Indonesia Risks Taking Pakistan’s Path to Intolerance

OPINION

Ali Dayan Hasan | April 18, 2011

Radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, currently on trial on terrorism charges, is a symbol of religious intolerance in Indonesia. (Reuters Photo/Beawiharta)

Were a hundred Indonesians to die in a suicide bombing, one would expect Indonesian politicians, political parties and religious groups to condemn it no matter who the victims were. But when such an attack occurred last year in Pakistan, silence ruled the day. The one political leader who spoke out was the target of vitriol from religious parties and groups. Frighteningly, the series of events that led Pakistan down this path appears to be repeating itself in Indonesia.

On May 28, 2010, Islamist militants attacked two Ahmadiyah mosques in the central Pakistani city of Lahore with guns, grenades and suicide bombs, killing 94 people and injuring well over a hundred. The Punjabi Taliban, a local affiliate of the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, claimed responsibility. The Taliban have targeted not just Ahmadis but all Pakistanis — regardless of religious or sectarian affiliation. The Pakistani opposition leader Nawaz Sharif condemned this attack on “brothers and sisters who are Pakistani citizens.”

Yet his statement was greeted with anger by religious political parties and groups led by the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Pakistan branch of the Khatm-e-Nabuwat — an international Islamist umbrella organization dedicated to the “preservation of the finality of the Prophet Muhammad’s prophethood,” which considers Ahmadis heretics. It was a very ugly moment for Pakistani society.

The Ahmadiyah community has long been persecuted in Pakistan. What has happened in Pakistan is instructive in understanding the nature and potential objectives of those attacking — verbally and physically — the Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia. The situation for Ahmadis in Indonesia suggests a similar pattern of systematic persecution and a similar trend toward legalized discrimination against all Ahmadis for their religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, there are clear and specific ideological links between anti-Ahmadi organizations in Pakistan and Indonesia.

In 1974, Pakistan’s Parliament introduced constitutional amendments that defined the term “Muslim” in the Pakistani context and listed groups that were, under the law, to be considered non-Muslim. The amendment, which went into effect on Sept. 6, 1974, explicitly deprived Ahmadis of their identity as Muslims.

In 1984, five ordinances in Pakistan’s penal code were amended to explicitly target religious minorities: a law against blasphemy; a law punishing the defiling of the Koran; a prohibition against insulting the wives, family or companions of the Prophet of Islam; and two laws specifically restricting the Ahmadis’ activities. On April 26, 1984, Pakistani dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq issued these last two laws as part of Martial Law Ordinance XX.

Ordinance XX undercut the activities of religious minorities generally, but struck at Ahmadis in particular by prohibiting them from “indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim.”

Ahmadis thus could no longer profess their faith, either orally or in writing. Pakistani police destroyed Ahmadi translations of and commentaries on the Koran and banned Ahmadi publications, the use of any Islamic terminology on Ahmadi wedding invitations, the offering of Ahmadi funeral prayers and the displaying of the Kalima — the statement that “there is no god but Allah, Muhammad is Allah’s prophet,” the principal creed of Muslims — on Ahmadi gravestones.

In addition, Ordinance XX prohibited Ahmadis from declaring their faith publicly, propagating their faith, building mosques or making the call for Muslim prayer. In short, virtually any public act of worship or devotion by an Ahmadi could be treated as a criminal offense.

With the passage of the Criminal Law Act of 1986, Parliament added Section 295-C to the Pakistan Penal Code. The “Blasphemy Law,” as it came to be known, prescribed the death penalty for blasphemy. With Section 295-C, Zia and the Pakistani government institutionalized the persecution of Ahmadis as well as other minorities in Pakistan. The Ahmadi belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is considered blasphemous insofar as it “defiled the name of Prophet Muhammad.” Therefore, theoretically, Ahmadis can be sentenced to death for simply professing their faith.

As a consequence, Ahmadi mosques have been burned, their graves desecrated and their very existence criminalized. Since the 1980s, hundreds of Ahmadis have been formally charged in criminal cases for professing their religion. Scores of Ahmadis have been specifically charged with blasphemy; several have been convicted and face life imprisonment or death sentences, pending appeal. The offenses included wearing an Islamic slogan on a shirt, planning to build an Ahmadi mosque in Lahore and distributing Ahmadi literature in a public square. As a result, thousands of Ahmadis have fled Pakistan to seek asylum abroad.

Not surprisingly, anti-Ahmadiyah prejudice remains widespread in Pakistan. The foundation of legalized discrimination laid by the Pakistani state has played into the hands of the Taliban and other militant sectarian groups. The suicide bombings and other attacks on Ahmadis by these groups in recent times are only a deadly extension of the Pakistani state’s legal regime against its Ahmadi citizens since 1974. And all Pakistanis are affected: the Taliban demand that either Pakistanis accept their version of Islam as the true faith or face discrimination, flee or live in fear for their lives.

The horrific example of Pakistan should instill fear in the heart of every Indonesian. Last week’s suicide bombing attack on the Cirebon Police mosque in West Java provides an ominous foretaste of what lies ahead unless extremism nurtured by bigotry is checked before it consumes Indonesian society. For, much like their Pakistani counterparts, those who espouse extremism in Indonesia are turning on their own state and its security forces.

In Indonesia, as in Pakistan, Ahmadis are easy targets in times of religious and political insecurity. Following the June 2008 national decree that bans the Ahmadiyah from publicly practicing their faith, punishable by up to five years in prison, provincial governments have increasingly issued anti-Ahmadiyah bans —16 provinces and regencies have done so since 2006.

These provincial bans on Ahmadiyah activities breed intolerance, discrimination and, as the increasing attacks against Ahmadis in Indonesia show, violence. In February, Islamist militants beat three Ahmadis to death in Cikeusik village, Banten. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should immediately void the 2008 national decree and all the provincial decrees. He should ensure that the police act quickly to protect the Ahmadiyah from violence and hold perpetrators accountable. Indonesia’s reputation as a tolerant society is at grave risk.

Today it’s the Ahmadis, tomorrow, as in Pakistan, it could be you.

Ali Dayan Hasan is the senior South Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch.

Copyright 2010 The Jakarta Globe
Source:	www.thejakartaglobe.com/commentary/indonesia-risks-taking-pakistans- path-to-intolerance/435924

Fatwa NU yang Mendukung Keyakinan Ahmadiyah

Masyhuri, ʻA. ʻAziz. 2004. Masalah keagamaan: hasil muktamar dan munas ulama Nahdhatul Ulama kesatu-1928 s/d ketiga puluh, 2000 = [Ahkamil fuqahai : fimaqarrata muhtamarot Nahdhatul Ulama wa musyaawaraatihaa]. Depok: Diterbitkan atas kerjasama PP RMI dan Penerbit Qultum Media. pp. 30-31

Keputusan Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke-3, di Surabaya pada tanggal 12 Rabiul Tsani 1347 H / 28 September 1928 M.

