective, if the authorities protected them. They would be seen as an expression of religious freedom. This is, of course, the opposite of a religious perspective, which always perceived them as heretical.

To end this article, I would like to say one more thing: Orthodoxy is actually not only a religious issue. Historiography and linguistics also have their orthodoxies and sometimes their proponents are no less fanatical than the proponents of religious orthodoxy.


The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).

— JP

Copyright © 2011 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

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Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/18/religious-orthodoxy-and-blasphemy-law.html

Jejak Tafsir Kaum Ahmadi

Majalah Historia, Jumat, 26 Agustus 2011 - 10:17:59

Karya terjemahan Muhammad Ali dicerca tapi juga dipakai sebagai rujukan.

RUMAH tinggal Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig, mubaliq Ahmadiyah Lahore, menjadi tempat bertemu orang-orang Muhammadiyah, khususnya anak-anak muda. Mereka terutama belajar bahasa Inggris. Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto dan para anggota Sarekat Islam (SI) juga kerap datang. Hubungan SI dan Muhammadiyah masih akur.

Tjokro tak sekadar belajar bahasa Inggris. Diam-diam dia menterjemahkan karya Maulana Muhammad Ali, presiden Ahmadiyah Lahore, berjudul The Holy Qur’an, ke dalam bahasa Melayu. Dia mendapat dukungan dari Ahmad Baig. “Dia bahkan mengerjakannya di kapal ketika dia, sebagai wakil SI, bersama Haji Mas Mansur dari Muhammadiyah berangkat ke Mekah untuk Mu’tamar ‘Alam Islami,” tulis Tempo, 21 September 1974, merujuk Kongres Islam Internasional (biasa disebut Kongres Mekkah), upaya membangun institusi pan-Islami baru setelah Mustafa Kemal Pasha menghapus sistem khilafah dan mendirikan Republik Turki pada 1924.

Tjokro dan Mas Mansur terpilih sebagai utusan dalam Kongres Al-Islam kelima pada Februari 1926 di Bandung. Kongres Al-Islam sendiri merupakan badan yang didirikan di Garut pada Mei 1924, bertujuan memperluas pengajaran agama dan menganjurkan pendirian Majelis Ulama untuk memutuskan perselisihan-perselisihan antara kaum ulama.

Muhammadiyah punya hubungan dekat dengan Ahmadiyah, bahkan memberi bantuan ketika Ahmadiyah didirikan di Yogyakarta pada 1925. “Namun, setelah debat publik antara Ahmad Baig dan pemimpin reformis-radikal Sumatra –juga pemuja Rasyid Ridha– Haji Rasul (Abd Al-Karim Amr Allah), Muhammadiyah berbalik melawan Ahmadiyah. Dan, sebagai konsekuensinya, Muhammadiyah memveto proyek penerjemahan Tjokroaminoto, dan memprotes dalam kongres Sarekat Islam pada 1927,” tulis Moch Nur Ichwan dalam “Differing Responses to an Ahmadi Translation and Exegesis”, yang dimuat di jurnal Archipel, 2001.

Kongres SI di Pekalongan itu sendiri hanya membahas secara singkat proyek Tjokro dan tak ada keputusan dibuat. Satu keputusan penting justru mengenai pemecatan anggota Muhammadiyah yang juga menjadi anggota SI –sebaliknya dilakukan Muhammadiyah setahun kemudian.

Pada Kongres Al-Islam di Yogyakarta pada 26-29 Januari 1928, Tjokro memberikan alasan penterjemahan Alquran dan komentar karya Muhammad Ali. Menurutnya, dia tahu terjemahan Alquran beserta komentar karya Muhammad Ali, dari Ahmad Baig, yang juga memperkenalkannya kepada para pemimpin Muhammadiyah. Tjokro berargumen sudah mendapat persetujuan dari para pemimpin Muhammadiyah, Fachruddin dan Kiai Mas Mansur, pada 1925. Bahkan Fachruddin berkontribusi atas terjemahan komentar Muhammad Ali. Namun dia tetap diserang dengan sengit.

Menurut A.K. Pringgodigdo dalam Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia, Agus Salim tampil dan mengatakan dengan lantang bahwa dari segala tafsir, tafsir Ahmadiyah Lahore yang paling baik untuk memberi kepuasan kepada pemuda-pemuda Indonesia terpelajar.

Menurut Herman L. Beck dalam “The Rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah“, dimuat jurnal Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, Muslim ortodoks maupun modernis menyalahkan Tjokro karena kurangnya pengetahuan tentang Islam dan dia, menurut opini mereka, sepenuhnya tergantung pada Ahmad Baig.

Baik Tjokro maupun Ahmad Baig mampu melawan kritik-kritik itu. Namun, beberapa hari setelah Kongres Al-Islam, Tjokro menyiarkan keluhannya di media Islam berkala Fadjar Asia –media ini juga menerbitkan sebagian terjemahan Tjokro. Antara lain dia menduga beberapa pengkritiknya khawatir tersaingi dengan terjemahannya, karena mereka juga sedang mengerjakan terjemahan Alquran mereka sendiri.

Dua minggu setelah Kongres Al-Islam, Muhammadiyah menggelar kongres ke-17 yang berlangsung 12-20 Februari 1928 di Yogyakarta. Pada kongres ini, Yunus Anis, sekretaris pertama Dewan Pusat yang baru, mengatakan bahwa Muhammadiyah menyesalkan keputusan SI mendisiplinkan anggota Muhammadiyah. Dia juga mengatakan, dengan menyesal Muhammadiyah tak bisa menyetujui proyek Tjokro. Alasannya: tak cocok dengan ajaran Islam yang sesungguhnya.

Tekanan lain datang dari Muhammad Rashid Ridha, salah seorang ulama dan ahli hukum paling pengaruh dari generasinya serta murid Muhammad Abduh paling menonjol. Melalui majalah Al-Manar, dia menyampaikan metode-metode pembaruan ke penjuru negara Muslim. Beberapa anggota Muhamadiyah punya hubungan dekat dengan Ridha dan Al-Manar. Rida juga punya pengaruh kuat di Indonesia.

Menurut Nur Ichwan, “Negara, Kitab Suci dan Politik”, termuat dalam Sadur: Sejarah Terjemahan di Indonesia dan Malaysia karya Henri Chambert-Loir, dalam fatwanya, menanggapi Syaikh Muhammad Basyuni Imran, Maharaja Imam dari Kesultanan Sambas di Borneo (Kalimantan), Ridha menolak proyek Tjokroaminoto karena menganggap terjemahan (dan tafsir) Alquran yang ditulis Muhammad Ali menyimpang dari ajaran Islam yang baku.
Karena perlawanan masih keras, penerbitan tafsir itu ditunda sampai Majelis Ulama mengambil ketentuan. Dalam kongres di Kediri pada 27-30 September 1928, SI membentuk Majelis Ulama sendiri –karena Muhammadiyah tak mau terlibat– yang bersidang saat itu juga. Majelis memutuskan bahwa terjemahan itu boleh diteruskan, asal dilakukan dengan pengawasan Majelis.

Pada tahun itu juga tiga bagian pertama terjemahan Tjokro terbit dengan judul Qoer’an Soetji, disertai Salinan dan Keterangan dalam Bahasa Melajoe.

“Fatwa Rashid Ridha mengenai karya eksegetik Muhammad Ali, The Holy Qur’an, tidak memperoleh tanggapan karena karya itu kemudian diterjemahkan, tidak saja ke dalam bahasa Melayu dan Indonesia, tetapi juga ke dalam bahasa Belanda dan Jawa,” tulis Nur Ichwan.

Terjemahan bahasa Belanda dilakukan Sudewo Partokusumo Kertohadinegoro, guru HIS Muhammadiyah, dengan judul de Heilige Qoern. Karya ini terbit pada 1935 beriringan dengan pengantarnya “Inleiding tot de Studie van Den Heilige Qoer’an”. Sementara dalam bahasa Jawa, Qur’an Suci Jarwa Jawi, dikerjakan R. Ng. H. Minhadjurrahman Djajasugita dan M. Mufti Sharif, diterbitkan di Yogyakarta pada 1958. Djajasugita adalah ketua Muhammmadiyah cabang Purwokerto yang memilih mundur dari Muhammadiyah dan bersama Muh Husni (sekretaris jenderal PB Muhammadiyah) mendirikan Indonesische Ahmadiyah Beweging atau sekarang dikenal sebagai Gerakan Ahmadiyah-Lahore Indonesia (GAI).

Beberapa tahun kemudian, pada 1979, terbit pula terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia, Qur’an Suci: Teks Arab, Terjemah dan Tafsir Bahasa Indonesia, oleh H.M. Bachrun –setelah sebelumnya A. Aziz melakukannya tapi tak jadi terbit pada 1939.

“Terjemahan dalam bahasa Jawa dan Indonesia bahkan disetujui dan disahkan oleh Departemen Agama. Pada tingkat tertentu, ini merupakan indikasi dukungan berkelanjutan atas terjemahan karya Muhammad Ali di satu sisi, dan tak signifikannya pengaruh fatwa Rasyid Ridha di sisi lain,” tulis Nur Ichwan dalam jurnal Archipel.

Terjemahan Tjokro memang tak terkenal, selain juga tak selesai dan hanya merupakan dokumentasi di museum. Tapi terjemahan Sudewo –bersama pengantarnya– terdapat di hampir semua rumah tokoh-tokoh intelektual Islam angkatan sebelum perang. “Boleh dipastikan mereka menyimpan kitab itu,” tulis Tempo, 21 September 1974.

Menariknya, edisi pertama Al-Qur’an dan Terjemahannya yang diterbitkan Departemen Agama memakai rujukan The Holy Qur’an oleh Muhammad Ali dan terjemahannya dalam bahasa Belanda oleh Sudewo, serta tafsir Ahmadiyah Qadiyan The Holy Qur’an oleh Maulvi Sher Ali. Edisi pertama diterbitkan dalam tiga volume pada 1965, 1967, dan 1969. Edisi ini diterbitkan Yayasan Mu’awanah Nahdlatul Ulama (Yamunu), sehingga kerap disebut “Edisi Yamunu”.

Edisi kedua, yang merupakan revisi, menyisipkan tafsir Ahmadiyah Qadiyan lainnya, The Holy Quraan oleh Mirza Basiruddin Mahmud Ahmad. Edisi ini diterbitkan pada 1974, kerap disebut “Edisi Mukti Ali”, merujuk nama menteri agama kala itu yang juga menulis kata pengantar. Lembaga yang terlibat masih sama, tapi diubah menjadi Yayasan Penyelenggaraan Penterjemahan Al-Qur’an.

Tapi edisi ketiga, karya-karya tafsir Ahmadiyah Lahore dan Qadiyan hilang dan digantikan karya Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, yang tak disebutkan pada edisi-edisi sebelumnya.

“Penggantian ini mungkin dibuat atas anjuran pemerintah Saudi, karena mereka menganggap Ahmadiyah menyimpang dari ajaran-ajaran ortodoks,” tulis Nur Ichwan.

Edisi ketiga ini kerap disebut “Edisi Saudi” karena diterbitkan atas kerjasama Departemen Agama dan pemerintah Saudi. Ia diterbitkan di Madinah oleh percetakan resmi pemerintah Saudi (Mujamma’ Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn al-Malik Fahd li al-Taba’at al-Mushaf al-Sharif) pada 1990.

Karya tokoh-tokoh Ahmadiyah, yang mempengaruhi dan menjadi rujukan kaum intelektual Islam Indonesia dari Soekarno hingga AA Navis, meredup karena persoalan politik. [BUDI SETIYONO)

Sumber: Majalah HISTORIA

Retrieved from: http://www.majalah-historia.com/berita-489-jejak-tafsir-kaum-ahmadi.html

Subyektivitas Tafsir Jemaah Ahmadiyah

istimewa

Kompas, Senin, 18 Juli 2011 | 15:54 WIB

Judul: Menggugat Ahmadiyah, Mengungkap Ayat-ayat Kontroversial dalam Tafsir Ahmadiyah
Penulis: Dr Muchlis M Hanafi
Penerbit: Lentera Hati, Jakarta
Tahun: Maret 2011
Tebal: 116 + xxii hlm
Harga: Rp. 20.800
Peresensi: Rafi’uddin*

Keberadaan Ahmadiyah khususnya di negeri ini selalu menimbulkan kontroversi, bahkan menimbulkan konflik yang berimplikasi pada tindak kekerasan. Perusakan-perusakan bangunan rumah, masjid, dan mushala. Penolakan umat Islam terhadap Ahmadiyah bermula sejak tahun 1930-an di berbagai daerah, antara lain, di Sumatera Timur (1953), Medan (1964), dan Kuningan (1969). Pada dewasa ini, persoalan Amadiyah tetap berlangsung, misalnya baru saja terjadi di Cikeusik, Pandeglang (6 Februari 2011).

Persoalan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia sudah sangat mengakar yang segera diselesaikan. Mengingat dari periode ke periode menjadi benih konflik yang berimplikasi pada kekerasan. Pertama, Ahmadiyah sebagai kelompok yang menyebabkan lahirnya pertentangan. Kedua, warga Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) menjadi korban dari kekerasan masyarakat yang menolak keberadaannya.

Sejak tahun 1914 Ahmadiyah pecah menjadi dua golongan, yaitu satu yang berpusat di Qadian di bawah pimpinan Mirza Basyiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, putra dari almarhum Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad yang sekarang berpusat di Rabawah Pakistan. Serta yang satunya berpusat di Lahore Pakistan di bawah pimpinan maulana Muhammad Ali M.A., LL. B., sekretaris pendiri Ahmadiyh. Perpecahan tersebut disebabkan dengan timbulnya perbedaan pendapat yang prinsipil. Misalnya golongan Ahmadiyah Qadian berpendapat bahwa Hadzrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad adalah seorang Nabi dan ia adalah Ahmad seperti yang terdapat dalam al-Qur'an. Juga mereka berpegangan pada Khalifah sebagai pemegang kekuasaan tertinggi. Sementara golongan Lahore tidak mengakui atas kenabian Hadzrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai Nabi. Karena Muhammad sudah cukup sebagai nabi terakhir, dan sesudah beliau tidak ada nabi lagi. Ketika seseorang sudah mengucapkan syahadat, ia sudah dianggap muslim dan tidak kafir walaupun tidak berbaiat pada Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

Namun dalam buku ini lebih khusus pada keberadaan Ahmadiyah Qadian yang ada di Indonesia, yang biasa disebut dengan Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) mengenai beberapa penafsirannya terhadap ayat-ayat Qur'an yang digunakan sebagai sebatas legitimasi terhadap produk penafsirannya.