"Nabi Isa akan turun kembali ke dunia sebagai Nabi dan Rasul"

Soal: 
Bagaimana pendapat Muktamar tentang Nabi Isa as. setelah turun kembali ke dunia. Apakah tetap sebagai Nabi dan Rasul? Padahal Nabi Muhammad SAW adalah Nabi terakhir. Apakah madzhab empat itu akan tetap ada pada waktu itu?

Jawab:
Kita wajib berkeyakinan bahwa Nabi Isa as. itu akan diturunkan kembali pada akhir zaman nanti sebagai Nabi dan Rasul yang melaksanakan syariat Nabi Muhammad SAW. Hal itu, tidak berarti menghalangi Nabi Muhammad SAW sebagai Nabi yang terakhir, sebab Nabi Isa AS hanya akan melaksanakan syariat Nabi Muhammad SAW, sedang madzhab empat pada waktu itu hapus (tidak berlaku).

download fatwa

Ahmadiyah bans: Legal justification for intolerance?

Published on The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com)

The Jakarta Post   |  Sat, 12/10/2011 4:27 PM  |  Opinion

Ati Nurbaiti
As of September this year, at least 26 regencies and municipalities have passed bylaws restricting or banning the Ahmadiyah sect, 11 of them in West Java alone, according to a list from the National Commission on Violence Against Women.

Some were issued after the murderous assault on the sect in Pandeglang regency, Banten, in February 2011; including the Banten bylaw itself. The Commission has said women and children of the sect were the most vulnerable in the attacks, which according to the Setara Institute have included 342 cases of assault from 2007 to 2011. This also includes the resettlement of an entire Ahmadiyah community to an island off Lombok.

The local regulations justify other citizens and authorities into closing down Ahmadi mosques, forcing them out of their homes, or ordering them to denounce Islam if they insist on their beliefs. Unlike mainstream Muslims, the Ahmadiyah do not believe that Muhammad is the last prophet, saying they differentiate between prophets and messengers.

However, Muslims have said this is their excuse to hide their real beliefs; that the Ahmadiyah have frequently violated the joint ministerial decree on their sect by proselytizing; and that the attacks on them would stop — if only they would drop their teachings, or declare that they are no longer Muslims.

The bylaws and the joint ministerial decree, revived in 2008, refer to the 2005 non-binding fatwa of the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) which states the Ahmadiyah is deviant; and also the 1965 Law on Blasphemy, which was upheld in 2005 by the Constitutional Court in its ruling against a group of human rights advocates who wanted it annulled. The plaintiffs had said the blasphemy law was no longer relevant for a democracy since it was issued under martial law in 1965.

The movement to annul the 1965 law and those advocating an end to prosecuting minorities, pursue entirely different reasoning from groups who are sealing the Ahmadiyah mosques, often accompanied by local police.

The first argues that the state of a democratic country should not decide which Islam is “right”. The second wonders out loud why the state is leaving Muslims to take matters into their own hands, because, they say, it is evident that Ahmadiyah should be banned, based on the 1965 law, the joint ministerial decree and the MUI fatwa.

A glimpse at news reports in the wake of the Feb. 6 attacks shows that a number of these reports asserted or implied that the real victims were not the Ahmadiyah, whose three members were mobbed and killed, with helpless police officers looking on — all on display to the world thanks to YouTube.

According to the sources in the reports, such as in CyberSabili and hidayatullah.com, the real victims were the Muslims, because the Ahmadis, who insulted Islam, and blatantly defied all civilized requests to stop proselytizing, gained all the sympathy. The “victimization” of Muslims is traced to the marginalization and suppression of Islamic expression by Soeharto, apart from reports of intelligence operations against Muslim activists.

That the Ahmadiyah were not the real victims in the February assault would not necessarily be the majority view; a poll involving 3,000 respondents found most rejecting violence in the name of religion. The July poll by the Setara Institute was conducted in 47 regencies and municipalities in 10 provinces.

But if most Indonesians agreed with these respondents, it doesn’t explain all those bylaws restricting the Ahmadiyah, emerging right under the nose of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The passing of the bylaws had no difficulty, it seemed, even though the regional autonomy law states that religion should be regulated by the state. But similarly, Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali and Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi have voiced their opinions that the state should ban or dissolve the Ahmadiyah instead of only restricting their activities.

So are Indonesia’s Muslims becoming increasingly intolerant? Many say tolerance is not the issue, for the Ahmadiyah has insulted Islam.

Leading lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution told a recent discussion in Canberra that he had a hard time convincing President Yudhoyono that the Ahmadiyah had constitutional rights as a minority — and thus the President may have been persuaded against an outright ban. The ministers overseeing the joint ministerial decree restricting the Ahmadiyah also have a constitutional reference; that religious freedom is limited in respect of followers of other faiths.

The International Crisis Group had recommended an independent body to work out a strategy for religious tolerance; such a body would have to deal with this legal confusion stemming from demands to “protect” the Muslim majority against “deviants”, through rulings such as a state ban on the Ahmadiyah.

Malaysia may seem tragic to many of us as its activists say ordinary citizens, including Muslims themselves, cannot speak out against increased state regulation of Islam, lest they would be considered un-Islamic.

But the incidences of Malaysians’ violence against minorities do not come anywhere close to our long list. Should we be proud of outdoing Malaysia?

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.
— JP

Copyright © 2011 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.

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Source URL: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/10/ahmadiyah-bans-legal-justification-intolerance.html

NU, Ahmadiyah, dan FPI

AntaraNews.com, Sabtu, 5 Maret 2011 11:22 WIB | 5905 Views

Edy M. Ya`kub 


Surabaya (ANTARA News) - Hanya dalam satu bulan Februari 2011 tercatat tiga kerusuhan bernuansa agama yakni di Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten (6/2), Temanggung, Jateng (8/2), dan Pasuruan, Jatim (15/2).

Rentetan peristiwa itu agaknya membuat Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono bersikap keras dengan mengeluarkan "warning" tentang kemungkinan pembubaran ormas anarkis.

Dalam sikapnya, Presiden tidak menyebut ormas yang dimaksud secara spesifik.

Walhasil, tiga kerusuhan bernuansa agama itu akhirnya tidak hanya berhenti pada penegakan hukum, melainkan juga mendorong persoalan mengerucut pada polemik tentang Ahmadiyah di berbagai daerah, bahkan para petinggi Front Pembela Islam (FPI) pun turut meramaikan polemik itu.

Adalah Gubernur Jawa Timur Soekarwo yang merupakan kepala daerah yang pertama mengeluarkan Surat Keputusan Nomor 188/94/KPTS/013/2011 tentang Larangan Aktivitas Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di wilayahnya.

Surat tertanggal 28 Februari 2011 itu disampaikan Gubernur di depan anggota Forum Pimpinan Daerah (Forpimda) dan pimpinan sejumlah media massa di Gedung Negara Grahadi, Surabaya (28/2/2011).