Seperti yang diungkapkan dalam buku yang ditulis Dr. Muchlis M. Hanafi ini memberikan penegasan mengenai keberadaan JAI di Indonesia. JAI menganggap bahwa hasrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad adalah sebagai nabi setelah nabi Mauhammad SAW. Kaum muslimin yang tidak berbaiat terhadap beliau dianggap kafir dan keluar dari Islam, walaupun belum pernah mendengar nama beliau. Misalnya dalam penafsiran kelompok Ahmadiyah terhadap al-Qur’an Surat al-Ahzab ayat 40 yang artinya “Muhammad bukanlah bapak dari seseorang di antara kamu, tetapi dia adalah utusan Allah dan penutup para nabi. Dan Allah maha mengetahui segala sesuatu.”

Dalam penafsiran jemaah Ahmadiyah ditemukan kekeliruan yang akan berimplikasi pada kesesatan umat Islam. Kalimat khatama tidak menunjukkan bahwa Muhammad adalah nabi terakhir dan tidak ada nabi lagi, melainkan masih ada nabi-nabi lain yaitu seseorang yang dianggap masih mau’ud (akan turun di akhir zaman) yaitu pendiri Ahmadiyah, Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Beliau diyakini oleh pengikutnya sebagai nabi yang akan tampil setelah kerasulan Muhammad.

Nubuwatan menjadi sempurna dalam wujud Hadlrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai masih mau'ud. Bahkan para penerus dari Mirza Ghulam Ahmad juga dianggap sebagai khalifah al-Masih dan berkeyakinan pemimpin mereka sebagai "rekan sejawat dan misal Nabi Isa," bukan Nabi Isa as. sendiri (halaman 49). Juga kebangkitan Nabi di akhir zaman nanti tidak diakui oleh kalangan jemaah Ahmadiyah, melainkan Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad dan beserta para pengikutnya dianggap masih ada dan tampil di akhir zaman.

Buku ini sangat signifikan untuk memperdalam dan memahami teks agama agar keyakinan tambah semakin kuat. Karena mengenai Muhammad sebagai Nabi terakhir telah diakui kebenarannya oleh umat Islam pada umumnya yang disertai dengan mukjizat sebagai bukti kerasulannya. Maka dari itu, keberadaan Mirza Ghulam Ahmad yang diakui sebagai nabi dan membawa ajaran baru, merupakan pemahaman yang sangat keliru dan tidak sesuai dengan meaning full al-Qur’an dan Hadits-hadits shahih.

Peresensi, Alumni Pondok Pesantren Nasy’atul Muta’allimi dan melanjutkan studi di UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta Jurusan Tafsir dan Hadits fakultas Ushuluddin. Di Yogyakarta selain kuliah, dia juga aktif di beberapa Komunitas. Antara lain Lembaga Kajian Sinergi Yogyakarta (LKSY), Komunitas Punulis UIN Jogja (PuJog) dan sekarang sebagai Peneliti di Lembaga Studi Qur’an dan Hadits (LSQH) UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.

The Special Case: Ahmadiyya Muslims

Global Politician, 5/12/2007

By Wolfgang Bruno

There are movements within Islam, or groups of people who at least identify themselves as Muslims, that are indeed somewhat more tolerant and less violent that mainstream Muslims. One such movement is the Ahmadiyya community.

The Ahmadiyya movement was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889. He taught that jihad “by the sword” had been replaced by jihad “of the pen,” and wanted to synthesize all religions under the banner of Islam. He claimed to be the "Reformer of the age" but did not bring any new revelation. After a schism in 1914, his followers split into two groups: The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, with its center in Lahore in what is today Pakistan. The main body, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (sometimes called the Qadiani after the village where the founder was born) claimed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet, although he didn't bring any new laws. The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, on the other hand, presented themselves as an Islamic reform movement and maintained the normal Muslim view that Muhammad was "the seal of the prophets" and that there would be no new prophet after him. Both branches, however, agree that Ghulam Ahmad was the Mahdi and the Messiah. They also believe that the Koran contains no abrogations.

Ahmadis still follow traditional Muslim rituals such as prayer and fasting, but among mainstream Muslims there is deep suspicion towards them, chiefly because the main body of Ahmadiyyas have affirmed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet, a claim that is considered heretical by most Muslims. The largest concentration of Ahmadiyyas is found in the Indian subcontinent, in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both groups are viewed as heretical by Saudi authorities, and are thus not allowed to go on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

At alislam.org, their official website, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community says about themselves:

“The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam is a religious organization, international in its scope, with branches in over 178 countries in Africa, North America, South America, Asia, Australasia, and Europe. At present, its total membership exceeds 200 million worldwide [note: it is impossible to verify this number, which is almost certainly inflated], and the numbers are increasing day by day. This is the most dynamic denomination of Islam in modern history. The Ahmadiyya Movement was established in 1889 by Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) in a small and remote village, Qadian, in the Punjab, India. He claimed to be the expected reformer of the latter days, the Awaited One of the world community of religions (The Mahdi and Messiah). It [the movement] advocates peace, tolerance, love and understanding among followers of different faiths. It firmly believes in and acts upon the Qur'anic teaching: "There is no compulsion in religion." (2:257) It strongly rejects violence and terrorism [emphasis in the original] in any form and for any reason. After the demise of its founder, the Ahmadiyya Movement has been headed by his elected successors - Khalifas.”

Precisely because they champion an unorthodox and somewhat more peaceful version of Islam, Ahmadis are frequently persecuted by traditional Muslims in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Under Pakistan's strict blasphemy laws the Ahmadiyya are not allowed to preach, nor even to call themselves Muslims.

Under the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) -led government, discrimination and violence against the Ahmadis has intensified. "It's a dangerous moment in Bangladesh when the government becomes complicit in religious violence," said Brad Adams, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division. "The authorities have emboldened extremists by failing to prosecute those engaged in anti-Ahmadi violence and by banning Ahmadiyya publications."

In October 2004 Muslim fanatics razed an Ahmadiyya mosque. The mob vandalized and robbed Ahmadiyya houses, injuring at least 11. One of the injured, Shabju Mia, 52, imam of the mosque, ended up in hospital. Witnesses said local BNP leader led the raiders.

In July 2006, the Bangladeshi newspaper the Daily Star carried a story on Ahmadis who had been victimized, but the article was later removed, probably following pressures from powerful anti-Ahmadiyya forces. The police had accused four Ahmadis of preaching publicly in a village in the Punjab. The villagers protested against "unabated preaching" of the Ahmadiyya faith in their village, and urged the police to ensure the arrest of those accused. The minority sect condemned law enforcers for being reluctant to act in two assault incidents on Ahmadis that same summer. The movement believed this encouraged the bigots to be more aggressive. The Ahmadiyyas had become confined to their houses and refrained from going to work after fanatics threatened to attack them.