Dalam SK tersebut terdapat tiga pasal. Pertama, melarang aktivitas JAI yang dapat memicu dan/atau menyebarkan terganggunya ketertiban masyarakat Jawa Timur.

Pasal kedua berisi empat poin; a) menyebarkan ajaran Ahmadiyah secara lisan, tulisan, maupun melalui media elektronik; b) memasang papan nama organisasi JAI di tempat umum; c) memasang papan nama pada masjid, mushalla, lembaga pendidikan, dan lain-lain dengan identitas JAI; dan d) menggunakan atribut JAI dalam segala macam bentuknya.

Gubernur Soekarwo menegaskan bahwa pihaknya tidak berwenang membubarkan ajaran Ahmadiyah.

"Kami hanya bisa melarang aktivitasnya, bukan membubarkan, karena pusat yang berwenang (membubarkan). Urusan agama merupakan salah satu dari lima kewenangan pusat," ujarnya.

Sikap gubernur Jatim yang juga mendorong sikap serupa di Jabar dan provinsi lain itu mengundang protes dari Jaring Masyarakat Anti-Kekerasan (Jamak) dan Aliansi Anak Bangsa Peduli HAM.

"Dari diskusi panjang lebar tentang kekerasan dalam beragama, kami mendesak Gubernur Jatim untuk mencabut SK Larangan Aktivitas JAI," kata Presidium Jamak Jatim, Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, di Surabaya (3/3).

Mereka menganggap SK tersebut salah alamat dan harus dicabut, karena SK itu seharusnya bukan dialamatkan kepada JAI, melainkan kepada kelompok-kelompok masyarakat yang selama ini melakukan kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah.

"Ahmadiyah selama ini selalu menjadi korban. Penerbitan SK pelarangan Ahmadiyah menunjukkan kalau pemerintah kalah dengan kelompok tertentu. Khususnya negara sudah kalah dengan masyarakat yang kalap. Negara juga sudah gagal dalam memberikan jaminan keamanan kepada masyarakatnya, terlebih pada masyarakat kelompok minoritas," katanya.

Menanggapi protes itu, gubernur mempersilakan para pemprotes untuk menggugatnya secara hukum, karena upaya hukum lebih bagus daripada demonstrasi (demo).

"Yang jelas, esensi SK hanya melarang aktivitas JAI di Jatim dan bukan membubarkan organisasinya. Akidah dan ritualnya tidak bisa dilarang. Hanya aktivitasnya, seperti pemasangan `plang` (papan nama) dan penyebaran melalui lisan dan tulisan. Itu juga sesuai SKB Menag, Mendagri, dan Jakgung," ujarnya.

Sikap yang sama dikeluarkan Gubernur Jawa Barat melalui Pergub Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Pelarangan Kegiatan Jamaah Ahmadiyah di Jabar yang esensinya sama dengan SK Gubernur Jatim tentang Ahmadiyah.

Sikap NU

Di tengah polemik itu, pandangan Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dalam menyikapi tiga kerusuhan (6-15/2) itu agaknya cukup menarik untuk disimak, termasuk soal Ahmadiyah dan FPI itu sendiri.

Hal itu karena NU merupakan organisasi kemasyarakatan (ormas) Islam terbesar di Indonesia, sehingga sikapnya menjadi rujukan bagi ormas lain untuk menilai konflik legalitas Ahmadiyah (Cikeusik), konflik antaragama (Temanggung), dan konflik Sunni-Syiah (Pasuruan).

Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama (PWNU) Jawa Timur mendukung pembekuan kegiatan Jamaah Ahmadiyah sebagaimana tertuang dalam Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB) Menteri Agama, Jaksa Agung, Menteri Dalam Negeri tertanggal 9 Juni 2008.

"Soal keyakinan itu tidak dapat dipaksakan, namun bisa didialogkan. Karena itu kami mendukung SKB Ahmadiyah yang intinya membekukan kegiatan Ahmadiyah yang menyimpang," kata Sekretaris PWNU Jatim HM Masyhudi Muchtar kepada ANTARA di Surabaya (21/2).

SKB Ahmadiyah itu antara lain berbunyi peringatan kepada jamaah Ahmadiyah untuk menghentikan penyebaran penafsiran dan kegiatan yang menyimpang dari pokok-pokok ajaran Agama Islam yaitu penyebaran faham yang mengakui adanya Nabi dengan segala ajarannya setelah Nabi Muhammad SAW.

Didampingi Rais Syuriah PWNU Jatim KH Miftachul Akhyar, Masyhudi Muchtar mengatakan Ahmadiyah itu menyimpang dari ajaran Islam dan paham NU, karena jamaah Ahmadiyah dari aliran Qadian dan Lahore itu sama-sama mengakui Mirza Ghulam Ahmad pernah menerima wahyu untuk menerima tugas sebagai Imam Mahdi atau Isa Almasih.

"Kami mendukung SKB Menag, Mendagri, dan Jaksa Agung, karena pelarangan atau pembekuan itu merupakan peluang pemerintah dan tokoh agama untuk bertindak sesuai porsi masing-masing yakni pemberintah menindak secara hukum dan tokoh agama melakukan pembinaan atau dialog dengan jamaah Ahmadiyah," katanya.

Hal itu penting, karena keyakinan agama itu merupakan keyakinan asasi yang tidak bisa dipaksakan kepada orang lain, tapi perlu dilakukan kompromi melalui dialog. "Islam sendiri mengajarkan `mauidhoh hasanah` atau cara-cara yang baik dan menjauhi cara-cara kekerasan. Hidayah itu hak Tuhan," katanya.

Menanggapi hal itu, Ketua Forum Cendekiawan Ahmadiyah Jatim Ustadz Hamid Ahmad kepada ANTARA di Surabaya (28/2) mengaku siap berdialog, karena Ahmadiyah itu menggunakan Al Quran, membaca syahadat, kiblat untuk shalat, nabi, dan hal-hal lainnya yang sama dengan umat Islam pada umumnya.

"Kalau dibilang kami punya kitab suci Tadzkirah itu nggak betul, karena kita suci kami tetap Al Quran. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad itu juga bukan nabi, tapi penerus nabi seperti Imam Mahdi atau Isa Almasih," paparnya.

Namun, Rais Syuriah PBNU KH Hasyim Muzadi berpendapat sebaliknya. Ia menilai aktivitas dan penyebaran Ahmadiyah ini memang harus dilarang dan dihentikan seperti SK Gubernur Jatim atau SKB Menag, Mendagri, dan Jakgung itu.

"Ajaran Ahmadiyah itu memang harus dihentikan, karena rawan terhadap umat Islam itu sendiri, kecuali kalau Ahmadiyah itu menjadi satu agama sendiri dan bukan Agama Islam. Itu (Ahmadiyah) tidak ada kaitannya dengan kebebasan beragama, tapi justru penodaan agama," ucap mantan Ketua Umum PBNU itu.