The irony is that although Ahmadis are hardly even considered Muslims by other Muslims, the first and so far only Muslim to be awarded a Nobel Prize for science was an Ahmadi. According to Hugh Fitzgerald:

“Among the nearly 1000 recipients of Nobel Prizes in science (Physics, Chemistry, Medicine), only one appears to have gone to a ‘Muslim’ - Abdus Salam. Trained partly at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, and dying in Oxford (to which he had retired), Abdus Salam shared the prize with Sheldon Glashow and Steven Weinberg. One presumes that Abdus Salam deserved his 1/3 of the 1979 prize. But his entire career depended upon access to Western education. And while he wrote on the ‘Wisdom of Islam’ (just the kind of thing to win a Templeton Prize) he was both claimed, in Pakistan, as a ‘Muslim’ and yet belonged, as ah Ahmadiyya, to a sect regarded by many Muslims in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and elsewhere as not a real Muslim at all. It was a case of claiming not him, but rather his Nobel, for Islam, and then not discussing if just possibly, the reason he was the only Muslim Nobel-winner in science might have something to do with, precisely, the relatively greater mental freedom that Adhamiddya Islam may offer its adherents, compared to that available to those in orthodox Islam.”

The Ahmadis do in some ways represent an interesting case of a “reformed” Islam, but it is in my view unlikely whether their version of Islam could ever form a viable alternative to the majority of the world’s Muslims. They are simply too far removed from Islamic orthodoxy, especially the largest branch which considers their founder a prophet.

Wolfgang Bruno is a European author. He is writing a book about the Internet movement of ex-Muslims.

http://globalpolitician.com/22785-islam (Accessed 7/25/2011)

Ambiguities of apostasy and the repression of Muslim dissent

Authors:

Saeed, Abdullah¹

Source:

Review of Faith & International Affairs; Jun2011, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p31-38, 8p

Abstract:

Early Islam acknowledged religious diversity and offered protections for people of other religions. As Islam's political and cultural influence grew, the concepts of apostasy, blasphemy, heresy, hypocrisy, and unbelief emerged to suppress dissent. Today, there are no universally agreed upon definitions of these terms, and laws against apostasy and blasphemy are used to suppress religious dissent, thwart political opposition, harass intellectuals, and incite acts of violence. Scholars who propose reforms may be imprisoned, exiled, or killed. Muslims in Muslim-majority states need to rethink laws that criminalize dissent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Author Affiliations:

¹Sultan of Oman Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, Australia

Ahmadiyah’s Controversy in Indonesia — Vying for an Authority

Islamlib.com, 23/07/2008

By: Ulil Abshar-Abdalla

The whole furor and controversy over Ahmadiyah sect is just a parcel of a larger dynamic in the Indonesian politics. Over the last ten years after the unleashing of democratic movement in Indonesia, one development stands out to be worthy of our analysis, namely the radicalizing trend among Muslim society. This trends manifested in various form, including the vigorous campaign launched by Islamists to adopt and implement sharia or Islamic law. The entire campaign to dissolve Ahmadiyah, to me, cannot be analyzed separately from this larger trend.

Looking at Indonesia solely through its constitution, you cannot help but to think that it is a modern state whose facade is not so different from the United States or Western European countries. All basic requirements you need to create democracy are meticulously met by Indonesia, ranging from free and fair election, protection of basic civil rights, freedom of the press, freedom of association, to a robust civil society–every thing, you name it. Indonesian press is now entitled a relatively full freedom to publish whatever it thinks fit to put on its page, including, of course, criticizing the way government officers conduct public affairs–something that is hardly to happen in the previous regime.

Indonesian constitution lends also a full protection of religious freedom. Theoretically speaking, people are free to exercise their freedom to embrace any religion, faith, mazhab, and denomination of their choice. You are free to be Muslim, Christian, Hindus, Budhist, Confucian, and so forth. As a Muslim, you are also free to be Sunni or Shi’i, as well as free to affiliate with any Islamic organization you think fit to express your way of being Muslim.

But constitution is not the best lens to have a glimpse into the nature of any state and society, since it is only what Indonesia’s adage says “hitam di atas putih”, a mere ink on a paper. What is more important is to look at how that ink materializes into reality, and to what extent state policies live up to the lofty ideals espoused in the constitution. If this is the stick by which you judge Indonesia, I am afraid that it fails, particularly with respect to religious freedom.

The recent phenomenon is the whole furor over what is considered as a “deviant sect” in Islam called Ahmadiyah. The problem of Ahmadiyah has been around since early on even before Indonesian independence. This sect that was groomed in Pakistan came to Indonesia in 1925, and it spurred a controversy right away as it did anywhere it spread. This sect made a claim that raised the eyebrow of Muslim, namely that its founder is a new “prophet” that came after the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims who adhere to mainline Islam believe in the finality of prophecy in Islam. Ahmadiya’s doctrine on prophecy runs at odd with this doctrine. To say that new prophet possibly emerges is as odd to Muslim ear as to say that Jesus is not resurrected on the third day after his crucifixion to Christians.

From its early stage of its introduction to Indonesia, many Muslim scholars objected to the doctrine of Ahmadiyah, although Ahmadiyah should be credited with its good work to introduce Islam to the rank of Muslim intelligentsia in 30s in a way that resonates with Modern mind-set. Bung Karno, the first Indonesian president, befriended many intellectuals and activists who are either member or sympathetic to Ahamdiyah’s version of Islam. The first “official” translation of the Quran into Indonesian language conducted under the auspice of Ministry of Religious Affairs in 60s was pretty much influenced by Ahmadiyah’s writers. In nutshell, Ahmadiyah has successfully made an inroad into the Indonesian Islamic discourse through its committed missionaries and propagandists.

Throughout President Suharto’s rule (1968-1998), Ahmadiyah still enjoyed a full freedom to conduct its proselytizing activities which seems to be robust and aggressive as it is the case anywhere. In early 80s, the first “fatwa” or religious edict was being issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) in which this sect was for the first time officially deemed “deviant”. However, the edict didn’t go far as to demand the government to intervene to dissolve the movement.

The crucial shift occurred after reformasi (political reform) that followed the downfall of Suharto and his regime in May 1998. A series of attacks on Ahmadiyah’s mosques and its member escalated right after the issuance of a second fatwa by MUI on July 29th, 2005 in which Ahmadiyah is again labeled as deviant sect. However, the fatwa took different course this time. It was followed by a massive campaign conducted by radical and fundamentalist Islamic groups to press for the dissolution of Ahmadiyah as an organization and movement. There are certain groups that are worthy to be singled out as “engineers” of this campaign, namely Hizbut Tahrir, FUI (The Forum of Islamic Umma or Community) and and FPI (Front of Islam’s Defender).

The campaign succeeded to achieve its goal, marked by the issuance of the Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama, known as SKB) in June 9th, 2008. The decree falls short of fulfilling the demand of radical Islamists to dissolve forever the Ahmadiyah movement. It mandates instead to freeze the proselytizing activities of Ahmadiyah, particularly its doctrine of prophecy. As noted by many observers, the decree is quite ambiguous. The question that is left un-addressed is whether the Ahmadi people are still free to conduct their religious activities in their mosques and madrasahs.

No matter how you interpret the decree, the fact remains the same: the government seems to fall into the trap set up by the Islamist groups that seem to be exerting its role recently in the Indonesian political landscape. By all means, the decree is evidently at odd with the constitution that insures the freedom of religion and faith.

How do we interpret this recent development as it unfolds in the case of Ahmadiyah?

Ahmadiyah is not a major and mind-boggling issue for Muslim rank-and-file. Of course, Muslim believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet. However, many of them won’t roll in anger if somebody in the corner of Islamic world show up and claim to be a new prophet. They will certainly object to that claim, but will never ever run into an amok simply because of that minor issue. If the course of event proceeds in the opposite direction, something must have gone wrong in one way or another!

The whole furor and controversy over Ahmadiyah sect is just a parcel of a larger dynamic in the Indonesian politics. Over the last ten years after the unleashing of democratic movement in Indonesia, one development stands out to be worthy of our analysis, namely the radicalizing trend among Muslim society. This trends manifested in various form, including the vigorous campaign launched by Islamists to adopt and implement sharia or Islamic law. The entire campaign to dissolve Ahmadiyah, to me, cannot be analyzed separately from this larger trend.

The main actors in this campaign are obviously Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, FUI and FPI. Hizbut Tahrir is worth mentioning here. I venture to claim that Hizbut Tahrir is the only group that has the highest stake in this campaign for a simple reason, namely to gain a credibility and credential in the eye of Indonesian Muslim who are mainly Sunni as an “Islamic voice”. Hizbut Tahrir has been confronted with resistance and political repression throughout Muslim countries, particularly in the authoritarian monarchies in Middle East. Indonesia is the only country where it finds a fertile soil to thrive. The first international conference of caliphate (Islamic global state) was conducted in Jakarta on August 2006. After its kicking out from UK on the allegation of its involvement in London bombing in 2007, Hizbut Tahrir sought an alternative base to launch its global movement to establish the Islamic caliphate. Where else does it fit better than Indonesia?

Ahmadiyah issue is also being politically exploited by other Islamist groups to earn reputation as an “authority” that deserves the respect of Muslim society. There are two major Islamic organizations that represent Islamic moderation in Indonesia, i.e. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. However, the image of “moderation” is looked upon with deep suspicion by other Islamic groups, especially the Islamist and radical ones. Moderation, in their eye, amounts to being playing into the game of Washington. It is incumbent upon these groups to wrestle the authority to speak about Islam from these two moderate organizations.

In other words, the entire debate on deviant sect in Islam is not something that has a merit on its own, but rather a proxy for differing Islamic groups which vie for an authoritative position as the sole “voice” of Islam. What is regrettable is that Indonesian government slipped or deliberately let itself trapped in this dangerous game. As stated in the constitution, the Indonesian government is tasked with only one thing, i.e. to respect and guarantee the right of all its citizens to exercise their freedom to embrace any religion and faith of their choice. The state has no stake whatsoever in delineating what is “straight” and what is “crooked” with respect to religious doctrinal debate within any community![]

http://islamlib.com/en/article/ahmadiyahs-controversy-in-indonesia-vying-for-an-authority/ (Accessed 7/23/2011)

Faith and violence

Inside Indonesia, Monday, 01 January 2007, Edition 89

The Islamic sect Ahmadiyah has been under official pressure and violent attack.

Munawar Ahmad

In July 2005, several thousand followers of the Ahmadiyah movement were holding a jalsah, or annual gathering, at their headquarters, the Mubaraq campus in Bogor, just outside Jakarta, when a mob invaded the campus grounds. This attack received considerable media publicity in both Indonesia and around the world. But it was just the latest and most dramatic episode in what increasingly looks like an organised and systematic campaign of violence against Ahmadiyah.

Ahmadiyah, an Islamic religious movement founded by a nineteenth century visionary, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, from present-day Pakistan, first appeared in Indonesia in 1925. It has approximately 500,000 followers in the country, part of a world-wide movement led from Britain. Its views on some key matters are very different from mainstream Muslims. For example, followers of Ahmadiyah believe that Ahmad was the promised messiah. As a result, its followers often come under great pressure in Indonesia and elsewhere.

The July 2005 attack began when a group of activists from the well-known Islamist group the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), hung a banner outside the meeting ground proclaiming ‘Ahmadiyah is un-Islamic, its Prophet is Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, its holy book is the Tazkirah.’ An FPI leader, Abdurrahman Assegaf, as well as others, made speeches denouncing Ahmadiyah as a ‘deviant sect’ and demanding that the meeting be cancelled.

Failing to have their way peacefully, on the second day, about 100 FPI members attacked the meeting. They began by throwing rocks at whoever they could see in the campus grounds. None of the Ahmadiyah members responded in kind, but 15 of them received head wounds. Although there was a police post located at the campus gates, the authorities did not prevent the growing crowd pushing down the gate, destroying and looting whatever they could find, breaking windows and burning copies of the Qur’an.

Most of the attackers came from the area of Parung, about one kilometre away from the campus. Other local people could do little more than look on. One of them, Trisno, told an Ahmadiyah production crew (who later produced a VCD detailing the attack) that it was the anarchy of the mob that seemed un-Islamic to him, and that the Ahmadiyah followers had behaved well and not disrupted the locals.

History of discrimination

This attack was just one of many attempts to forcefully dissolve Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Between 1993 and 2005, 35 separate violent attacks on Ahmadiyah members were recorded around Indonesia. And since the attack in Bogor, there have been more.

Ahmadiyah’s problems in Indonesia flow from more than just mob rule. Since 1980 the movement has faced structural discrimination. In that year, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the government-endorsed Council of Islamic Scholars) released a fatwa (legal ruling) that Ahmadiyah was ‘outside Islam’, that it was ‘deviant’ and could lead others into error. Then Minister for Religion, H Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara, signed off on the decree. Eventually, in 1984, the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta issued an instruction to its offices in the regions to carefully monitor the movement and do what they could to prohibit its activities.

At the July 2005 attack, one of the main speakers denouncing Ahmadiyah was Amin Jamaluddin, a leader of the Islamic Institute for Research and Study (LPPI). LPPI is itself part of MUI. Its job is to study the religious credentials of movements within Islam, and its views are typically endorsed by the Ministry of Religion.

A few days after the attack on the Bogor campus, MUI again reconfirmed its view, issuing another fatwa declaring that Ahmadiyah are kafir (infidels). Since then, the Minister of Religion, Maftuh Basyuni, has repeatedly spoken out against Ahmadiyah. For instance, in February 2006 he warned them that its adherents would have to choose between returning to core Islamic beliefs or proclaiming themselves a new religion.

What is Ahmadiyah?

In sociological terms, the followers of Ahmadiyah are not strikingly different from other Muslims. They perform the five pillars of Islam: they pray five times a day, fast in the month of Ramadhan, read the Qur’an, recite the confession of faith and partake in the haj pilgrimage if they are able. Theologically speaking, however, Ahmadiyah is unique because it believes that prophets can appear after the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him [pbu]). They believe that Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the movement’s founder, was himself such a person.