Tapi, kata Sekjen International Conference of Islamic Scholar (ICIS) tersebut, kebebasan hidupnya sebagai warga negara tetap dilindungi dan SK atau SKB itu justru melindungi mereka dari oknum yang menggunakan atau memanfaatkan kerawanan untuk memicu konflik.

Senada dengan itu, Ketua Umum PBNU KH Said Aqiel Siradj menegaskan bahwa Ahmadiyah memang menyimpang dan tidak sejalan dengan NU, karena pandangan yang menganggap ada nabi setelah Nabi Muhammad SAW itu tidak sejalan dengan akidah NU (Aswaja).

"Namun pembubaran Ahmadiyah adalah domain Pemerintah dan NU tidak berada dalam wilayah itu. Selain itu, perbedaan keyakinan tidak bisa menjadi pembenar untuk melakukan tindakan kekerasan atau kesewenang-wenangan," katanya.

Agaknya, NU selalu bersikap "jalan tengah" (tawassuth, i`tidal, musawah, tasamuh). NU menyalahkan ajaran Ahmadiyah, tapi tidak menyalahkan pemeluknya terkait hidayah Tuhan.

NU menyalahkan cara kekerasan FPI, tapi NU tidak menyalahkan atau membubarkan organisasinya terkait hidayah Tuhan juga.
(*)

Editor: AA Ariwibowo

COPYRIGHT © 2011

Retrieved from: http://www.antaranews.com/berita/248702/nu-ahmadiyah-dan-fpi

My Academic Works on Ahmadiyya

Book, Journal Article, & Book Chapter

1. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2020. "'It's a Jihad': Justifying Violence towards the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia," TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.8
2. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2020. “Torn between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: Discussing Erfaan Dahlan’s religious affiliation and self-exile,” Indonesia and the Malay World, 48 (140): 60-77. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2019.1663678.
3. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2020. "Ahmadiyah and Islamic Revivalism in the 20th Century Java, Indonesia: A Neglected Contribution", in Alternative Voices in Muslim Southeast Asia: Discourse and Struggles, eds. Norshahril Saat and Azhar Ibrahim, pp. 199-220. Singapore: ISEAS.
4. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2019. Menemani Minoritas: Paradigma Islam tentang Keberpihakan dan Pembelaan kepada yang Lemah. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
5. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2017. "Melintasi Batas Identitas dan Kesarjanaan: Studi tentang Ahmadiyah di Indonesia". Jurnal Harmoni, Vol. 16, No. 2, h. 254-271. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v16i2.15
6. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2017. "Menjaga Kerukunan Agama, Menjaga Keutuhan Bangsa", dalam Ahmadiyah di Mata Cendekiawan: Kesaksian Mereka, ed. Ahmad Saifudin Malangyudo. Yogyakarta: Taman Pustaka Arif Rahman Hakim. h. 95-106.
7. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2016. "Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent: The LPPI’s Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia". Indonesia and the Malay World (SOAS). 44(129): 145-164. DOI: 10.1080/13639811.2015.113560
8. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2015. "Sectarian Translation of the Qur’an in Indonesia: The Case of the Ahmadiyya". Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, 53 (2): 251-282. DOI: 10.14421/ajis.2015.532.251-282
9. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2015. “Ormas-ormas Islam di Indonesia: Sejarah dan Karakteristik”, dalam Sejarah Kebudayaan Islam di Indonesia: Institusi dan Gerakan. Jilid 3. Editors: Azyumardi Azra, Taufik Abdullah, dan Jajat Burhanuddin. Jakarta: Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Budaya, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.
10. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "Khilafah Ahmadiyah sebagai Satu Model Penerapan Sistem Kekhilafahan di Era Kontemporer", in Komaruddin Hidayat (ed.), Kontroversi Khilafah: Islam, Negara, dan Pancasila. Bandung: Mizan. pp. 113-129
11. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "Conversion to the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia: Winning Hearts through Ethical and Spiritual Appeals". Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia (ISEAS), 29 (3): 657-690. DOI: 10.1355/sj29-3e
12. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "Ahmadiyah Lahore dalam Revivalisme Islam di Indonesia." Ulumul Qur'an  X (1): 41-47.
13. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "Treating minorities with Fatwās: A study of the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia." Contemporary Islam (Springer), 8(3): 285-301. DOI: 10.1007/s11562-013-0275-6.
14. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences". Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 25 (2): 141-158. DOI:10.1080/09596410.2013.864191.
15. "Living as Persecuted People: the Plights of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia" (in progress).
16. Who Speaks for Islam? The Concept of Heresy in Muslim Tradition (Oxford University Press). (in progress).
17. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2014. "Hating the Ahmadiyya: The Place of Heretics in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Society." Contemporary Islam (Springer), 8 (2): 133-152. DOI: 10.1007/s11562-014-0295-x
18. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2012. "Tiga Problem Dasar dalam Perlindungan Agama-agama Minoritas di Indonesia." Jurnal MAARIF, 7 (1/Desember): 43-55.
19. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2012. "Pengantar". In Sekuntum hikmah dari maha guru Ahlussunnah, Syi'ah, dan Ahmadiyah, oleh Asrar Mabrur Faza.  