This view about prophets and prophecy is the central source of conflict between followers of Ahmadiyah and most other Muslims in Indonesia. The Ahmadiyah understanding is quite unique. As Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself wrote in the Tazkirah (Our Teaching), to confirm whether a person has truly been appointed by God as a prophet, he must first proclaim himself to be acting on God’s mandate. The community of believers then must make their own evaluation of the claim on the basis of the previous scripture.

This belief conflicts with that of the mainstream Islamic community. Mainstream sunni Muslims believe that there is a total of 25 prophets, and that none would come after the Prophet Muhammad (pbu). This view is based on an interpretation of the Al-Ahzab verse (33): 40 of the Qur’an which includes the Arabic phrase khataman nabiyiin, which is usually translated into English to mean that Muhammad (pbu) is the ‘seal of the Prophets’. The mainstream interpretation is that Muhammad (pbu) is the ‘last’ of the prophets. However, the Arabic word khatam in fact has several meanings, including ‘most perfect’, ‘most glorious’ and ‘ring’ or ‘seal’. Ahmadiyah followers interpret the phrase to mean that the Prophet Muhammad (pbu) was the main or most important of the prophets, thus not excluding the possibility that others would come after him. For them, it is thus not inconsistent to be both a Muslim and to believe that the founder of their movement was a prophet.

For many Muslims in Indonesia, however, this interpretation of the phrase ‘khataman nabiyiin’ is a dangerous insult to their own beliefs. MUI scholars are particularly angered by the belief that Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad could be considered a prophet, as well as by the view that his book, the Tazkirah, is a revelation from God and that Ahmadiyah followers make the haj pilgrimage not to Mecca but to Qadian.

In my own view, it is possible to reconcile Ahmadiyah’s beliefs with mainstream Islamic practice. Six centuries ago the famous theologian Ibn Arabi wrote that there would be prophets after Muhammad (pbu). In his view, the spiritual light provided by the Prophet Muhammad (pbu) would continue to glow after his departure. Indeed, he believed that the phrase ‘khataman nabiyiin’ guaranteed that there would be prophets after Muhammad (pbu); if there were not, this would mean that the spiritual strength of the message of the Prophet Muhammad (pbu) was weak, which could not be. In this respect, it might be possible to think of prophets after Muhammad (pbu) as carrying forward the mission of their great predecessor, in the way that, in Islam, Isa (Jesus) is seen as carrying forward the prophecy of Musa (Moses). Such prophets do not bring their own law, but instead revive and implement the law their predecessor has brough.

Ahmadiyah today

The theological controversy about the status of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the root of violence against Ahmadiyah. The movement has been attacked not just in Indonesia, but also elsewhere, including in Bangladesh and Pakistan. As a result of the pressure they face from others, Ahmadiyah has become both more cohesive internally, and more exclusivist in how it deals with others.

Even so, Ahmadiyah is a fast-growing religious movement in many countries, including Australia. In Australia, the movement is based in Blacktown, Sydney, and has a beautiful large mosque and a congregation of about 2000 people, mostly Pakistani migrants. From the movement’s headquarters in Britain, Muslim Television Ahmadiyya (MTA) is broadcast globally. The channel provides information about Ahmadiyah’s vision of a rational Islam which can be applied easily in daily life, and which lays heavy emphasis on moral teachings and peace.

In Indonesia, it is almost as if the all the pressure has helped to promote Ahmadiyah. Many people have been attracted by Ahmadiyah’s peaceful resistance, and by the message of love that is at the heart of its vision. Data from 2004 suggests that over the preceding 12 years, there had been about 150,000 new converts in 298 branches around the country. This remarkable growth itself refutes the view that Ahmadiyah has no place in Indonesian society, as the movement’s detractors suggest. Indeed, it might just be that the cause of the violent reaction against Ahmadiyah is not just theological, but also derived from resentment at the movement’s success.

Munawar Ahmad (munawar_ahmad@lycos.com) is a lecturer at the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University in Yogyakarta. He is currently writing a PhD thesis on the political thinking of Abdurrahman Wahid. This article was translated by Edward Aspinall.

Inside Indonesia 89: Jan-Mar 2007
http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-89/faith-and-violence-1407014

Accusations of blasphemy

Inside Indonesia, Monday, 02 January 2006, Akh Muzakki, Edition 85

Are recent fatwa evidence that moderate Islam is a myth?

Akh Muzakki

On 30 November 2002, Muslims across Indonesia were celebrating the closing days of their month-long fast. It was the final week of the holy month of Ramadan. That week, however, was marked by the release of a fatwa, or opinion on religious law. The fatwa came from the Religious Scholars Forum of the Indonesian Muslim Community (FUUI) in Bandung, West Java.

FUUI had delivered their decision in response to an article written by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, the coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL). The article, entitled ‘Refreshing Our Understanding of Islam’, had been published nearly two weeks earlier in the popular Indonesian language newspaper Kompas. FUUI declared that Ulil’s article was blasphemous and that according to Islamic law such an offence was punishable by death.

Fatwa promoting the death penalty for perceived acts of blasphemy are rare in Indonesia, so the impact of the FUUI announcement was dramatic. All the more so because it was issued during Ramadan, a month devoted to peace and good will among Muslims.

Backlash

Why had Ulil’s article provoked such an intense reaction? In his article, Ulil strongly criticised the religious understanding of some Indonesian Muslims. He stated that some groups had ‘fossilised’ Islam by unconditionally accepting an understanding of Islam as it was practiced in seventh century Arabia. They allowed no room for reinterpretation.

In his view, the interpretation of Islam which these groups propagate has led to stagnation within Islam. He argued that Islam should be perceived as a living organism; something which grows and develops. He maintained that Islam does not promote ‘divine laws’. Rather, it develops universal principles the application of which may change with time and place.

Ulil’s article, and the subsequent fatwa, sparked a heated debate among Muslim scholars and leaders across the country. Not surprisingly, the strongest criticism of JIL came from FUUI, a small group of conservative Islamic leaders and activists. Their view was that Ulil had been deliberately provocative and attacked the basic principles of religion: God, Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim scholars, and the Muslim community in general. On these grounds, FUUI argued, he deserved to die.

FUUI pointed out that according to Islamic law a death penalty can be issued for any act of humiliation directed towards the teachings of Islam. Athian Ali M Da’i, the chair of FUUI and one of those responsible for issuing the fatwa, said in response to Ulil’s article that, ‘being a Muslim, my blood boiled.’

Earlier criticism

Eleven months before FUUI issued their fatwa, JIL had already been the target of criticism. This criticism was most vehement in a book entitled The Dangers of Liberal Islam. The author of the book was Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, one of the key Muslim thinkers behind the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytising, or DDII. In highlighting the danger of JIL, Hartono had raised the issue of the death penalty in the opening sections of his book.

Throughout the book, Hartono repeatedly called for the death penalty against those who reject being bound by Islamic law. This specifically included JIL. Hartono’s references to the potential use of a fatwa calling for the death penalty highlighted the opportunity for using such a penalty against JIL activists.

In the months following the release of the book, the argument for the death penalty against JIL members was developed within the pages of Media Dakwah, a publication of DDII.

Over the course of 2002, the publication ran numerous pieces under the same title as Hartono’s book. Gatra, a weekly news magazine, suggested that Hartono’s statements about the death penalty against the JIL activists made early in 2002, along with the ensuing barrage of criticism against JIL in Media Dakwah, culminated later in the year in the fatwa issued by FUUI.

Is Indonesian Islam moderate?

The rather extreme reaction of FUUI and DDII to an interpretation of Islam with which they did not agree may seem surprising. Indonesia has long been regarded as a nation whose Muslim population is tolerant and inclusive.

However, incidents such as FUUI’s fatwa and DDII’s ongoing discussions about applying the death penalty for heresy indicate that some groups do not wish to tolerate all views and, in fact, strongly oppose them.

These extreme responses raise a fundamental question. Why has there been such open confrontation between Indonesian Muslims in a nation that has long been known for its moderate and tolerant convictions and practices?

Looking further back into the history of Islam in the archipelago, we find previous examples of contestation between various groups of believers, including the issuing of death sentences.

During the initial process of Islamisation in Java, the walisongo (the nine revered Muslim saints who brought Islam to Java in the fifteenth century) delivered a fatwa calling for the death penalty for Syekh Siti Jenar. Syekh Siti Jenar, who was indeed put to death, was accused of spreading heresy among the Muslims of Indonesia.

But that was a long time ago. A death penalty fatwa is quite new in the context of modern Indonesia. And it is not the only indication that the nature of Indonesian Islam as moderate and peaceful may be at a crossroads.

No longer an isolated incident

In 2005, another fatwa was released, this time by the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI). MUI issued a fatwa against the followers of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect, asserting that the organisation was propagating heretical teachings about Islam. This fatwa was actually a re-assertion of a fatwa MUI had issued against Ahmadiyah in 1980. It did not mandate the death penalty, but it did state that Ahmadiyah was heretical. Unlike the fatwa against Ulil, however, this fatwa was acted upon.

On 9 July 2005 a mob destroyed part of the Ahmadiyah compound in Parung, West Java. Less than a week later, media sources reported that thousands of people armed with sticks had descended on Ahmadiyah’s headquarters in Pondok Udik, Bogor, West Java demanding the dissolution of Ahmadiyah. The local police were forced to evacuate around 200 Ahmadiyah followers to the police station in Cibinong.

> Where are the moderate Muslims?

It is generally believed that radical Islam has only a small following in Indonesia. But perhaps this notion has been promoted in order to dismiss a worrying reality. Have Indonesian Muslims been radicalised during the transitional period following Suharto’s authoritarian rule?

A number of religious commentators have argued that moderate Islam in Indonesia is only a myth. They go so far as to argue that law-abiding Indonesians can never hope to be free from the destructive powers of radical Islam and their fatwa. JIL activist Hamid Basyaib even argues that what has been known as ‘the moderate group’ now amounts to basically nothing.

These sentiments, however, would seem to be an over-reaction. The process of democratisation in Indonesia is still in its infancy. And despite isolated calls from groups like FUUI and DDII, Indonesians are already enjoying more freedom of speech than they have for several decades. There are also arguably unprecendented levels of protection of human rights.

Indeed, while there was some public criticism of Ulil’s article, only a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims supported the responses of FUUI and DDII. Both the small membership of FUUI and the limited circulation of Media Dakwah are testament to the fact that these organisations do not represent the majority of Indonesian Muslims.

The large moderate Islamic organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, have led campaigns to educate Indonesian Muslims about the dangers that radicalisation of socio-religious life can bring. These organisations have openly rejected radical teachings that endanger human rights and tolerance.

These efforts must be supported by a commitment on the part of the government to ensuring equal rights for all citiziens. Indonesians must be allowed to practice their religious beliefs freely but responsibly. While fatwa proposing death penalties for blasphemy are not supported by the large majority of Indonesian Muslims, they do impinge on the rights and the safety of individuals and organisations who simply wish to practice their newly acquired rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief.

Akh Muzakki (azaki9@hotmail.com) teaches at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Surabaya. He is a graduate of the Australian National University.

Inside Indonesia 85: Jan-Mar 2006

http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-85/accusations-of-blasphemy-1507117

Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia: Ormas Islam dan Aliran Sesat