Conference & Workshop 

1. Presenter at the International Workshop on Islam and Cultural Diversity in Southeast Asia /The 2nd meeting, ILCAA Joint Research Project “Multi-disciplinary Study on Islam and Cultural Diversity in Southeast Asia (The 3rd Term)-Dynamics of Conflict and Co-existence”, organized by TUFS (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies), in Kota Kinabalu Malaysia, 24-25 September 2017.
2. Presenter at The 2nd International Symposium on Religious Literature & Heritage on “Cultivating Religious Culture for Nationalism”, Bogor, 18-21 July 2017. My presentation: "Between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah: Tracing Erfan Dahlan’s Religious Identity"
3. Keynote Speaker in Indonesia Programme Workshop on “The Rise of Religious Intolerance in Contemporary Indonesia,” 25 August 2016, Shangri-La Hotel Jakarta. Organized by: Indonesia Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
4. Workshop on Qur'anic Studies in Contemporary Indonesia, organized by Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian kepada Masyarakat (LP2M) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, September 2, 2015. My paper: "Sectarian Translation of the Qur’an in Indonesia: The Case of the Ahmadiyya"
5. The 20th Anniversary of Studia Islamika Int’l Conference on Southeast Asian Islam: Legacy and New Interpretation, Jakarta, August 14-15, 2014. My paper: “South Asian Channel of Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia: The Case of Ahmadiyya”.
6. International Conference on Qur’anic Studies on Grounding the Qur’an: Towards transformative Qur’anic Studies, at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, February 15-16, 2014. Paper: “Sectarian Qur’an: Controversies and Influences of Ahmadiyya Translation of the Qur’an in Indonesia”.
7. The 6th Al-Jami’ah Forum on Plurality and Minority, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, December 6-8, 2013. Paper: “Discriminative regulations on religious minorities in Indonesia.”
8. International conference on Religious diversity and identity: Negotiating state order and civil rights, Gottingen University and UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, November 20-22, 2013. Paper: “Religious rights of ‘heretical’ groups in Indonesia: The case of the Ahmadiyya.” 
9. Seminar and Workshop on Islamic Humanitarianism in Southeast Asia, Organized by the Graduate Program, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), Dompet Dhuafa (DD), and LAZISMU, June 26-28, 2013. My paper: "Humanitarianism and Heresy: Helping the Oppressed Ahmadis in Mataram and Shi’ite Muslims in Sampang".
10. The 2013 UCLA Indonesian Studies Conference on Critical Histories of Activism: Indonesia’s New Order and its Legacies, April 13-14, 2013. My paper: "From Opposition to Alliance: The LPPI and Its Mission to Eradicate Deviant Sects in Indonesia". Link
11. The 30th Annual Conference of American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies (ACSIS) on   Continuity and Change in Islamic Societies, held in Seton Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey, on April 5-6, 2013. My paper: "Globalized Discourse on Exclusion and Its Impacts on the Treatment of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia". Link
12. The Conference on Beyond binaries: toward a continuum model of religious normativity, organized by the Graduate Committee for the Study of Religion at the University of Texas, Austin, March 23-24, 2013. My paper: "The Victim of Orthodoxy-Heterodoxy Binary: The Case of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia". Link
13. The 2nd Annual SEA Studies Symposium at the University of Oxford, 9-10 March 2013. My paper: "Hating the Ahmadiyya: The Place of Heretics in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Society". Link 
14. The AAR (American Academy of Religion) Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois, November 17-20, 2012. Sacred Space in Asia Group. My paper: 'Sacred Spaces in Qadian and their Roles in the Construction of Ahmadiyya Theology.' Link
15. The International Conference on Minorities in Islam/Muslims as Minorities, at Wake Forest University, Wake Forest, NC, October 19-20, 2012  My paper: 'Treating minorities with Fatwās: A study of the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia.' Link
16. The Conference and Workshop on Militia, Religion and the Legitimation of Violence in Southeast Asia organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. My paper: 'Force and Discourse: Militia and Vigilante Groups behind the Persecution of the Ahmadiyya'. Singapore, June 14-15, 2012. Link
17. The UCLA Indonesian Studies Conference 2012 on Indonesia in Global and Transnational Perspective, hosted by Center for Southeast Asian Studies, UCLA. My paper: ‘Arabization and Pakistanization: A Study of the Treatment of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.’ Los Angeles, April 27-28, 2012. Link
18. The Santa Barbara Global Studies Conference (SBGSC) on “Crisis,” hosted by the Orfalea Center and the faculty of Global & International Studies at UCSB. My paper: ‘Crisis of Religious Freedom in Indonesia: A Study of Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Minority’. Santa Barbara, February 24-25, 2012. Link
19. The Second-Annual UCSB Islamic Studies Conference on Locating the Sharīʿa: Creating New Sources for Knowledge and Inquiry, hosted by the Department of Religious Studies, University of California Santa Barbara. My paper: ‘Fatwās as a Source to Sustain Orthodoxy: A Study of the Charge of Apostasy to the Ahmadiyya’. Santa Barbara, February 17-19, 2012. Link

Talk & Seminar

1. Presenter at the Book Launch and Discussion on Alternative Voices in Muslim Southeast Asia: Discourse and Struggles, P2MB, LIPI, Friday, 6 March 2020. 
2. Speaker at the Seminar on Pancasila and Khilafah, Saturday, 14 December 2019, Hotel Sumber Alam Garut, Jawa Barat. My talk: “Pancasila, Khilafah, dan Ahmadiyah dalam Tata Pemerintahan Modern”. 
3. Presenter in the Halaqah Nasional Ulama dan Cendekiawan, organized by Maarif Institute, PBNU, UKP PIP, UIN Yogyakarta on 16-19 November 2017. My presentation: "Fatwās on the Ahmadiyya: Analyzing the Boundaries of Orthodoxy"
4. Speaker in the ARI - Seminar on "Neither Insider nor Outsider: Crossing Boundaries in the Study of Religious Minorities in Indonesia", Singapore, 24 Aug 2017.
5. Presenter in "Multicultural Day 2016: Managing Diversity, Fostering Harmony". UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, on 7 November 2016. 
6. Public Lecture on "Muslim in Asia (2): Muslim in Indonesia," Aichi University, Nagoya, Japan, 19 April 2016. My presentation: "Religious Minorities in Muslim Majority Country of Indonesia".
7. Presenter in the Discussion on Naskah Akademik RUU PUB, organized by Balitbang dan Diklat Kemenag, Hotel Balairung, Jakarta. 15 December 2015. My presentation: "Pluralitas & Minoritas: Pengalaman Mengkaji Minoritas Agama (Ahmadiyah & Syiah)".
8. Presenter in the Third Australia-Indonesia Dialogue, sponsored by La Trobe University’s Centre for Dialogue and the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) and supported by the Victorian State Government of Australia, Jakarta, 15-16 October 2014. My presentation: "Managing Religious Diversity, Bridging Divides".
9. Presenter in the Workshop Fakultas Ushuluddin, Dakwah dan Adab, IAIN “Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin” Banten, di Auditorium Lt. III Gd Rektorat IAIN "SMH" Banten, 9 October 2014. My presentation: "Gerakan Radikal Islam: Respon Muslim terhadap Minoritas Keagamaan". 
10. Public Lecture and Bedah Disertasi on Politics of regulating religion: State,civil society and the quest for religious freedom in modern Indonesia, Perpustakaan Sekolah Pascasarjana UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, Thursday, 2 October 2014.
11. Presenter in the 16th PPIM Seminar on "Batas-batas Kebebasan Beragama di Indonesia: Kajian terhadap Sila Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa dalam Pancasila", at Gedung PPIM UIN Jakarta, September 17, 2014.
12. Talk Show at Perspektif Indonesia on “Peta Politik di Senayan Pasca Pemilu 9 April 2014", Gedung DPD RI, Jakarta, Friday, 25 April 2014. My presentation: "Peta Politik di Senayan dalam Kaitannya dengan Kelompok Minoritas".
13. Seminar on GAI (Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement) and religion in Indonesia, organized by the GAI, Yogyakarta, December 22-24, 2013. Paper: “South Asian Channel of Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia: The Case of Ahmadiyya”.
14. Stadium General on Islam and Nation-state, organized by UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, October 26, 2013. Paper: “The limits of religious freedom in Indonesia: Analyzing the first pillar of Pancasila”.
15. Indonesian Fronties of Social Science Symposium, organized by AIPI (Indonesian Academy of Sciences), Lombok, October 17-19, 2013. Paper: “Heresy in social sciences”
16. Stadium General for graduate students of the Department of Theology and Philosophy, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, October 4, 2013. Paper: “Who speak for Islam? The concept of heresy in Muslim society”.
17. A presenter in a seminar organized by Maarif Institute, "Is Indonesia a failed state? Analyzing the of Ahmadiyah in Cikeusik & Transito". Jakarta, July 31, 2012. With Philips Vermonte (CSIS) and Zafrullah Pontoh (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia). Link
18. A presenter at Gedung DPR-MPR RI Jakarta, organized by DPD RI, July 12, 2012. Topic: "Sosok Alternatif Calon Presiden: Perspective from Minority Groups." With Paulus Yohanes Sumino (DPD RI), Berry Nahdian Furqan (Walhi), and Grace Natalie (Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting). Link 
19. A talk at the Center for Society and Culture (PMB) - the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) on Fatwas against the Ahmadiyya. Jakarta, Friday, June 29, 2012.
20. A talk at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies - Indonesia (CSEAS-I) on the Current Persecution of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. Jakarta, June 28, 2012. Link
21. Co-organizer of  Seminar Sehari on "Kritik atas Kebebasan Beragama di Indonesia", PMB LIPI, Friday, September 23, 2005. 

Other Publication

1. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2019. "Alhambra, Borobudur, dan Doktrin 'Love for All, Hatred for None'," IBTimes.id, 29 November.  
2. -----. 2019. "Kelompok Minoritas sebagai Kategori Mustadh'afin". Suara Muhammadiyah, 06 / 104 | 16 - 31 Maret 2019 / 9 - 24 rajab 1440. h. 44-45.
3. -----. 2017. "Memahami Kontroversi Ahmadiyah". Geotimes, Jum'at, 24 November.
4. -----. 2017. "Membantah Tuduhan tentang Ibadah Haji Ahmadiyah". Geotimes, 28 July. 
5. -----. 2017. "Pengalaman Seorang Muhammadiyah di Jalsah Salanah Ahmadiyah - Qadian, India". Warta Ahmadiyah, 7 Januari. Link lain
6. -----. 2014. "Isu Minoritas dalam Pilpres 2014". Koran Sindo, 9 Mei.
7. -----. 2013. "Radikalisasi Pancasila di Bidang Agama". Koran Sindo, 3 Oktober.
8. -----. 2013. "Mempertegas Hak Zakat untuk Muallaf". Koran Sindo, 30 Agustus.
9. -----. 2012. "Time to Forgive and Live in Harmony With Ahmadiyah." The Jakarta Globe, September 07.
10. -----. 2012. "Mencari Sosok Calon Pemimpin Alternatif".
11. -----. 2012. "Ramadan di Transito." Seputar Indonesia, Tuesday, August 07.
12. -----. 2012. "Indonesia a Failed State? Fate of The Ahmadis Shows It Could Be." The Jakarta Globe,  August 04. 
13. -----. 2010. "Religious orthodoxy and the blasphemy law". The Jakarta Post | Thu, 03/18/2010 5:00 PM | Opinion
14. -----. 2005. "Ahmadiyah and the vulgarization of Islam." The Jakarta Post, Wed, 07/27/2005 3:30 PM | Opinion.  

Transcript from a talk: Ahmadiyah Lahore dan Revivalisme Islam di Indonesia

Recorded Talk: Ahmadiyah Lahore dan Revivalisme Islam di Indonesia
Interviewed by Madina Online: Ahmad Najib Burhani: “Peran Kerajaan Saudi dalam Kekerasan Keagamaan Bersifat Tak Langsung” (22 July 2015. Reporter: Irwan Amrizal).

Interviewed by Sinar Harapan: Negara Tak Lagi Netral Ketika Terbitkan SKB tentang Ahmadiyah. (Senin, 12 Agustus 2013. Reporter: Melki Pangaribuan) 
Interviewed by Sinar Harapan: Nabi Muhammad SAW Ajarkan Prinsip Demokrasi yang Menghindari Tirani Mayoritas . (Selasa, 6 Agustus 2013. Reporter: Melki Pangaribuan)

Research & Other Activities Related to Ahmadiyah

• Guest Speaker at the 32nd Jalsa Salana, Singapore, 1 December 2019. Title: "Becoming a Friend of the Ahmadiyya".
• Attending the 30th Jalsa Salana Singapore 1-3 December 2017 at 118 Onan rd (Masjid Taha) Singapore 424530 
• Expert witness (saksi ahli) in the Judicial Review of UU No. 1/PNPS/1965, the Constituional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) Republic of Indonesia, Tuesday, 7 November 2017. Paper: "Menjaga Kerukunan Agama, Menjaga Keutuhan Bangsa".
• Participating in the 122nd Jalsa Salana (Annual Convention) Qadian, Punjab, India 23 December 2016 - 1 January 2017. The Jalsa itself was organized on 26-28 Dec 2016.
• Participating & giving talk in the International Peace Symposium on "Implementation of Pancasila in Freedom of Religions as Inspiration for the World" organized by PB JAI and Fakultas Sosial & Humaniora UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 29 October 2016.
• Participating & giving talk in the International Peace Symposium on "Implementation of Tolerance for Humanity and Harmony" organized by PB JAI and Fakultas Ushuluddin & Filsafat UIN Jakarta in the Auditorium Harun Nasution, UIN Jakarta, 30 September 2015.
• Attending & giving talk in the Pengajian Keluarga Ahmadiyah (JAI), Bumi Sangkuring, Bandung, 22 August 2015.
• Attending & giving talk in the haul keluarga Djojosoegito, the founder of GAI (Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia) Perguruan PIRI, Baciro, Yogyaarta, 25 April 2015. Paper: "Minhadjurrahman Djojosoegito and the Revival of Islam in the 20th Century Indonesia".
• Attending & giving talk in the discussion on "Khilafah in Islam", Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta, 21 March 2015.
• Attending & giving talk in the Jalsah Salanah Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), Gondrong, Cipondoh, Tangerang, Banten, 20 March 2015.
• Attending & giving talk in the monthly meeting, Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) Depok, 15 March 2015.
• Participating & giving talk in the Jalsah Salanah Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), Hotel Wira Carita, Banten, 19-21 Februari 2015.
• Participating & giving talk in the Jalsah Salanah/ Silaturahmi Keluarga Besar Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), Perguruan PIRI, Yogyakarta, 24 Desember 2013.
• Participating in the Peace Symposium & Mulaqat with the caliph of Ahmadiyah, Mirza Masroor Ahmad, in Singapore, 26-28 September 2013. 

-oo0oo-

Indonesia’s Religious Violence: The Reluctance of Reporters to Tell the Story

 ‘In an average Indonesian newsroom, most media workers identify closely with an Islamic and nationalist identity.’

By Andreas Harsono

On Sunday morning, February 6, 2011, about 1,500 men approached a house in Cikeusik village in West Java, about a seven-hour drive from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. The villagers were led by Idris bin Mahdani of the Islamist militant Cikeusik Muslim Movement. Twenty members of the Ahmadiyah religious community were inside the house and guarded by police.

"Infidels! Infidels! Police go away!" bin Mahdani shouted at the 30 or so police officers who surrounded the house.