Oleh: Drs Marpuji Ali, MSi

Kemunculan aliran-aliran pemikiran dan gerakan baru dalam Islam adalah suatu keniscayaan dan gejala yang wajar. Setiap zaman baru dalam sejarah peradaban mengharuskan umat beragama untuk meninjau kembali isi khasanah doktrinnya. Apakah pola pemahaman Islam yang dianut dapat digunakan untuk melihat permasalahan umat secara akurat? Apakah para penganut Islam dapat merampungkan seluruh persoalan kehidupan yang dihadapinya dengan menggunakan pendekatan Islam? Jika kedua masalah itu clear, berarti pemahaman keislamannya masih fungsional dan tidak memerlukan pemahaman atau penafsiran baru atas doktrin. Aliran Islam baru itu akan muncul apabila corak pemahaman Islam yang mereka anut dirasakan sudah tidak mempan lagi untuk melihat masalah kehidupan. Karena itu, berbagai persoalan yang muncul tidak terselesaikan dengan baik dan cenderung semakin menumpuk. Dalam situasi demikian, kemunculan berbagai aliran baru tidak terelakkan. Demikianlah dalam sebuah episode sejarah Islam klasik kita mengenal aliran-aliran teologi Islam, seperti Khawarij, Murjiah, Qodariah, Jabariah, Mu’tazilah, dan Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah. Dalam fikih Islam juga dikenal berbagai aliran hukum Islam,atau lebih dikenal dengan mazhab, seperti Syafii, Hambali, Maliki, Hanafi. Di Indonesia juga muncul aliran Islam yang bercorak reformis, seperti Muhammadiyah dan Al-Irsyad, ada pula yang bercorak tradisionalis seperti Nahdlatul Ulama. Yang menjadi permasalahan sekarang adalah mengapa ada aliran Islam yang sesat dan ada pula yang lurus (shiraatal mustaqim)? Memakai tolok ukur apa suatu aliran Islam dikatakan sesat, sementara ada aliran Islam lain yang tidak sesat.Siapa yang berhak membuat tolok ukur sebagai alat kategorisasi? Berdasarkan ketentuan Allah, lembaga keagamaan seperti MUI, Muhammadiyah, dan NU, atau malah negara? Secara sederhana, pemahaman rukun Islam bisa digunakan sebagai salah satu tolok ukur ortodoksi Islam. Maka, yang menyimpang dari lima pilar keagamaan tersebut bisa dikatakan menyimpang dari ajaran Islam ortodoks. Misalnya, rukun Islam pertama adalah syahadat, sebuah persaksian bahwa tidak ada tuhan kecuali Allah dan Muhammad adalah utusan Allah. Jadi, jika ada aliran Islam yang percaya bahwa ada nabi lagi sesudah Nabi Muhammad,itu sudah bisa dianggap aliran sesat karena pemahamannya tentang salah satu pilar Islam telah menyimpang dari ajaran Islam ortodoks. Bila berdasarkan tolok ukur tersebut,memang ditemukan ada aliran sesat, selanjutnya bagaimana sikap kita terhadap mereka? Memunculkan fatwa sesat, membunuhnya, membakar rumahnya, atau merangkul kembali mereka dan membimbingnya menuju Islam yang benar? Peran Ormas Islam Akhir-akhir ini ada tiga aliran Islam baru yang dianggap sesat dan mengemuka ke permukaan, yaitu Ahmadiyah, Lia Eden, dan terakhir Al-Qiyadah Al- Islamiyah. Ketiga aliran itu disebut menyimpang karena mempercayai ada Nabi atau Rasul (baru) setelah Muhammad SAW. Menghadapi maraknya aliran-aliran sesat itu, apa yang bisa diperankan ormas Islam seperti NU dan Muhammadiyah untuk meredam dan menanggulanginya? Apakah mengumumkan fatwa sesat ke publik cukup efektif, yang biasanya diikuti dengan tindakan anarkistis massa terhadap para penganut aliran tersebut? Apakah tidak ada jalan lain untuk mengingatkan dan menarik mereka kembali kepada jalan yang benar? Sebelum mengambil sikap terhadap mereka, sebaiknya dikenali dan dipahami terlebih dahulu akar penyebab pemunculannya. Mereka merupakan minoritas yang secara sengaja memisahkan diri dari mayoritas umat.Sebuah aliran sesat timbul karena beberapa alasan; (a) reaksi terhadap proses marginalisasi dan atomisasi kehidupan modern, terlempar dari kehidupan masyarakat, (b) secara psikologis mereka merasa kehilangan pegangan dalam menghadapi proses sosial yang baru, dan (c) biasanya mereka tidak terjangkau oleh kepemimpinan organisasi umat yang ada. Dengan demikian, kemunculan aliran-aliran sesat tersebut lebih banyak disebabkan faktor kulturalreligius, bukan masalah ekonomi. Karena itu, aliran-aliran sesat bisa muncul di pedesaan dan juga di wilayah perkotaan, orang-orang terpelajar maupun yang kurang terdidik. Karena akar kemunculan aliran sesat itu bersifat kultural-religius, ormas Islam memiliki peran yang sangat strategis dalam rangka menanggulangi lahirnya aliran-aliran sesat tersebut. Ada dua langkah yang bisa dilakukan ormas Islam untuk menanggulangi munculnya aliran sesat. Pertama,mengefektifkan peran dan fungsinya sebagai gerakan pendidikan dan dakwah. Hampir semua ormas Islam memiliki kedua kegiatan tersebut. Saluran pendidikan melalui sekolah, madrasah, dan pesantren. Para santri dan siswa ditanamkan sejak dini bagaimana model keberagamaan Islam yang benar sejalan dengan ortodoksi Islam, sembari dijelaskan tentang perbedaan-perbedaan furu’iyah yang bisa ditolerir sehingga bisa bersikap moderat terhadap perbedaan pemahaman. Senapas dengan model pendidikan formal yang dijalankan di lapangan,dakwah seperti pengajian juga mengembangkan model pemahaman keagamaan moderat sehingga kelompok-kelompok jamaah pengajian tidak gampang menyesatkan kelompok lain yang tidak sehaluan dengan pemahaman kelompoknya. Kedua, memperluas basis gerakan pendidikan dan dakwahnya kepada kelompok-kelompok masyarakat yang sejauh ini tidak terjangkau oleh kepemimpinan umat atau ormas Islam. Kehadiran ormas Islam pada umumnya berada di daerah yang tingkat pemahaman keislaman masyarakatnya sudah memadai.Tokoh-tokoh Islam muncul dari komunitas seperti ini. Di sisi lain, komunitas muslim yang tidak terjangkau kepemimpinan semakin jauh dari paham Islam ortodoks sehingga mereka sangat rentan untuk berpaling kepada aliran-aliran sesat. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, ormas Islam bisa mengambil prakarsa mengadakan migrasi dakwah, mendorong perpindahan beberapa ahli agama dari satu daerah ke daerah lain yang kering komunitas keislamannya. Cara ini bisa ditempuh dengan menyebarkan dai-dai muda untuk memasuki kehidupan kelompokkelompok masyarakat yang belum terjamah oleh kepemimpinan umat tersebut. Dai inilah yang akan membimbing umat ke jalan Islam yang benar. Jika sejenak menengok ke belakang, pesantren pada umumnya muncul di balik komunitas masyarakat abangan atau bahkan penduduknya menjalankan tindakan “hitam”(pencuri/rampok) sebagaimana kasus pondok pesantren Salafiyah Syafi’iyah Tebuireng Jombang. Setelah pesantren berdiri, perilaku umat berubah. Pesantren mampu mentransformasikan masyarakat dari abangan dan “dunia hitam” menjadi komunitas santri. Penyebaran gerakan dakwah Muhammadiyah juga dipercepat oleh mobilitas pedagang Minang yang memiliki jiwa merantau. Para pedagang Minang, di samping menguasai keterampilan dagang, memiliki pemahaman agama yang memadai sehingga pengembangan usaha dagang dilakukan bersamaan dengan perluasan dakwah Islamiah. Dengan demikian, baik NU maupun Muhammadiyah memiliki pengalaman untuk melakukan migrasi dakwah dan melakukan proses santrinisasi. Sudah tentu,untuk konteks sekarang perlu ada desain dakwah,bukan sekadar peristiwa insidental seperti peristiwa masa lalu. Dua langkah tersebut yaitu mengefektifkan peran ormas Islam sebagai gerakan pendidikan dan dakwah serta perluasan basis dakwah ke daerah yang keislamannya “tandus”. Hal tersebut perlu menjadi bahan renungan sebagai usaha memperbaiki strategi dakwah ormas Islam. Dalam konteks ini, munculnya aliran sesat pada dasarnya menunjukkan bahwa strategi dakwah ormas Islam belum tepat sasaran, belum mampu menembus penduduk muslim yang justru sangat memerlukan sentuhan dakwah. Melahirkan fatwa sesat terhadap suatu aliran keagamaan harus dipandang sebagai usaha kuratif.Yang lebih penting dari itu adalah memikirkan usaha-usaha preventif sehingga aliran itu tidak muncul. Usaha preventif bisa dilakukan ormas Islam dengan melakukan dua langkah tersebut. Tanah yang tandus sangat rentan terhadap bencana banjir maupun tanah longsor,demikian pula keberagamaan yang “tandus”. Tugas kita adalah menanami kembali tanah keagamaan yang tandus itu dengan dakwah yang menyejukkan, dakwah bil hikmahdan keteladanan.Peran itu dapat dimainkan secara penuh oleh ormas Islam karena itu adalah ladang dakwah yang konkret dan membumi. Wallahu a’lam bish-shawab.(*) URL Source: http://www.seputar-indonesia.com/edisicetak/opini/ormas-islam-dan-aliran-se

Drs Marpuji Ali, MSi Ketua Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah Jawa Tengah

Keterangan Artikel Sumber: Koran Sindo Tanggal: 14 Nov 07 Catatan: -

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