The Cikeusik police chief, Muh Syukur, tried to persuade bin Mahdani not to attack. Bin Mahdani waved him away. As soon as the chief left, bin Mahdani led the mob inside the compound, shouting, "Banish the Ahmadiyah! Banish the Ahmadiyah!"


About 1,500 Islamist villagers attacked the Ahmadiyahs’ house in Cikeusik, West Java, on February 6, 2011.

The Ahmadiyah are a minority sect who identify themselves as Muslims but differ with other Muslims as to whether Muhammad was the "final" monotheist prophet. Many mainstream Muslims perceive the Ahmadiyah as heretics, and their faith is banned in several countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

An amateur video shows what happened when the mob entered the Ahmadiyah compound. Deden Sujana, the Ahmadiyah's security adviser, confronted bin Mahdani and hit him in the face. This prompted the villagers to start throwing stones. Stepping back, bin Mahdani took out his machete. The Ahmadiyah men used bamboo sticks and stones, but were in no position to stop the large mob. In less than five minutes, the villagers overpowered the sect's men; they caught several of them, ordered them to strip naked, and several villagers beat them brutally with sticks. These beatings can be seen on the video. A teenager took a large stone and smashed the head of an Ahmadiyah man lying on the ground. They also burned the house, two cars, and a motorcycle. Three Ahmadiyah men—Tubagus Chandra, Roni Pasaroni and Warsono—died and five others were seriously injured.

Wielding a machete, Idris bin Mahdani, in dark pants, led the attack against 20 Ahmadiyah in Cikeusik, West Java. Three Ahmadiyah men were killed and five seriously wounded.


Reporting the Attack

By Monday morning word of the attack had reached Java's main cities, and news media published and broadcast stories about it. Jawa Pos, Kompas, Pikiran Rakyat, Republika, and Suara Merdeka, five of the largest newspapers in Java, as well as TV One and MetroTV, Indonesia's most important news channels, used the word bentrokan or "clashing" in describing what happened, leaving the impression that it was a fair fight. The channels broadcast the first part of the amateur video—showing villagers throwing stones—but they did not show the killing.

Meanwhile, Al Jazeera, ABC Australia, Associated Press Television Network, BBC and CNN used the verb "attack" in their reporting, and this word helped them place the news story in the context of the rise of Islamist violence in Indonesia. They blurred the brutal video scenes, but they broadcast them. Al Jazeera even broadcast a report on Islamist attacks against Christian churches and Ahmadiyah properties in Indonesia.

Welcome to post-Suharto Indonesia where impunity for violence against religious minorities has fostered larger and more brutal attacks by Islamist militants. According to the Communion of Churches in Indonesia, there have been attacks on more than 430 churches since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took office in 2004. According to Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, the national Ahmadiyah association, mobs have attacked Ahmadiyah properties more than 180 times since President Yudhoyono issued a decree in June 2008 restricting the Ahmadiyah's religious activities. More than 80 percent of these attacks took place on Java, the main island of Indonesia. Human Rights Watch has repeatedly urged Yudhoyono to act against these militants, to rein in religious violence, and revoke the 2008 decree.

On the day the reports about the Cikeusik attack were first broadcast, an Ahmadiyah activist who was meeting with me complained about Metro TV. He had given the Cikeusik footage to Metro TV earlier that day. In their broadcast, this Jakarta channel toned down the atrocities. This activist let me know that his friend, the Ahmadiyah cameraman who had shot the video, had risked his life to record the violence. He felt that the Indonesian public should bear witness to such atrocities, especially since hundreds of Ahmadiyah properties had been damaged.

This video—and the news coverage that resulted—reminded me of another amateur video that showed Indonesian soldiers torturing two West Papuan farmers. It was released in October 2010 and broadcast on international media, but no Indonesian station showed it. The incident had taken place on May 30 when Battalion 753 soldiers arrested Tunaliwor Kiwo and Telangga Gire in West Papua's Puncak Jaya regency. In the 10-minute video, the soldiers are seen kicking Kiwo's face and chest, burning his face with a cigarette, applying burning wood to his penis, and holding a knife to Gire's neck. In testimony videotaped later, Kiwo describes the torture he suffered for two more days before he escaped from the soldiers on June 2. Soldiers also tortured Gire, who was released after his wife and mother intervened.

If Jakarta's mainstream news media think they still play the role of gatekeeper in this Internet age, they should realize how rapidly that role is diminishing. Raw video files of the Cikeusik violence were uploaded quickly onto YouTube. One video went viral; 40,000 viewers watched it in just 24 hours. Some users copied the video from YouTube and uploaded it on their accounts. This digital dimension broadened the reach of news about the Cikeusik attack and prompted the Indonesian police to remove some high-ranking police officers in charge of Pandeglang regency and Banten province, where the violence occurred.

That same week Islamist militants attacked three churches in Temanggung, central Java, injuring nine people, including a Catholic priest. In Bangil, a small town in eastern Java, Sunni militants attacked a Shia school, the largest Shia facility on Java.

Given the frequency of such attacks, the international news media took up the story of Muslim violence in Indonesia. Their coverage shook the image of Indonesia as a "moderate Muslim" country. Scot Marciel, the United States ambassador to Indonesia, issued a statement deploring religious violence and encouraging President Yudhoyono to uphold the rule of law in Indonesia. The message he delivered was in stark contrast to the one that President Barack Obama had given in his Jakarta speech three months earlier when he highly praised Indonesia's "religious tolerance."

Probing Self-Censorship

The question confronting journalists in Indonesia is how to explain what can only be seen as their selective self-censorship on stories involving religious freedom. Recently, Lawrence Pintak, a professor at Washington State University, and Budi Setiyono, with the Pantau Foundation in Indonesia, wrote about the findings from a nationwide survey in which 600 Indonesian journalists were asked about their perceptions of Islam in the context of their work and personal lives. (The paper, "The Mission of Indonesian Journalism: Balancing Democracy, Development, and Islamic Values" appeared in the April 2011 issue of the International Journal of Press/Politics.) No survey of this scale on the topic had been done before.

What this survey revealed offers insights that help get at the question of self-censorship, including these findings:

• In an average Indonesian newsroom, most media workers identify closely with an Islamic and nationalist identity. Asked to complete the sentence, "Above all, I am a(n) …" the primary identity cited by about 40 percent of respondents was "Indonesian" (40.3 percent) and "Muslim" (39.7 percent). Only 12 percent said they were a "journalist" first.
  
• When asked if they supported banning the Ahmadiyah sect, 64 percent of the surveyed journalists said yes.
  

When I saw that figure of 64 percent, it reminded me of a conversation I'd had with a newspaper editor in Jakarta who was a Christian. She told me that she was shocked when her chief editor, a Muslim, told an editorial meeting, "Our policy is to eliminate the Ahmadiyah. We have to get rid of the Ahmadiyah."

Learning this explained why the West Papua and Cikeusik videos were not shown on Indonesian channels. Some of the broadcasters have explained that they didn't want to broadcast the West Papua torture video since it might create a negative impression of Indonesian rule over West Papua. Some contended that they didn't show the Cikeusik video because doing so might have incited violence.

Media Freedom

The Sukarno (1949-1965) and Suharto (1965-1998) dictatorships controlled Indonesia's media through publishing licenses. A newspaper that violated the restrictions would lose its license. According to Pintak and Setiyono, in 1997, near the end of the Suharto rule, about 7,000 journalists worked for fewer than 300 print outlets, the state radio broadcaster, and 11 TV networks owned by Suharto's children or cronies. After Suharto stepped down from power in May 1998, his successor as president, B.J. Habibie, opened up the news media as he lifted restrictions. Today, there are some 30,000 journalists, more than 1,000 print publications, 150 TV stations, and 2,000 radio stations. The report's authors portray it as "a media free-for-all."

Islamist organizations, which were repressed since the early 1960's, also used this media freedom—expanding their own media—to spread their Salafian messages. Their propaganda quickly gained influence in spreading intolerance in Indonesia. The Islamists are also aided by some in the mainstream media. Militant groups such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam, Hizbut Tahrir, and Jemaah Islamiyah were established, frequently attacking Christian churches, Ahmadiyah mosques, Buddhist temples, and other minorities.

Local news media near the Cikeusik attack played a role in determining how other reporters would tell this story. They circulated news reports that the Cikeusik violence was fabricated to discredit Indonesian Muslims. At the trial of 12 defendants accused of participating in the Cikeusik attack, Ade Armando, a communication lecturer at the University of Indonesia, testified that journalists from Republika, Voice of Islam, and Anteve twisted a statement by Deden Sujana to make him sound like the provocateur of the attack. He described how news coverage of the event had cast the Ahmadiyah men as aggressors, not victims.

On July 28, the Serang district court found the 12 village men guilty on various charges, including public incitement, illegal possession of sharp weapons, destruction of property, maltreatment of others, individual assault, participating in an assault, and involvement in an attack. None of the defendants were charged with murder or manslaughter. The court sentenced those who were found guilty to between three and six months. Two of the 12, including the teenager who smashed the large stone against a man's head, walked free that day. The reason: time they had already served. The court also found Sujana guilty of inciting the attack and sentenced him to six months in jail.

Bad habits die hard. Lifting controls doesn't always change the way journalists handle themselves. In Java, their bosses encourage self-censorship in an attempt to stay in the good graces of those in power, including the Muslim clerics. Why should they change the way their newsrooms work when they have produced so much money during the Suharto era? Even though it is a free-for-all with government restrictions lifted, journalists continue to use their religious and nationalist reflexes in their newsrooms.

Andreas Harsono, a 2000 Nieman Fellow, is a consultant in Jakarta for the New York-based Human Rights Watch and chairs the board of the Pantau Foundation, which conducted the nationwide survey of Indonesian journalists for Pintak and Setiyono. He was managing editor of the Jakarta-based Pantau magazine, a monthly newspaper about media and journalism.

Retrieved from: http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102685/Indonesias-Religious-Violence-The-Reluctance-of-Reporters-to-Tell-the-Story.aspx

Ahmadiyah community faces ongoing discrimination

On October 18, 2011, by Amtul Q Farhat

An interview with Zaenuda Ikhwanul Aziz from the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Community (JAI) published by the Asian Human Rights Commission regarding the situation faced by Ahmadis in Indonesia..

Zaenuda Ikhwanul Aziz, is the secretary of the legal committee of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah congregation (Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia - JAI). He is actively involved in the struggle of the Ahmadiyah in the country.

How do you feel about what is happening to the Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia?

We feel that we are being discriminated against, especially the Ahmadiyah communities at the localities outside the capital of Jakarta. For example, the government does not give identification cards and marriage certificates to Ahmadiyahs.

At the economic sector many Ahmadiyahs have had to change the location of their businesses. Even in some provinces, the people from the community are intimidated not to buy products from Ahmadiyah shops and businesses and this has resulted in a serious reduction of our income.

In the social sector we also are excluded and intimidated. We are not allowed to be involved in social gatherings.

At the religious sector the Minister of Religion prohibits us from conducting the Hajj, (the pilgrimage to Mekka) and even when we pray, members of the local communities attack our mosques. Sometimes, our villages are also attacked.

Also, in the health sector, many people reject Ahmadiyahs as patients. We therefore feel discriminated against in most, if not all, sectors.

When did you start to feel the discrimination?

The discrimination started when the Indonesian Ulama Assembly (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI) declared Ahmadiyah as an errant sect in 1980. This fatwa brought to light the differences between Ahmadiyahs and the community. The people followed the fatwa believing that Ahmadiyah is errant without seeking any further explanation or consideration.

The main actors involved are the Indonesian government, central and local law enforcement authorities and several Ulama members who influence the people to attack Ahmadiyah communities. This is especially so with those persons who live within Ahmadiyah communities.

In your opinion, what is the reason for the increase of the aggression against Ahmadiyahs in the last few years?

There are several reasons, not the least of which is that the government is indecisive about law enforcement. If the joint ministerial decree against JAI still prevailed then the government could not allow the local regulations in the provinces to declare Ahmadiyah as an errant sect. Unfortunately, the government did nothing to prevent this from happening.

The aggressors see Ahmadiyah as a threat because the numbers of Ahmadiyah communities is increasing and they are scared that they will lose their followers.

Also, the content of the joint ministerial decree has been misinterpreted. There are local regulations which use the joint resolution decree to declare Ahmadiyah as errant whereas there is no such statement in the decree itself. The JAI think this happened because the government is trying to distance itself from the joint of resolution decree.

Is the state doing anything to protect the Ahmadiyahs?

We feel the state protection is still minimal. There is still turmoil because there is no law enforcement. It is seldom that perpetrators of violence against Ahmadiyahs are arrested and they are never prosecuted in the courts.

What do you feel about the work of the police?

In general, the work of the police is still far from professional. However, we must acknowledge that in some areas, there are some good police officers working in relation to Ahmadiyahs.


What about the work of the courts?

Judges are deficient at searching for the truth. Their efforts are deficient when examining at a trial, investigating the witness and proof, such as happened at Cisalada trial. Even the verdict against the Ahmadiyah victim was heavier than that of the perpetrators.

What is the Ahmadiyah community doing in their own defence?

Our representatives visit government officials, legal enforcement authorities, and the community in general. Relating to the legal dealings, we entrust this to our legal counsel.

The result of our visits are promising in that there are several communities and authorities who opened up and accepted us such as in Bandung, Central Java, and Wonosobo. But there have also been rejections such as in Cianjur, Bogor.

What is your ultimate goal in this struggle?

All we ask for is the right to live like other citizens and that these rights are fulfilled by the government

----------

The views shared in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the AHRC, and the AHRC takes no responsibility for them.

Retrieved from: http://www.themuslimtimes.org/2011/10/religion/an-intreview-ongoing-ahmadiyyah-discrimination-in-indonesia